Anatolia , the land which is considered by the East as the "far western" and for the West, the "near eastern" point of Asia, also named Asia Minor, has acted as a bridge for trade, culture, the sharing of knowledge and communication between these two regions for centuries.

Nowadays, this strategic geography should be considered a major "energy meeting point," taking into consideration the vast energy resources on its eastern side and the increasing energy demand on its west. The Republic of Turkey, located on the land called "Anatolia" lies between Europe and two regions are rich in natural energy resources.

Figure 1: Anatolia and Surrounding Geography

Energy Issues around Anatolia

The energy resources around the Anatolia region are as follows:
1. Caucasus and Caspian Region
• Crude Oil; 17,5 billion tons, 11% of world reserves
• Natural Gas; 57,0 trillion cubic meters, 30% of world reserves
2. Middle East
• Crude Oil; 102,0 billion tones, 60% of world reserves
• Natural Gas; 76,0 trillion cu mt, 41% of world reserves

Consumption figures in the West as of 2008 are as follows:

1 Europe energy consumption 1876 mtoe
2 EU energy consumption 1728 mtoe
3 Europe crude oil consumption 797,0 million tones (mmt)
4 EU crude oil consumption 703,0 mmt
5 Europe crude oil imports 681,0 mmt
6 Europe crude oil production 230,0 mmt
7 EU crude oil production 116,0 mmt
8 Europe natural gas consumption 530,0 billion cu.mt (bcm)
9 EU natural gas consumption 501,0 bcm
10 Europe natural gas imports 237,0 bcm (including LNG)
11 Europe natural gas production 293,0 bcm
12 EU natural gas production 187,0 bcm

As the above figures reveal, Europe is the largest energy consumer and importer of either crude oil or natural gas in the region. As for crude oil, supply and transport is more flexible compared to natural gas. In the past ten years, due to depletion of reserves, Norway's natural gas production decreased by 24%, and the EU's dropped by 37%. European countries, including Norway, still provide about 70% of the gas used in Europe, but indigenous supplies are expected to decline further and by 2020 will be around 40%. Natural gas is the second-largest type of energy consumed in Europe. The supply sources come mostly from the North Sea fields (British, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian), Italian, Romanian, German fields, with ad¬ditional gas imported from Russia, North and West Africa and Latin America. In 2030, consumption levels are expected to be around 816,0 bcm, the gap between the EU production and demand is expected to rise to 600,0 bcm, whereas the depleting indigenous production is expected to be 163 bcm.

Currently, Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya supply gas via pipeline to Europe. The existing capacity is 311,0 bcm as of 2007. By 2030, if planned and currently under construction pipeline projects materialize; total capacity is expected to reach nearly 450,0 bcm.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is another source of gas supply. But the process of liquefying natural gas is still expensive and most of the natural gas exporters and importers have to develop the infrastructure in order to make LNG shipments cost-effective. Therefore, in the short and middle term, Europe's consumption of piped natural gas is likely to rise. Around Europe, in the Middle East, Gulf and Caspian regions, supply sources are available to meet this expected increase in European future natural gas demand. The main challenge, however, is to transport this gas to consumers and at present there are not enough means for transporting these gas volumes to European natural gas markets either by pipelines or as LNG. The regions with rich gas reserves and yet not connected with European markets via pipeline are the Caspian Region, Middle East and Egypt. The possible supply sources are given in Figure 2 as trillion cubic meters (tcm).

 
Figure 2: Europe's Natural Gas Supply Sources

Connecting Supplier and Consumer Regions

Over the past five to six years, considerable international attention has been given to the issue of transporting oil and natural gas from the Caspian Basin to either East or Western markets with a discussion of potential routes through Russia, Georgia, Turkey, China, Afghanistan and Iran. The relative merits of the proposed options rest on both economic and political factors. Many arguments have been advanced for favoring one route over the others. These include concerns about the security of the routes, as well as the monopolizing of power. Some routes have been built and a number of others have been proposed.

In terms of crude oil supply, besides the relatively limited capacities of the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk pipelines, after 14 years of struggle, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) with a 1 million barrels/day (bpd) capacity was inaugurated in 2005 and runs with Azerbaijan-sourced crude oil. Capacity is planned to expand to 1,2 million bpd in the first phase and later to 1,6 million bpd. The transportation of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation crudes were also under consideration for this pipeline. For example, Kazakhstan crudes can be transported to Baku with a new pipeline running under the Caspian Sea and then can be transported with the BTC. Russian crudes can be transported to Tbilisi with the utilization of existing 28" pipeline from Tikhoresk-Grozny, then with a new 280 km pipeline to Tbilisi, and connection to the BTC. The Caspian crude oil exporting countries and Russia are aware of Turkey's concerns about congestion in the Turkish Straits, especially the Bosporus, and are searching for new export routes.

The BTC can also be referred to as a "bypass route" for the Turkish straits. Besides the BTC, several shorter bypasses of the Turkish Straits have been considered. The pipeline proposals for possible bypass routes are one alternative solution to address the congestion and environmental externalities created by the transit of oil tankers through the straits. A bypass pipeline through Turkey with a capacity of 70,0 million tons/y could be a relatively inexpensive substitute to transit through the Turkish Straits and should be considered as a means of transporting projected increases in oil exports from the Caspian region that will be loaded at Black Sea ports.

Caspian oil presents an opportunity, especially for Western consumers, to diversify their oil supplies and to decrease their dependence on Persian Gulf and Russian crude oil. Indigenous natural gas production all over Europe is decreasing and new infrastructure sources have to be established to meet the expected future natural gas demand. The projected pipelines to supply natural gas to Europe are as follows:

1. Algeria-Spain, "Medgaz", 8-10 bcm, in operation;
2. Algeria-Italy, "GALSI", 8-10 bcm, in operation end 2011;
3. Caspian via Turkey-Greece-Italy, "ITGI", 8-10 bcm, in operation end 2011 (Greece phase inaugurated);
4. Russia-Germany, "Nord Stream", 2x27.5 bcm, in operation 2010-2013;
5. Caspian via Turkey, "Nabucco", first phase 8 bcm, in operation 2014, by 2019, 31 bcm;
6. Russia-Bulgaria, "South Stream", 63 bcm, in operation 2015;
7. Caspian via Georgia "White Stream", first phase 2 bcm, in operation 2015, by 2030, 32 bcm;
8. Russia-Turkey-Europe "Blue Stream II", 16 bcm, in operation 2013.

Pipelines Connecting the Caucasus via Anatolia to Global Markets

The Caspian Region, the Middle East, and especially Egypt, with their vast gas reserves will play a crucial role in the diversification of natural gas supplies and the future energy security of Europe. The opening up of a "fourth main supply corridor" will provide the means of transfer of the above mentioned sources of supply and will serve as the main solution to meet the future gas demands of Europe (Figure 3). Consequently, this route offers a wide range of supply sources for a main natural gas pipeline, receiving gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Iraq and Iran.

Figure 3: Fourth Main Supply Corridor

The Nabucco Pipeline Project, the main transport pipeline of the fourth main supply corridor connects via Turkey the energy sources passing through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to reach Austria (Baumgarten) and is viewed to be the answer to the supply challenges cited earlier. As shown in Figure 3, the project provides the technical options to transport gas from various sources of the Caspian Region and the Middle East.

The Nabucco pipeline (Figure 4), is 3300 kilometers long and at the plateau capacity, will carry 31,0 bcm of natural gas. Nabucco is geopolitically important because it will bypass Russia and Ukraine and will play a crucial role in the diversification and security of supply. The first phase of the project, scheduled to be in operation by 2014, will have a start up capacity of 8 or 12 bcm.

Figure 4: Nabucco Pipeline Project

Before evaluating the "fate" of the Nabucco Pipeline, it would be worthwhile to present a short history of the Nabucco Project and recent developments.

• In October 2002, a Cooperation Agreement was signed between BOTAŞ, Bulgargaz, MOL, Transgaz and OMV Gas in order to conduct a feasibility study for the construction of the new gas pipeline.
• In December 2003, a Grant Agreement was signed between OMV Gas, the other four partners as associated beneficiaries and the European Commission. With this agreement, the EC awarded a grant in the amount of 50% of the estimated total eligible costs of the study phase i.e. the feasibility study including market analysis, technical, economic and financial studies.
• Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (Nabucco) was established on June 24, 2004 and is seated in Vienna.

Nabucco is responsible for the construction and development of the pipeline. In keeping with European law, Nabucco will not buy or trade any gas. The customers will do so and they have to decide which sources they will approach. Nabucco's engineer was already engaged at the end of 2007 and detailed planning is on its way. It is foreseen that construction will start in 2011 and the first gas will flow in 2014. This project has encountered several problems as natural gas supply; about 1000 km of missing pipeline connection to the "Caspian gas fields" (see Figure 4); and financing of the investment (for 3300 km of pipeline, 7,9 billion Euros is needed). The main question for Nabucco is the origin or source of gas to be transported.

1. As far as the resources in the Caspian region, Turkmenistan gas is already committed to Russia with a contract until 2028. Also, with the pipeline to be inaugurated in late 2009 extending to China, 40 bcm is committed. Unless new field developments are executed, there is no excess gas available for Nabucco. On the other hand, Russia signed a major deal on December 20, 2007 with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build a new natural gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea, which will strengthen Russia's monopoly on energy exports from this region.
2. Since its inception, there has been doubt over availability of non-Russian gas to supply Nabucco, damaging investor confidence and stirring political manipulation. Russia and to a lesser extent China have exploited the climate of speculation to secure gas from Central Asia.
3. Azerbaijan and Egypt gas is not sufficient to meet the pipeline's capacity.
4. The huge resource in the Middle East, and Iran gas (Pars Fields) in particular, still needs to be developed to fill the pipeline. Nevertheless, because of the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States, the EU is in a position to turn a cold shoulder to Tehran.
5. Iraq remains a major question as far as its political stability, the status of the revenue sharing and the hydrocarbon law, the amount of reserves and the future of its energy sector.
6. Regarding the Gulf region, the geography that Qatar's natural gas pipeline has to traverse to reach Turkey and the Fourth Corridor is politically complicated and problematic.

Azerbaijan has pledged to provide unspecified volumes of natural gas but the major source for filling the pipeline is not available yet. The second-phase development of "Shah Deniz II", an energy giant, has been put back to 2016. This date is almost two years behind the latest delayed target for Nabucco's start up date of 2014. However, Gazprom is after Azerbaijan's new gas fields. The latest news from the region suggests that Gazprom proposed buying everything Azerbaijan produces. Even if European bidders were to prevail, Azeri supply by itself will not be sufficient to fill the pipeline. The pipeline starts from the eastern side of Turkey, either at the border with Georgia or Iran. Up to these points, new pipelines have to be constructed to the east and/or southeast in order to reach the supply sources.

For Turkmenistan gas, either the trans-Caspian or trans-Iranian pipeline should be constructed. Regarding the trans-Caspian, the sharing of the Caspian basin is still not concluded and at least a 1,000 km pipeline (280 km undersea) is needed to couple to the projected Nabucco pipeline at the Turkish border. In the case of the trans-Iran pipeline, about 2,000 km of new pipeline construction is required to reach the coupling point at the Turkish border. For the Iranian gas, to connect the South Pars Fields to the Turkish border, at least 1,800 km new pipeline is required.

Nowadays, a new concept, the "Southern Corridor," is being vocalized by the EU. This concept combines Nabucco, the "Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy" (ITGI), and the White Stream, which would link Romania and Ukraine to the Caspian via Georgia under the Black Sea. Together, all three could supply as much as 60 bcm a year, or a tenth of Europe's current consumption in 2020.

As stated by the company , the White Stream option with a start up capacity of 2 bcm is expected to gradually reach 32 bcm in the next 16 years. The pipeline starts from Supsa-Georgia and extends to Constanta-Romania. The length of the pipeline is supposed to be either 1,400 km; 200 km being on land at Crimea-Ukraine, with the rest under the Black Sea; or 1,200 km directly under Black Sea from Supsa to Constanta (Figure 6).

Besides the huge cost of construction and yet unresolved financing challenges this project faces similar obstacles to Nabucco on the supply side. The availability of natural gas to be transported, financing of a project which does not show an economically viable scenario and the "Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)" that the pipeline is supposed to traverse are serious matters that need to be solved. As such, the White Stream project is the least likely to evolve. 

Figure 5: White Stream Planned Routes and EEZ of Black Sea Countries

In response to the above "Western backed projects", the Russian Federation has declared that the South Stream gas pipeline will be in operation from 2015 on (Figure 6). The Russian side claims to be able to supply both the "South Stream" and the "Blue Stream II" pipeline projects at their declared capacities; South Stream at 63 bcm annually from 2015 onward (double the figure projected last year for 2013) and Blue Stream II at 16 bcm annually, presumably from 2013 onward. But Russia's stagnant gas production, lack of new investments on upstream operations, new market approaches with LNG (Sakhalin projects) and looming shortfalls invalidate such claims.

The South Stream pipeline with about 900 km passing across the Black Sea at a depth of 2,000 meters is technically possible. But taking into account the enormous cost of construction of an undersea pipeline spanning virtually the entire breadth of the Black Sea seems inefficient, besides the financing challenges. The main advantage of South Stream is the guaranteed gas capacity. The line starts from Beregovaya at the Black Sea coast to where existing Russian gas lines bring huge capacities. This station is also the start up point for the existing Blue Stream I and projected Blue Stream II. Ownership is also a strength of the South Stream project. The South Stream is backed by state-owned Gazprom, which willingly finances projects that may not make commercial sense but are aligned with Moscow's strategic goals. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of South Stream gas is that it will by definition be significantly more expensive than Nabucco. European customers have to subsidize the construction of this uneconomic pipeline through the price they will pay for gas.

The threat for the South Stream is that shipping gas via Nabucco could be 30-40% cheaper than shipping it via the South Stream. This would mean that Nabucco will have a downward influence on European gas prices relative to what it would be in case both Nabucco and South Stream gas would be available in Europe. Therefore, the existence of Nabucco will force Gazprom to sell its gas at Nabucco's price as the target market is the same. This would clearly be beneficial for European consumers. The cheaper transport to be provided by Nabucco would make it more lucrative for suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran or Iraq to contribute available volumes which is for the benefit of these countries. The South Stream's 900 kilometer seabed section is planned to traverse Ukraine's exclusive economic zone for most of its length, as well as a small part of Romania's exclusive economic zone. This situation can give both countries potentially decisive leverage over the project (Figure 5).

Figure 6: South Stream Route

Russia's other option is the "Blue Stream II" pipeline. Gazprom, which already pumps gas to Turkey through the Blue Stream pipeline across the Black Sea, is considering the construction of a South-European gas pipeline, or Blue Stream II natural gas pipeline, to link Turkey to the EU and underground gas storage in Hungary for exports to the EU. The Blue Stream II option runs parallel to the existing Blue Stream line in the Black Sea, and after reaching Turkey at Samsun, follows the routes parallel to the existing Turkey national trunk lines and reaches Bulgaria. It then follows the route through Romania and Hungary to Italy. The planned pipeline also has another option to extend it to Ceyhan and involves the installation of a LNG train to serve the Mediterranean market.

This option is more viable than the South Stream, taking into account the disadvantages and threats mentioned above. Also, as this line will be parallel to the existing pipelines, it offers advantages such as lower engineering costs, existing infrastructure, and thus shorter construction periods which will reduce the total investment costs.

Anatolia as an Energy Hub

Thanks to its geographic position and governance till 1923, Turkey, the state on the land of Anatolia, has become increasingly integrated with the West through membership in organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the G-20 major economies. Turkey began full membership negotiations with the European Union in 2005, having been an associate member of the EEC since 1963, and having reached the Customs Union agreement in 1995. Meanwhile, Turkey has continued to foster close cultural, political, economic and industrial relations with the Eastern world, particularly with the states of the Middle East and Central Asia, through membership in organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Turkey is classified as a developed country and as a regional power by political scientists and economists worldwide.

Due to the geostrategic location-for the most part considered to be an advantage--Turkey is regarded as being a "bridge between East and West". But Turkey does not seek to be a "transit country" only. The correct word for describing Turkey's position in the energy market should be "energy hub" (Figure 7). Turkey's geography makes any energy pipeline project more feasible as the country itself is a major consumer. Europe can cooperate with Turkey on overcoming dependence on outside sources of energy, thus optimizing its geostrategic position and maximizing its potential. Any new gas pipelines bypassing Russia from the Caspian region will have to go through Georgia, while Turkey is a main point of entry for gas from that region into the EU.

Certainly, Turkey is motivated by a set of aims and priorities to act as an energy corridor and/or hub. The first priority is to have the necessary natural gas with route and source diversification; the second is to have access to low-cost gas sources; and the third is reasonable revenues from transit and trade. Turkey becoming a future energy hub does not mean being solely a "trading hub" to which vocal opposition has risen from Nabucco partners. Turkey, or Anatolia, being at the meeting point of sought after regional resources, can be active as both a "trading hub" and "physical hub" and more broadly, as an "energy hub". Turkey is the best available corridor and/or energy hub for supplying critical natural gas sources to Europe.

The advantages of Turkey as an energy hub are the following;
• Available prerequisites for the realization of an energy hub;
• Broad number of regional supplier countries;
• A major energy consumer with a robust domestic market and close proximity to international consumers;
• The availability of supply flexibility even for gas storage and spot gas markets;
• LNG gasification capacity;
• Well experienced in pipeline construction and operation activities.

On the other hand, J. Van Aartsen's suggestion of giving Turkey a role as an "energy bridge", as prerequisites for taking part in the proposed "Caspian Development Corporation-CDC" and formation of "multiple energy hubs" as stated in his Activity Report are inadmissible either economically and/or technically. He proposes multiple routes, long and costly subsea pipelines to transport gas sources just to take Turkey's image out of the frame. Baku, Romania, Greece and Austria are proposed as "energy hubs" instead of a single hub, to carry on trading activities. Placement of one at the junction region and the other at the distribution region is understandable and economically appropriate. But "multi energy hubs" for the same sources does not make sense. Just one glance at the map at Figure 7 provides enough proof to what extent the proposal is unrealistic. 

Figure 7: Anatolia "The Meeting Point" of Energy Resources

The notion of Turkey becoming a trading hub for natural gas can only be realized in the longer term after the realization of a fourth main supply corridor with the connection of Iraq and Iranian natural gas, those to be supplied by different upstream operators and would not apply in the first stage of Nabucco. By increasing the gasification and storage capacities of existing LNG terminals, introduction of new capacity contracts for LNG supply with the existing and new suppliers, and upgrading the gas pipeline grid will allow Turkey to become a gas trading hub.

To summarize the potentials of Anatolia as a natural gas hub, the below available sources can be highlighted:

1. From the Caucasus
• Azerbaijan Shah Deniz II
• Turkmenistan South Yolotan-Osman uncommitted gas reserves
2. From the Middle East
• Iran; besides associated gas in the crude oil fields, South Pars Field gas reserves
• Iraq; In addition to associated gas reserves in crude oil fields, Al-Mansuriyah, Kahaskem-Al Ahmar, Akkas and Siba gas field reserves
• Egypt; the fields at the Nile Delta region and in the Western Desert
3. From the Russian Federation
• Blue stream II
4. From Turkey; by expansion of the existing two LNG gasification terminals and developing the north-west pipeline system, the Balkans can be supplied with gas.

Turkey was active as a spearhead in the BTC pipeline, the BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline), and the ITG (Interconnector Turkey Greece natural gas pipeline) which are active and serving for the benefit of supplier and consumer countries. Unfortunately, until end 2003- which is the date on which "Nabucco Project", the main line of the "fourth main supply corridor" gets a start up- no achievements were displayed up to now. A lack of gas supply, lack of necessary pipeline links from the possible supply sources , and lack of necessary financing prevails.

Turkey's chances of becoming a "gas hub country" will materialize if the fourth main supply corridor operates at full volume, including Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq natural gas, potentially totaling up to 100 bcm or more annually and flowing east-west via Anatolia. As stated before, without the Azerbaijan Shah Deniz II gas, the Nabucco investment cannot be started and without Turkmenistan, Iraq or Iran gas, Nabucco becomes a non-starter.

Nabucco is in fact a priority when it comes to the overarching goal of energy diversification both regarding route and source of supply. If energy diversification is truly Europe's goal, then the South Stream option makes little, if any, sense. It is a threat to both the EU as a whole and to the European countries involved in the project.

European countries who on the one hand complain bitterly of Russian gas dependence, either sign bilateral agreements to construct new pipelines to transport Russian gas to Europe or to increase their gas drawing capacity from Russia or try to act as an energy hub for Europe. The coordinator of the Nabucco Project, OMV-Austria, with this very same aim, makes agreements with Russia, which weakens the Nabucco Project. Germany is the main partner and supporter of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. ENI-Italy is the main partner and contractor of the South Stream gas pipeline.

Since Nabucco is privately financed it needs to harness investor confidence. Should any of the EU member countries offer backing to the South Stream, this will have negative implications for Nabucco as well as Caspian gas. Strong political will is necessary on the EU side to encourage the project, to overcome the delays and the poor coordination and conflicting interests among the six shareholders. To establish vigorous, strong and applicable contracts between the supplier and consuming countries is a must for the execution of the project. If the Iran gas supply cannot be achieved and Iraq gas supply problems cannot be settled, Nabucco will no longer be a valid option as a diversification process of supply route and reach out to additional natural gas sources.

The EU and US need to cooperate much more closely. For the US the key concern is that Europe should not fall under Russian influence, and that the transatlantic solidarity remains firm. This is the main reason for Washington's backing of non-Russian owned and non-Russian controlled new gas pipelines, especially out of the Caspian and Middle East. It is vital that the US offer support to the EU in their decisions to seek and implement innovative methods of reducing energy dependence on monopolistic Russia. At a minimum, they should work to encourage new sources and transit lines that bypass Russia. As such, it is important that the sanctions applied to Iran be reviewed.

Just like China and Chinese energy companies, the EU and/or Nabucco partners should be in cooperation and active with Turkmenistan by offering upstream operations and concrete volume commitments. The close contacts and cooperation of EU companies in this region will be good for Russia as well. As Russia's access to Central Asian gas is basically the source utilized for the transport to Europe of what is known as "Russian gas", Russia/Gazprom will eventually have to invest in increasing their domestic production and focus on enhanced energy efficiency. Such a case would bring in more EU investment and operators, thus opening up the system, and making more gas available for Europe.

On July 13, 2009 the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey signed the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) in a high-level ceremony hosted by Turkey. The ceremony was also attended by the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, the E.U. Commission's President Jose Manuel Barroso, E.U. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy Richard Morningstar.

Russia will most likely continue to seek progress on the South Stream, with additional agreements concluded at Sochi on 15 May 2009 between Gazprom and ENI, and with the companies of states in southeastern Europe interested in the project. But further progress will be dependent on finding the huge financing required and securing transit through the Ukrainian and/or Turkish EEZs in the Black Sea. Due to these obstacles, the "Blue Stream II" gas pipeline connecting Russia and Turkey seems the more likely applicable project for both parties. Russia will easily and in a little while enter the European market from a new route and the notion of Turkey becoming a trading hub for natural gas could be realized if re-export clauses would be included in an agreement. This could provide Turkey with new trading opportunities.

EU executives have attempted to develop a common energy policy in the past three years. The policy move gained political momentum after January 2006 when Russia first cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and sped up after January 2009 when the second gas cut off, which was more severe than the first, hit EU consumers. The "solidarity" shown by EU member states in 2009's disruption is worth praising and one can say that the "political ingredients" are now in place for the EU energy policy.

If the EU has any hopes of emerging as a global powerbroker, it needs to get its act together on a united energy security policy. The ultimate goal is to diversify supply sources and ensure energy security. And to do this, credible political support to the "Fourth Supply Corridor - Nabucco" is a must in order to enable and encourage exploration and development of upstream operations in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran.

Finally; if Europe is after a reliable, economic, technically applicable and viable route to tap into the vast resources of the Caspian Basin and Middle East, Turkey is the best available corridor and/or energy hub for supplying the necessary natural gas sources to Europe.

So, ultimately the question is, "Why not with Turkey?"

Paper presented at the Caucasian Energy Security and Turkey Conference: European Energy Policy Towards the Caspian Sea- with or without Turkey? 27 June 2009.

M. Mete Göknel is an energy analyst and former Chairman and CEO of BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation.