The EU's Central Asia Strategy has increasingly become a test case by which to measure the EU's ever-questionable capability of pursuing a soft power leadership. In discussing how effective the EU's efforts of norm promotion are, or could be, its relations with the five republics of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - is a highly determining factor.
In terms of further cooperation in energy supply and trade, as the meeting between the EU's troika and the foreign ministers of these five states in Ashgabat on 9-10 April 2008 showed, a rapprochement between the two geographies, connected through pipelines, has been happening for some time. In compliance with the EU's quest for new energy transport routes, energy-saving and energy-efficient projects as well as for renewable energy resources, Central Asia generously offers various prospects of partnerships and opportunities, including the Trans-Caspian corridor. Being fully aware of these prospects, the EU has allocated moderate but mounting financial assistance since the independence of these republics that has today reached the amount of €1.4 billion. Furthermore, as Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU's Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, frequently highlights, in the budget period 2007-2013, the EU has earmarked a total of €750 million to be used in Central Asia related matters. Within these enhancing liaisons, as the EU interminably seeks to secure its energy supply and reduce its very visible dependence on Russia, energy dialogue seems to be given the ultimate priority. Nevertheless, the soft power aspirations of the EU requires a more complex interaction between the two parties to facilitate progress in terms of the rule of law, democratisation, good governance and education. Despite its inherent commitment to these values, Brussels has appeared rather slow to reinforce an action plan to attend to these priorities. Having so far managed its Central Asia policy through a one-faceted approach of energy interests, the EU has deliberately and conveniently postponed its norm-promoting, reform-facilitating role. European public opinion, on the other hand, is very aware of this neglect and aims to influence the European Commission's dealings with Central Asia in favour of a norm-oriented attitude through NGOs.
The Central Asia Strategy, re-launched in Ashgabat last month, reveals one of many dilemmas embedded in the functioning of EU foreign policy. As Thomas Diez puts it, in the mission of creating and promoting norms to guide international affairs, a clash between norms and interests will be inevitable at some point. When the norm promoter in the international arena faces the dilemma of choosing between its economic, political or geostrategic interest and the norm to be promoted and when the norm in question jeopardises the interest in question, the norm promoter's capacity of surmounting such dilemma determines its capability as a soft power. In the cases of disentangled norms and interests, the EU has not always adopted an uncompromising stance constantly enhancing its civilian and normative power, fostering human rights, democracy and the rule of law. There have been times in which the EU's interests have overshadowed its norm-setting incentives depending on the partner country and policy area at hand. This shifting position of the EU causes the neighbour states, NGOs and scholars to question the EU's sincerity and capability as a soft power. Despite the EU officials' claim to be learning from its mistakes, rather than following an unfolding great strategy, in terms of skilfully conducting its foreign affairs, the EU has been facing what Christopher Hill had underlined fifteen years ago as the "capability expectation gap." When the policy area to attend to is that of energy-supply security and the counterparts are the once "newly independent" republics of Central Asia, the EU deliberately fails to highlight its civilian-power discourse and appears mostly as an energy partner acting solely in its own interests. In that sense, it appears almost trivial whether the EU has fulfilled the capability expectation of its own public or not. Such a pragmatic attitude, undoubtedly, exerts a damaging influence on its soft power aspirations.

As German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said last year, on the occasion of the introduction of the EU's new Central Asia Strategy, "countries such as Russia, China, Japan, Turkey and the US are very present there" and, inevitably, there is an urgent need for "some catching up to do in Europe" on the matter. Therefore, the EU encounters very serious competition in Central Asia, which attributes priority to its economic and security interests at the expense of promoting European values and principles of good governance. It is clear that the competitive environment dominated mainly by Russia, Turkey and the US prevents the EU from insisting on the socio-political transformation of the Central Asian republics as a prerequisite of further economic and security cooperation. A firm, uncompromising attitude similar to that adopted in the face of candidate and some neighbouring states is simply not affordable in such conditions. Furthermore, if the norm promotion was brought to the forefront as a prerequisite in the progress of relations with the Central Asian republics, an assertive tone constantly reminding of the lack of reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law would in effect strengthen in the region the hand of Russia and Turkey, who already enjoy significantly much closer interaction with the five republics due to their geographical, cultural and historical proximity. The EU expressly takes cautious steps so as not to lose ground to other states in the crowded rivalry over Central Asia.
The shifting position of the EU in playing the norm promoter has not gone unnoticed by the NGOs in Europe and a strong opposition appealing for an uncompromised commitment towards the enhancement of civil society equally in every candidate, associate or partner state has emerged. Among the most fervent participators of this opposition, the Human Rights Watch criticises the EU on the grounds that "a credibility gap exists between words and deeds." It is no longer possible to conceal the fact that the member states have "no room for manoeuvre because of their energy dependency" in their dealings with Russia and Central Asia and the soft power prestige of the EU erodes considerably because of this - far from minor - flaw. Of course, expecting a monolithic attitude towards all 130 states, which the EU has established relations with is not realistic. Nevertheless, consistency while conducting foreign affairs and claiming soft but still hegemonic power is essential and the EU receives much criticism on its inconsistency and insufficiency regarding its good governance-building incentive, especially from the civil organisations within.
The meeting between the EU-3, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, Slovenia (current EU presidency) and France (next term president), and five of the Central Asian republics on 9-10 April, in fact, aimed at a renovated, intensified dialogue to serve both the overhaul of the soft power credibility of the EU and the broadening of the cooperation areas designated between the two parties. The new dialogue suggests a much closer interaction in the spheres of politics, economics, environmental protection, education, poverty reduction and law as well as security and energy. It also envisages comprehensive plans for personnel training, human resources development and, of course, civil-society building. This meeting was the third time that the EU and these five Central Asian states came together at the level of foreign ministers and it was the first time that strong will was exhibited on both sides to take their cooperation and association to another level, beyond just mere projects. A tangible indicator of this new phase of comprehensive cooperation will be the "Europa House", which, as Ferrero-Waldner points out, will be built in Ashgabat as a contact point in Central Asia and in accordance with the intensification of the EU's existence in the region, full delegation offices will be opened in all Central Asian states.
Undoubtedly, all these attempts by the EU Council and Commission are designed to foster a new relationship with the Central Asian states essentially grounded in norm promotion and thus show a positive response to the criticisms of European civil society. Ferrero-Waldner's words spelled out after the 9-10 April meeting saying "human rights are, indeed, a very important part for us in our external relations, and therefore we really want to see an even better commitment" are significant in that sense. Re-emphasising its soft power mission, the EU seeks to join international competition over Central Asia as a hegemon promising stability, good governance and democratisation and asking for further integration of transport and energy networks and common actions, strengthening border management and drug trafficking control in return. Nevertheless, norm-promotion in foreign realms does not always bear the desired outcomes. Whereas other actors compete for dominance in the region without setting prerequisites such as painful and comprehensive political transformation in their offers of security and trade, the EU carries around its neck a very heavy burden of norms, which makes the European promise at times very repulsive and offensive to the partner or associate states. In order to prevent the departure of these states from its sphere, the EU has also begun to adjust its soft power discourse in a way as to elaborate that the partnership and association programmes will be more carefully "tailored to the specific needs of each country" and that they will not always prescribe one rigid set of unchanging norms. And in the case of Central Asian states, as Ferrero-Waldner puts it, the EU is now more "aware of different historical and cultural contexts" and will act accordingly. Still, even such compromise from the norm-promoting stance unleashes criticism and accusations of double standards within the EU.
All in all, the EU has not yet overcome the ‘capability expectation gap' that becomes shamefully visible in its foreign affairs and Central Asia is an especially apt test case to observe such a gap. Despite high expectations that the EU can sustain the rule of law, democratisation and good governance in its neighbourhood and beyond, through comprehensive cooperation and multilateral partnership treaties, its capability in doing so is, in reality, restrained by its needs for energy. As long as the EU states' inconceivable need for energy continues, the EU's soft power capability will not be realised in its full force. Soft power capability requires that many prescriptions of bitter medicine for socio-political and economic transformation be given, most of which may disturb the counterpart governments and put the energy interests of the EU at risk. The dilemma persists.

*Endnotes
1http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm, 15.05.2008.
2Diez, Thomas (2005) ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe' ‘, Millennium 33, 3: 613-636.
3Hill, Christopher (1993) ‘The Capability Expectation Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role', Journal of Common Market Studies 31, 4: 719-746.
4http://www.euractiv.com/eu/enlargement/eu-outlines-new-central-asia-strategy.html, 14.05.2008.
5http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/interview-eu-credibility-gap.html, 15.05.2008.
6http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm, 15.05.2008.
7http://euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-sees-huge-scope-cooperation.html, 14.05.2008.
8http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm, 15.05.2008.
9http://euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-sees-huge-scope-cooperation.html, 14.05.2008.

*PhD, Researcher. caatac@gmail.com