Conflict In The Caucasus: A Catastrophe In Waiting?
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, peoples within its realm rediscovered their national identities. Conflicts frozen by the red rule for 83 years were rekindled and bloody clashes ensued. In the beginning the only external player that interfered in post-Soviet conflicts such as the Azeri-Armenian or Abkhazian-Georgian seemed to be Russia. Today, however, the situation is much more complex and the conflicts are more prone to wider external intervention.
The Caucasus is regarded as a major conflict zone of the near future. Escalating tension between Georgia and Abkhazia is likely to spark a conflict that may engulf the wider region. It is the following international causes -not regional ones- that have pushed the conflict to the brink of armed confrontation:
- The eastward enlargement of NATO,
- The US's efforts to expand its sphere of influence over the Caucasus,
- Kosovo's declaration of independence,
- Russia's perception of the previous three events as direct threats to its interests.
Developments in the last few months have been reminiscent of the Cold War. Russia has increased its peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and began deploying troops on its border with Georgia. A Georgian drone was shot down over Abkhazia. The situation is in fact a product of the asymmetric methods that were used by the US and the EU in countering Russian actions in the Caucasus and have in return caused fury of Moscow.
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence Abkhazia was expected to spring into action in the international arena. But nobody expected the region to come to the brink of armed conflict in such a short period of time. Abkhazia used to be an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union, a status similar to that of Kosovo which was an autonomous province of Yugoslavia. Today Abkhazia aspires to be an independent republic. Victory in the war of 1992 and its success in surviving as a de facto state since then have strengthened Abkhazia's hand in the quest. The international community also has to take into account the strong will of Abkhazian people for independence, unbroken by the losses they have suffered as a result of long standing embargoes.
Recent developments at the UN indicate that the international community may now take a more flexible stance towards Abkhazia. In the past, autonomous republics of Russia came under fire for signing economic cooperation agreements with Abkhazia. Today Western companies flock to Abkhazia's capital, Sukhumi, in order to establish economic partnership with Abkhazia and face no criticism. The UN Security Council Resolution 1808 adopted on Russia's initiative on 15 April 2008 does not only appeal for urgent economic development in Abkhazia but also legitimises, in effect, Moscow's assistance to the republic. However, Russia has not been taking any steps in the international arena to secure recognition for Abkhazia's independence. Therefore, it is not possible to draw parallels between Moscow's Abkhazia policy and the policy of states that recognised Kosovo. What is more, Kosovo's independence created an international legal precedence.
Meanwhile, the nationalist Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili has been taking military steps. In order to achieve EU and NATO membership, he has to restore Tbilisi's control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In other words, decline of Russia's influence in the Caucasus is a sine qua non for Georgia's accession to the Western club. Georgia's future depends on the actions it will take to counter Russia. Following the elections of 21 May 2008, Saakashvili began taking steps that may be indicative of what is to come. His government's attempt at suppressing the media by methods such as expulsions, threats and illegal phone tapping has caused widespread concern. Subsequently, criminal cases were brought against representatives of opposition parties such as the Greens, Movement for United Georgia and People's Front. Regrettably, OSCE election observers supported the government's election campaign, violating the principle of neutrality. In fact, Saakashvili had no need for OSCE's support as he has already secured American help. His election campaign was run by Frank Anderson, a CIA agent.
Saakashvili's success in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will depend on how much Western support he can garner. Following the elections his priority will be to establish total control domestically. And, ironically, the more unstable the region becomes, the stronger Saakashvili's hand gets at consolidating his rule over Georgia. Saakashvili may attempt to use the increasing tensions in the region as an excuse for declaring a state of emergency. If that happens, armed clashes will break out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia where Georgia will hope for a limited military engagement with Russia. Realising that he cannot win a war with Russia, Saakashvili will expect international public opinion to come on his side and exert pressure on Russia. However, as the stronger side, Russia, not Georgia, will determine the scope and intensity of armed clashes and, as a result, expand its influence over the Caucasus. In such an eventuality Saakashvili may well find that he is not getting sufficient Western support as the US will then be preoccupied with its presidential election and the EU will not want to risk its energy supplies from Russia.
An armed conflict in the Caucasus will be disastrous for Turkey which serves as a bridge between Saakashvili and the West. Turkey has a long-standing policy of neutrality towards Georgia and has always respected the latter's territorial integrity. This policy will prevent Turkey from interfering in a possible conflict and cause it to lose its importance in the eyes of the EU as a major transport hub and energy corridor. Three possible scenarios may ensue if armed conflict breaks out:
- The viability of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline may be threatened.
- Opening of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) may be delayed indefinitely.
- Status of Turkish straits may again be subject to international negotiations.
Especially the last scenario is a nightmare for Turkey because a war in the Caucasus may give the US an excuse to establish its presence in the Black Sea. Turkey managed to resist American demands thanks to the Black Sea Harmony naval operation in 2004. But it may not be that lucky this time around. Turkey has always fought against attempts of external intervention in conflicts in the Black Sea area arguing that it would destroy regional stability. A possible war will invalidate Turkey's reasoning as the region would already be destabilised as a result. What is worse for Turkey, this may even lead to the violation of the 1936 Montreux Straits Convention -Turkey's finest diplomatic achievement in the republican era. Turkey may be forced to allow US naval forces to enter the Black Sea through the Turkish straits. As a result, Turkey's relations with Russia may be damaged beyond repair. This may also harm Turkey's future prospects as it can no longer count on a hostile Russia as a geostrategic alternative to the West. In addition, let us not forget that there is a sizable minority of Muslim Caucasians in Turkey who may be drawn into the conflict.
Consequently, Turkey cannot be a mere spectator to developments in the Caucasus. It has already abandoned its "wait and see" policy in favour of active diplomacy. Scheduled visits by the Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba to Ankara and by a delegation of Turkish Foreign Ministry officials to Georgia and Abkhazia are interpreted as testing the waters for a future role for Turkey as a mediator in the conflict. If the meetings are successful, we may see Saakashvili and the Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh sitting at the mediation table in Turkey.
In the coming days Russia, Turkey and Georgia will most probably abandon the embargo on Abkhazia, helping it to reactivate its railways and open its motorways to international traffic. Such a positive step will enable Turkey and Georgia to take part in the construction effort for Sochi Olympics and pave the way for solving regional problems through enhanced economic cooperation. That way the Caucasus will no longer be under the threat of foreign intervention and exploitation every time there is a regional conflict, thus averting calls for a modern day "Abriskil".
** Betwixt and Between
i Abriskil is a political legend in Abkhazian Folk Literature. Shinkuba, Bagrat; 1st edition As Yayınları; İstanbul, 2000,
