The Uygurs have been on Turkey's agenda for about 150 years, but Turkish President Abdullah Gül's recent visit to China and the Uygur revolt in Ürümqi have once again raised the Uygur question as agenda item one. Time will tell whether President Gül's visit to Ürümqi was a gesture of good will or a skillfully crafted diplomatic maneuver on the part of China.

Although Turco-Chinese ties have been based on growing economic relations lately, this has not been enough to clear away the political disagreements that lie beneath the surface. Although Turkey has shied away from being an external influence and champion for the rights of the Uygurs in China, Beijing's response to Uygur demands and, by association, its outlook on Turkey's influence over the Turkic group have not changed.
Last year, China presented its tough stance on this issue during the Dushanbe Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China had raised the issue in relation to acts of terrorism which had taken place before the Beijing Olympics, for which it held the Uygurs responsible. Chinese President Hu Jintao warned the Central Asian republics against allowing money coming from Turkey to reach local Uygur groups. According to China, Istanbul is the hub for separatist Uygur movements and there is little indication that China will back down from this allegation under any circumstances.
The Third Turan
Contemporary Turkish-Chinese diplomatic relations got their start in 1971, and grew closer in the 1980s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the Turkic Republics in Central Asia resulted in the cultivation of the concept of ‘periphery Turks' in Turkish foreign policy discourse. This new chapter in Turkish foreign policy that emerged in the first half of the 1990s was shaped under an ideological slogan that aspired to a Great Turkish World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. Perceiving Turkey's discourse as a form of Pan-Turkism (Turan), this banner would first and foremost disturb the Chinese, who were unsettled because of their Uygur population. China began to voice concerns over its territorial integrity, mostly because the Uygur Autonomous Region, which, like other Turkish Republics, was seeking independence--an idea fiercely opposed by the Chinese government. In all the reports that were published in China during the first half of the 1990s, Pan-Turkism was at the top of the list of threats. Turkey, on the other hand, saw the then President Sűleyman Demirel's visit to China in 1995 as an opportunity to brush away such concerns. However, China cooperated with Russia, which shared similar concerns with China due to the conflict in Chechnya, against the Pan-Turkism threat and established the Shanghai Five, a sort of regional security mechanism with the inclusion of the new Central Asian republics, as a safeguard. With the second half of the 1990s, Turkey was forced to move away from Central Asia and any realistic hopes it had of assuming a larger paternal role were thwarted by economic and domestic political problems at home as well as America's growing insistence on unilateral action in the region. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, China began to assert more confidently that the dream of a "Great Turkish World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" was nothing more than a flash in a pan.

While the second half of the 1990s heralded a decline in Turkey's role in the Turkic world, it ushered in a new spring in China's rise to prominence. China's 10% annual economic growth and the strength of its economy, which survived the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 unscathed, caught the attention of the world and China became a safe heaven for foreign investors. China's economic finesse also came to manifest itself on its political power, thus making it a significant decision maker with growing stakes in the international arena. Without a doubt, China's rapid economic and political rise did not go unnoticed in Turkey. First in 1998, the then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz mandated that officials abstain from participating in meetings organized by the Uygurs and forbade activities and the use of the separatist Uygur flag that could offend China. Then in 2000, Turkey gave the highest official priority to Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit and given him state order.
Turkish-Chinese relations entered a new period after the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) victory in Turkey's 2002 elections. Tayyip Erdogan's visit to China in 2003, as the leader of AKP, and the official welcome of Chinese President Hu Jintao was seen as a significant development. However, the center of gravity of Turkish foreign policy changed in the following days because of the occupation of Iraq and domestic political problems in Turkey. Since AKP's main goal in foreign policy is EU membership, Turkey had to turn its back on Asia during this period. Consequently, Turkish-Chinese relations started to deteriorate at a time when China was gaining the upper hand in Central Asia with the establishment of the SCO.
Cyprus and Xinjiang
In 2005, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül visited China to seek support on the Cyprus issue and met with high-level officials. China declared that in principle it was willing to support the Turkish cause in Cyprus. In return, China asked Turkey not to support the Uygurs. Gül made a gesture of good will by not visiting the Uygur Autonomous Region. However, after a few months, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Greek-Cypriot side. During this visit, the Chinese minister's statements backed the Greek-Cypriot arguments. Ankara, which could not find the support in the United Nations that it hoped from China, lowered its diplomatic relations with Beijing. Without a doubt, the Chinese decision to refrain from supporting Turkey in the UN influenced Turkey's decision to take the lead in the campaign to put quotas on Chinese textiles, which came as a result of the United State's strategic maneuver to that end. During that time, the Chinese Minister of Trade, Bo Xilai, stated that China would take revenge on Turkey, which it eventually did by not supporting Turkey on the Cyprus issue.
The New Iron Curtain
A significant event happened in Asia in 2005. At the Astana Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Iran, Pakistan and India were accepted as observers. Furthermore, SCO requested that the US withdraw its soldiers from Central Asia and Afghanistan and forced the US to shut down the Hanabat base in Uzbekistan. While the US was searching for international support against Iran, Iran's observatory status in the SCO, whose main principle is regional security and peace, was perceived as an open threat raised by the SCO against the US. How these developments were reflected in Turkey was significant. Since it came to power, AKP's main foreign policy thrust has been directed towards EU membership and efforts to improve ailing Turkish-American relations. However, new developments in Asia did not bode well for prospective regional actors, like Turkey, which were trying to carve out areas of influence for themselves. Domestic groups that oppose Turkey's EU membership and its relations with the US have wanted Turkey to join the axis of the SCO that was created by Russia and China. This has unwillingly created pressure on the AKP administration. Turkey's sway over the Turkic World was seen to be limited only to Azerbaijan as the SCO descended like an iron curtain between Turkey and the Turkic World.
Another factor that damaged Turkish-Chinese relations during this time was the Turkish Prime Minister's suggestion of the Taiwan model for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Turkey perceived the Taiwan model, which China sees as a threat to its territorial integrity and national interests, as a justifiable basis for the resolution of this longstanding conflict.
Another point of contention was the improvement in economic and political relations between China and the Kurdish government in Northern Iraq following 2003, a sensitive red-line issue for Ankara. China acquired the rights to prospect oil in this region and Chinese firms assumed the role of subcontractors for large European energy corporations keen to move into the region. During this same period, China's relations with the Greek-Cypriots were rapidly improving. Turkey noted with apprehension the arms deal between China and the Greek-Cypriot National Guard that followed Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül's visit to Beijing in 2005.
Military Relations between Turkey and China
Since its establishment in 2001, the SCO has been moving forward on track towards becoming Asia's NATO, a sentiment repeated often by Chinese President from 1993 to 2003, Jiang Zemin. The Turkish government, which was never quite able to hit the right chord with Washington during the Bush administration, was keenly keeping an eye on the course of SCO's progress. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan shared with Russian President Putin Turkey's interest in the SCO, Putin never carried out his promise to voice this issue at any SCO summit. In reality, Turkey's approach to the SCO has been a cautious one. Official statements made by both the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their Chinese counterparts made on several accounts underlined that that Turkey has not formally applied for SCO membership.
Actually, the past few years have witnessed a noticeable increase in the level of strategic importance paid to SCO by Turkey's military wing. Despite the ups and downs in the course of economic and political relations between Turkey and China, the level of military relations between the two states has been the scene of more interesting developments. In addition to joint collaboration on various military systems, the two states are about to initiate a new phase of cooperation in aviation and space areas. Turkey has come to realize over the years that state security should not be left to the exclusive purview of one bloc and its associated member states or international organizations. As a necessary conclusion then, the current status of military relations with China, as Turkish military officials have stated, should not be seen as an alternative to the Western alliance but a means of diversification in Turkey's security environment.
Do Uygurs Want to Become the Bridge?
Hundreds of Uygurs and Chinese lost their lives following the revolt that erupted violently in the capital of the Uygur Autonomous Region, Ürümqi following the death of two Uygurs during a scuttle at a toy factory in Guangdong, China in June. These events sparked unprecedented levels of angry backlash and unrest. Following the event, the wave of Pan-Turkism made a come-back among segments of Turkey's public as well as official circles, which had cast issues pertaining to the fate of Turkic kinsmen beyond Turkish borders outside of the agenda for quite some time. Although Pan-Turkism is a deadly gamble for Turkish foreign policy, which has suffered from a lack of a concerted ideological framework for some time, mostly due to internal political divisions that hijacked political will and energy, the current administration used the Uygur uprising as a flashpoint to avert criticism stemming from their poor performance on economic policy.
Various aspects of Turkish foreign policy were reformulated to cope with the changing dynamics of the new international political environment that emerged following the end of the Cold War. Turkey, which had followed a Western centric foreign policy approach during the Cold War period, began to show more allegiance and responsibility to the Turkic republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union owing to shared cultural and historical ties. The main reason why China wished recognition of its identity as a Central Asian country is the establishment's bid for exclusive control over the Uygur region that is contagious to Central Asia. This region has vital importance for China's land trade. While the bulk of Chinese trade and energy shipments are done via sea routes, these are under the pressure of the American and Indian navies, which pushes China to desperately protect its coveted land access.
Islam is the one of the most significant factors in the Uygur resistance throughout their history and the mantle of their ethnic identity. Even today, Muslim identity continues to play a defining role in Uygur identity. Aware of this, China initiated a set of intense immigration policies to change the demographics of the region and encouraged the settlement of Han Chinese to the region to prevent any possible attempts for self-determination by the Uygurs. In order to control the potentially destabilizing political implications of religion, various madrasas were taken over by the Chinese government. Handpicked religious clergy loyal to the Chinese Communist Party were assigned to the madrasas that were allowed to exist.
Without a doubt, ethnic, religious and cultural problems are not the only reasons behind the Uygur revolt. Perhaps more central than any other reason, the Uygurs did not receive their share from China's incredible increase of wealth over the past 30 years. This fuels obvious grievances stemming from income inequality and a lack of regional development. But it has not only been the Uygurs, but also the Han Chinese who have failed to sufficiently claim their share of national wealth, a topic that has been under heated discussion over the past two years in the Chinese Communist Party.
Following the Cold War, the official view in Turkey was that the Uygurs could be used as a bridge between Turkey and China and a policy ground to improve bilateral relations. A closer reading of Turkey's rhetoric on the subject shows that this was little more than an evasive answer to the Uygur problem. In the post-9/11 world, where the global political-security agenda changed overnight and was defined as the global war on terror, evasive answers have lost their utility in solving the Uygur question. Especially, after the allegations that Uygurs were behind the various terrorists attacks in China before the Beijing Olympics and Chinese President Hu Jintao's warning to Turkic Republics to tighten control on financing made available to Uygur groups, Turkey can no longer turn a blind eye to the Uygur problem. Despite this, the Turkish administration prevented the entrance of the Leader of the Uygur Government-in-exile, Enver Yusuf Turani, and renowned Uygur businesswomen Rabia Kadir to Turkey, in line with China's request, and tried to assure China on the Uygur issue.
The Turkish President's China Visit
Uygurs hopeful in the lead up to the visit of Turkish President Gül to the Uygur region, a first in their history, found themselves disappointed in its aftermath. The only memory left after the visit was the traditional game-playing of various MPs, far from expectations that Gül would take the opportunity to voice the problems faced by the Uygurs in China, vow Turkey's support and ask the Chinese administration to enable the protection of Uygur identity and freedom of worship. In addition to this, it had been expected that the President would encourage Uygurs to become Chinese citizens on equal grounds. However, this did not happen.
Chinese National Radio broadcasted President Gül's remarks made during his meeting with Hu Jintao that no terrorist organization would be allowed to operate on their territory and that Turkey is ready to cooperate with China on this issue. The President's remarks deeply disturbed the Uygurs and was interpreted as a sign that Turkey had given up on using the China's Uygur problem as a trump card. Without a doubt, Turkey's decision to move away from the Uygurs was influenced in large part by China's continuous remarks regarding the political and cultural rights of Turkey's Kurdish citizens. Beijing has been following a tactic of lumping the situation of Turkey's Kurds and the Uygurs together as if they are one and the same. They are not. China does not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, unlike the US and EU, and classifies it as an illegal political party instead; and while China denounces Al Qaeda attacks in Turkey, it has consistently refrained from condemning PKK attacks which have cost Turkish lives. But China's approach seems to have worked and forced Turkey to ease up on their support of the Uygur population.
Turkey's vow to carry the events in Xinjiang to the attention of the UN and China's prompt response that this is strictly China's internal affairs is nothing but Beijing's covert threat. First of all, it is difficult to overcome China at the UN Security Council. Russia has already declared its support for China, meaning that there are already two vetoes ready for any Turkey-sponsored motion. China is infamously well-known for its diplomatic maneuvering on the questions of Iran, Darfur and Myanmar. It is difficult for Turkey to effectively oppose China at the UN Security Council, where Turkey's non-permanent membership will cease at end-2010.
Under the light of the latest developments, can Turkey-China relations be like old times? As long as China feels it is under pressure on the Uygur question, it will be sure to keep Turkey at arms length. China sells 17 billion dollars worth of goods to Turkey but spent 60 billion dollars on the Beijing Olympics alone. Even though Turkey is a good source for chrome and gold for China, it remains to be seen whether economic ties alone can be enough of a life line for bilateral political and diplomatic relations to advance from this point on. By all means, the role of defense industry cooperation between the Turkish Army and China should be taken into account.

Dr. Adibelli is a faculty member at the Department of International Relations at Ankara University and the author of Turkey-China Relations and East Turkestan. He may be contacted at badibelli@yahoo.com.