The U.S invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to decimate Al Qaeda and its allies, the Taliban. The NATO led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in Germany in December 2001 to promote political reconciliation in Afghanistan between different factions and embark upon democratic reconstruction. Seven years after Pentagon's Afghan venture named "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF), the Taliban and Al Qaeda, we are told, instead of being destroyed, have moved eastward across a fluid border into Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), from where they can cross in to Afghanistan and move back again with relative ease. Instead of rooting out terrorism from Afghanistan, a regionally expanded and more lethal version of it has been produced. Suicide bombings, hitherto rare in Afghanistan, are now widespread in the country. Worse still, these have spread to neighboring Pakistan and to the northern tier of Afghanistan, home to the Northern Alliance. The sorry state of political reconciliation in Afghanistan is evident from NATO's outright rejection of Karzai's offer on April 3, 2008, to manage Kabul so as to free NATO for spreading out to the provinces. [1] NATO would not concede Kabul to Karzai and the Afghan National Army (ANA) because without its assistance, even Kabul would fall to the insurgents. On the socio-economic front, matters seem to have deteriorated instead of moving towards development. Afghanistan's indigenous economic base consists of drug production that has sky rocketed since the invasion. Its youth is still driven to fighting an insurgency unto death instead of attending schools and colleges.
Unlike Iraq, the U.S has carefully maintained a multilateral emphasis in Afghanistan so as not to look like an occupying force. Yet the efforts of 26 powerful NATO states and the additional 14 non NATO partners at reconstructing an impoverished, battle weary Afghanistan for almost seven long years have so far yielded a negative result? What are the reasons for this failure?
The roots of failure lay in the very architecture of the 2001 U.S military operation against Afghanistan. The purpose of this operation was not to promote humanitarian reconstruction, (that followed later), but to decimate Al Qaeda. Furthermore, The Taliban was taken as synonymous with Al Qaeda in the U.S war discourse. Hence the U.S mission was not simply to topple it but to destroy the Taliban. Pakistan's coordination with the U.S was crucial in this regard. The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S military intelligence had a clear idea of the entrenched infrastructure along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that could facilitate a potential future insurgency against Kabul. During more than a decade long Soviet Afghan war, this material and political support structure was installed with the help of U.S intelligence agencies who wanted the Soviets to bleed in Afghanistan. The infrastructure was never destroyed after the Soviet withdrawal. However, The U.S did not get Pakistan to physically seal its border with Afghanistan prior to the commencement of the OEF. Neither did it persuade Islamabad to bring its lawless tribal belt "FATA" under full state suzerainty and install a preemptive security network there.
The U.S let the Taliban and Al Qaeda escape in to Pakistan under the assumption that the Pakistan military could be activated as a regional extension of the U.S military effort against both. This assumption seems to have ignored two important factors. A) Given the mutually supportive relationship between the Taliban and the FATA Pushtuns, (some families in FATA have their members within the Taliban) the Pakistan army's operation against the Taliban would have zero local support. " B) The Pakistan military was the very force that propelled the Taliban in Kabul. Expecting this force to turn around and start battling the latter overnight was unrealistic. Even if the military high command agreed to fight, it would have a hard time mobilizing its soldiers. Under the circumstances, the best thing to do was to devise a border control strategy that would preempt the creation of a sanctuary for Afghan insurgency. General Tommy Frank failed to do so.
Furthermore, in order to engage Pakistan in an effective battle against the Taliban, it was important to placate the former's foremost strategic anxiety regarding India on its eastern front. Washington made no effort, what so ever, to mediate a resolution of the Kashmir dispute in 2001/2002. Subsequently, this fear became the raison d'être of Pakistan military's reluctance to fully commit itself to battle on the western front. It feared an over engagement on the western front would render its eastern front with India vulnerable. Mounting tensions over the complexities of the issue led a serving minister of Pakistan's military government to state in March 2008 that the U.S and India were deemed to be behind terrorism in Pakistan. [2]
Secondly, NATO has failed to provide Afghanistan with an indigenous political leadership that the Afghans "as a nation" can relate to. In fact, NATO has frustrated the hope of the ordinary Afghans for post war restoration of their political identity. There is a symbiotic relationship between security and legitimacy. While state building rests on security, stable security rests on legitimacy. This relationship is absent in Afghanistan. Whereas the Taliban were considered Pakistan's puppets, Hamid Karzai is seen as Washington's puppet. Ever since 1989, the Afghan masses have resented Washington for abandoning them to corrupt war lords after the Cold War ended. Once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Afghan Jihad deteriorated into personal vendettas and corruption. The ordinary Afghans considered themselves hostage to the overly armed war lords. They held Washington responsible for arming them and for looking the other way as the war lords ravaged post Soviet Afghanistan. As such Hamid Karzai, with his obvious Washington affiliation, is not a legitimate person to posit as an Afghan leader. NATO's failure to give Afghanistan a leadership capable of inspiring confidence in the Afghan nation as a whole and amongst the Pushtuns as the majority segment within that nation is the single most important cause of Pushtun insurgency. The insurgency in the South and East of Afghanistan is not carried out by the Taliban only. Afghan government officials acknowledge that it is decentralized and carried out by Pushtuns of different political persuasions.[3]
Thirdly, NATO has failed to develop an ideological alternative to the Taliban. The forces that are co-opted in to the Afghan government are comprised of warlords that the Afghans were already weary of. They are viewed as corrupt, selfish, and driven by petty provincial interests as opposed to Afghan national interest. Hence, the Afghan intelligentsia and masses alike are repelled by the ruling coalition. Instead of putting their faith in the government and helping it reconstruct Afghanistan, they are either apathetic fence sitters or swayed towards helping the elements who are attempting to get rid of this government. NATO's cooption of the war lords is a pre emptive strategy on its part. However, in putting together an Afghan government, NATO has given preference to its own geopolitical convenience rather than the Afghan meritocracy. Civic initiative is the best instrument for change in a society. This initiative has been sidelined at best and stymied at worst by NATO's co-option of corrupt war lords as the political leadership of Afghanistan. Their rampant corruption has created a deficit of trust between the Afghan masses and Kabul. This deficit is easily exploited by the insurgents. Afghan reconstruction should have been channeled through the indigenous and recalled Afghan meritocracy. Instead, it is mainly channeled through either the corrupt war lords or through foreign troops and consultants. The latter are siphoning off 40% of the reconstruction funds in salaries and personal perks and remain largely alienated from indigenous societal structures.
Fourthly, NATO's force protection considerations are thwarting reconstruction in Afghanistan. Maintaining a multilateral force balance in Afghanistan is the linchpin of Washington's strategy. Continued multilateral commitment depends upon the public support within NATO member states for the Afghan mission. A high rate of troop casualties would end the support and turn it in to bitter opposition. Force protection is a predominant consideration in any military operation. However, within the Afghan context it has become a domineering consideration. It has led to the troops shooting at weddings, killing unarmed civilians and producing a high rate of civilian casualties. The racial composition of NATO and partners, (largely Euro-American) gives its presence a colonial hue while its troops' fear governed trigger happy behavior makes them appear to the Afghans as belted brutes instead of friendly forces.

Fifthly, the policy of rotation of personnel may work well from the point of a military operation's health; but it is counterproductive within the context of civil reconstruction efforts. ISAF's rotational practice has led to the change of personnel eleven times since 2001. Each new personnel start all over again with lesson one in what is supposed to be done and are often poorly briefed regarding their predecessor's efforts. The imperatives of constructive engagement in a complex environment dictate enduring presence in that environment. This factor is missing from ISAF's efforts.
Lastly, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, (PRT), have the military missions co-located with them. The task of both is at odds. The former are in the business of providing security and building long term relationships, the latter in the business of gaining short term tactical advantages and invasive interrogation. Furthermore, Searching of houses by coalition soldiers over and over again with each new rotation alienates the locals and destroys their faith in the system. Such searches are a fundamental assault on the local cultural norms. Traditional local leaders are the ones whose support can tip the balance in support of the state or vice versa in an insurgency.
During the recent NATO summit in Bucharest from April 2-4, 2008, Afghanistan's problem was analyzed within cognitive, financial and military frameworks. However, tangible results were obtained only on the military front in the form of commitment to troop escalation. Troop reinforcements in Afghanistan will continue to yield negative results if the above referenced reasons for failure are not mitigated one by one. The insurgents' goal is to sap NATO's will to stay in Afghanistan, not to capture Kabul. This goal renders their job easier than that of NATO. If insurgency is to be contained, NATO must solve the legitimacy problem of the Afghan government at the upcoming election in 2009. According to opinion polls, Karzai will not win a free and fair election. Secondly, the reconstruction of Afghanistan should be put in the hands of the Afghans by commencing a search for Afghan meritocracy within Afghanistan and abroad.
In order to counter the force protection factor amongst NATO troops and the interruptions caused by rotational requirements, troops and consultants from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) should be invited in to Afghanistan as NATO's partners. Reconstruction teams from OIC member countries only will have the staying power in Afghanistan. They will also enjoy greater acceptability by the locals then the Trans Atlantic troops currently do. Afghan reconstruction should be carried out by the troops and consultants from OIC member countries only. Security should be shared between NATO and OIC partners.
A robust coordination between NATO, the ANA and the Pakistan Army is required to halt fluidity on the Pak-Afghan border.. The border should be sealed. A no man's zone should be created, preferably on both sides, which should be monitored with the help of drones. Pakistan's war against the Islamic militants on its land should be carried out by the Pakistan army within a Pakistani framework. Nothing would be more counterproductive then dragging Pakistan in to a U.S led fight against Islamic militants. It will lead to the region wide swelling of the latter.
Lastly, NATO's ability to repatriate the returning refugees from neighboring countries is a key element of stability in Afghanistan. Like security, this task too should not be left to the Karzai regime alone. It is crucial to enduring security and should be tended to with utmost urgency and a generous influx of NATO's resources.

Endnotes
1) Wild, Deborah B. NATO: In Afghanistan for the Long Haul.
2) Staff Report. "U.S Concerned Over Hamid's Remarks." Daily Times, March 3, 2008
3) Najib Manalai, Advisor to Afghanistan Minister for Culture and Youth, interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's correspondent Muhammad Tahir, June 6, 2007.

The writer is an independent consultant and analyst of energy geopolitics based in Washington DC.
zeenia.satti@yahoo.com