In the post 9/11 world, democracy has gained new meaning. Former insurgents claim to be prepared to learn it. Barely elected governments promise to speak on behalf of it. Western democracies claim to be best suited to preach it. There is little doubt that the solution to the host of ills that ail the less developed world, societies oppressed by authoritarian rule, and transitioning states lies in greater democratization, not less. But the means to achieving it, the processes involved, and importantly, who the actors need to be is less clear. Can yesterday's terrorists be today's democratizers? Is democracy possible in the absence of democrats? These are certainly not new questions, but tortuously ancient ones. And the answers are as complicated and elusive as ever before.

The concept of spreading democracy has been swept by immense forces of political conviction and momentum in the history of the modern world, but as a rallying cry, it reached a rarely before seen and almost frantic urgency in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This is not to say that as an idea, democracy was not an invaluable leverage before, serving as both carrot and stick, as a means for accommodation and political convenience.

During the course of democracy promotion in the Middle East carried out as a part of the US-led global ‘War on Terror,' what has been widely reiterated in the popular political imagination as the core democratic ideals and the necessary underpinnings of a free and open society have been dealt a blow-by the very forces that were championing the cause of democracy. Optimists would say that the culprit has been in the execution, not the intention.

U.S. President Barack Obama made it apparent during the early round of his presidency that he would honor the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the US and Iraq made as the Bush administration was winding down, committing to a ‘responsible' and phased US troop withdrawal from Iraq, with the removal of all American combat brigades by the end of August 2010 and removal of all troops by end 2011. What was made more clear in simple terms was Obama's insistence that the war in Afghanistan would be the centerpiece of his administration's strategic attention, and that US allies should follow suit. This shift in strategic focus and political will to Afghanistan has had several implications, with perhaps the most prominent question being whether the Iraqi army and police forces are ready for the daunting task of securing and stabilizing the country. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been adamant that they are. The upturn in recent deadly attacks in Iraq, mostly directed at Shiite targets, begs to differ.

Skeptics fear that Iran will have the political space and maneuvering ability to increase its sway over Iraq in the coming years; especially after US withdrawal plans are complete. A second scenario entails a return of Al-Qaeda to Iraq.

The Resurgent Taliban

Obama's commitment to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan is a departure from the policy adopted by his predecessor. Under the Bush administration, the fight against al-Qaeda and the stabilization of Afghanistan was peripherized for the sake of the war in Iraq. In fine tuning his Afghanistan policy, announced in broad terms in March, Obama made a point to underscore its regional approach-appealing to both Afghan and Pakistani leaders to join the US in the fight against the common threat of militancy.

Inspired by the relative success the US was able to achieve with the surge in Iraq and the Sunni Awakening movement, US foreign policy strategists are increasingly willing and ready to take measures to bring into the mainstream political fold insurgent groups and Islamist forces that are seen to hold the potential to emerge as legitimate political actors. Naturally, how to do this is less clear. In Afghanistan, for the time being, the prescription appears to dictate talking with mid-level Taliban militants or sympathizers, with the hope of bending their hard-line vocabulary towards a more accommodating language, and improve their willingness to play the democracy card.

As part of a better coordinated, more nuanced counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan that seeks to engage with and employ social, economic as well as political methods, the notion that it is possible to negotiate with a moderate Taliban or religious parties with influence to change the current rules of the game is at once pragmatic and misleading. Over the past few months as this option seems to have become a more convincing option in Washington and London, many analysts reiterate that it is simply wishful thinking for a variety of reasons. The obvious and oft repeated argument is that a moderate Taliban is an oxymoron, it would weaken the US position in Afghanistan, and diminish Kabul's claim to legitimate ownership of political authority. It has been reported that the US did not completely dispel the idea of speaking with the Taliban even under the Bush administration. Over the past few months, there has been more deliberate pressure levied by Western diplomats and Afghan officials to broaden the scope of the talks, insisting that in the absence of broad consultation among the Taliban leadership and Pashtun tribal leaders, any efforts to engage moderate Taliban factions alone will not be enough to shed the irreconcilable or hard-line groups.

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband recently underlined the merits of initiating dialogue with the moderate Taliban in a speech at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 27 July amidst a wider emphasis that NATO must adjust its strategies in Afghanistan. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's special representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide rejected the proposal, calling any efforts to reach out to ‘second or third' tier of the Taliban who have little to no say in matters to end the Afghan conflict futile. But while deciding on whom to speak with may be, and has been, possible, the second reason will prove to be more challenging. And this has to do with whether the Taliban at any level has an incentive to negotiate at this point of the war given their own barometer of success. What will they negotiate for and will they think it worth it? Although overtures were made last year by the Taliban and even US officials floated the option of engaging in some form of dialogue with elements prepared to enter the national political process, the reality on the ground and current circumstances have tilted since. Back then the Taliban were weaker. Now, they have pushed forward and gotten within reach of Kabul and Islamabad; not to mention their status in the Swat valley.

As the situation stands currently, local Afghans have grown weary of nighttime operations in village and bombings of suspected Taliban hideouts that have resulted in civilian casualties. Despite an increase in US troop levels, most military strategists find that current levels still fall short of the operational capacity to secure the local population. Civilian deaths empower the Taliban forces with the vocabulary of occupation, injustice and oppression. Whereas immediately after 9/11, the Taliban was a defeated force, they have since rebounded, controlling much of the country, and even carrying out operations in the heart of the capital. Attacks in February 2009 targeting Afghanistan's Justice Ministry proved that the Taliban was defiantly capable of reaching beyond its traditional strongholds in rural areas and provincial centers in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Violence in the run-up to the August 20 elections escalated sharply, with an attack on government buildings on August 10 in Pul-e-Alam, capital of Logar province, near Kabul. Militant attacks this year have been at the worst levels since the militant Islamist Taliban were ousted in 2001.

For now, Obama seems confident that the US is prepared for the long haul in Afghanistan. The catch twenty two inherent in any drawn out, open-ended American presence and commitment to the war is that it hands any Kabul government with a blank check to deter its neighbors, despite its own internal institutional political, economic, security inefficiencies. The longer the US is inclined to fight this fight, the less incentive and concerted will there is likely to be for a regional, cross-border, coordinated security framework to emerge among neighboring states.

Regional perspectives on the prospect of engaging diplomatically with the moderate Taliban, or the Taliban at all, has been mixed. Ali Ahmed of the New Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis insists that it is not implausible to exploit divisions in the Taliban, suggesting that not all are motivated by a jihadist ideology. "There is scope for bringing about a distinction between the hard core and uncompromising Taliban and those who can be ‘purchased'" he says, adding, that "A stable Pakistan being in Indian interest, India need not be averse to talks with the Taliban." Over recent months, and more so since last year's Saudi hosted mediation efforts to bring Afghan officials and Taliban insurgents together, Pakistan has been encouraging the US to talk with Taliban moderate elements. The rationale behind Islamabad's position is that dialogue will facilitate stability in Afghanistan as well as adjoining Pakistani tribal areas. Since 9/11, the insurgency in Afghanistan has toppled Pakistan into greater levels of destabilization. According to UN figures over two million residents of Swat Valley have been displaced, the most extensive case of internal displacement since the partition of India. Skeptics among Pakistan's neighbors fear that the recent momentum in Pakistan counter-terrorism efforts in the Swat valley and border regions, amount to nothing more than a temporary move to impress Obama and may not last much longer.

Although US and Western officials have their own reservations about what can and cannot be ultimately pursued on the matter, the consensus on Pakistan appears to be that they should be militarily fighting the Taliban, not sitting down to talk with them. But public opinion is not responding favorably to US overtures to dialogue with elements of the Taliban, while at the same time stepping up drone attacks on Pakistan's side of the border and urging the Pakistan army to move troops into the Waziristans. In terms of Pakistan's own plan to handle known or suspected militants, the government may opt to grant amnesty to Taliban foot soldiers, while prosecuting hard-core terrorists, prominent commanders and militant financiers.

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin was quoted in March as saying that Moscow opposed any talks with the leaders of extremist groups in Afghanistan but that they would not object to talks between the Afghan government and moderate Taliban if they laid down their arms, recognize the Afghan constitution and sever ties with al-Qaeda. He pointed out that Moscow was concerned that a US defeat against the Taliban would mean a more defiant and strengthened wave of Islamist militancy that could spread through Central Asia and threaten Russian national security. Borodavkin reiterated these conditions in August, adding that talks that reached beyond moderates and "Attempts to agree with extremists and concessions to them lead to nothing good. Terrorists use respite to gather forces and spread their influence, and Afghan authorities should take it into account."

It is not in Russia's interest to see a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, mostly because they fear Islamic forces of fundamentalism further penetrating Central Asia. But where there is room for cooperation with the US and NATO-led forces battling a resurgent insurgency, there is yet to be convincing evidence of it. Moscow may be tempted by the prospect of NATO being stuck in a quagmire in Afghanistan, or intrigued by the possibility of an eventual Taliban defeat in a way that does not directly allow NATO to claim strategic credit for it, and may even damage its deterrence credibility. Essentially, while Russia is skeptical about US and NATO staying power in Afghanistan and their ability to stabilize the country, they see it as a way of buying time. As long as foreign forces are stationed in Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda may be contained at least in part, which mitigates the risk they pose to Central Asian republics.

With increasing urgency, it has become more clear that eight years in after 9/11, with a vulnerable, and not irreversible, stability achieved in Iraq, and a grim forecast in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, defeating terrorism and extremism has proved resistant to a military solution alone. Defense has necessarily become engaged with development and diplomacy. This requires a shift in military thinking and strategy, a recalibration of political commitment, but perhaps most importantly, demands strong and sustained public support for the process of national reconciliation. As long as national security forces fail to convince local populations that they can, will, and are able to protect them from militant attacks, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and other insurgent groups in Iraq will continue to breed on fear, impoverishment and sectarian loyalties. Afghan nation-building and means of supporting political reconciliation is still the best way to confront al-Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban.

The State of Democracy at the National Level

As a political category, and in many parts of the country, even as a word, democracy, in any real sense, has yet to make an appearance in Afghanistan. With few practical indications of a functioning democracy, Afghans went to the polls last month in an impoverished country, grappling with a violent insurgency that has threatened with death, those who brave election day and don an ink-stained finger.

Both the target of the Bush-era ‘War on Terror', and simultaneously the destination for the self-purported 21st century cause of spreading democracy, regions in trouble are still plagued by rampant corruption, limited rule of law, good governance, infrastructure, and poor public services. Years of arbitrary rule by warlords and a dysfunctional central government with little power to reach beyond the capital has disillusioned an Afghan civilian population and fueled suspicions that if this is what was meant by democracy, than they do not want it. Pakistan is faring little better. Iraq is still facing an upward climb, with several pivotal issues relating to its future left unanswered as the country spirals back into sectarian violence ahead of January's parliamentary elections.

Arab countries responded to the post 9/11 world at the domestic level by passing anti-terror laws based on a wide and unspecific definition of "terrorism". Such measures granted government security agencies sweeping powers, such as allowing undefined periods of pre-trial detention; widening the applicability of the death penalty; increasing police powers to search properties; tapping telephone calls and limiting freedom of expression. The imperative of fighting terrorism presented most Arab regimes with a pretext to violate individual rights and freedoms, while doing close to nothing to improve government accountability, the troubled state-society relationship, or basic socio-economic indicators of living standards.

However defined, a central feature of what is taken to mean democracy is that it is intimately related to equality and an equality of standing, and the expectation to be treated with some level of respect by those who claim to rule on behalf of the ruled. Where this is persistently not the case, faith in democratically assigned institutions, processes and motivations are undermined. Where security, livelihoods and basic services provision are not guaranteed, the presence of elected institutions are of minor relevance and can have little impact. Mechanisms for better oversight of foreign assistance and donor funds in Afghanistan and Pakistan must be put in place and fast. Crippling levels of corruption, bureaucratic hurdles and often misinformed investment priorities in the way funds have been allocated and disbursed have slowed down the process of stabilization and economic reconstruction since 9/11. Although US aid should not be used as a leverage to impose political requirements on Afghanistan or Pakistan, more systemic measures are needed to improve supervision of aid, and develop with the recipient governments a strategy for how the money should be spent. Indications of corruption in the Pakistani military and security services undermine Pakistani public support for counterterrorism operations. Underestimating the role of domestic public pressure on the government to intensify its fight against terror would be a mistake.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, some analysts were adamant that defeating international terrorism would only be feasible by simultaneously addressing the underlying root causes of poverty, underdevelopment, and general societal impotence and grievances that served to sustain popular support for insurgent movements. But while it is irrevocably convincing that persistent income, opportunity and human capacity chasms between the haves and have-nots within the national borders of impoverished and conflict-prone states are enabling factors of terrorism; the imperative to reduce global inequalities cannot be explained by the need to defeat terrorism alone. This is a cause in its own right. The globalization of democracy must move forward with the understanding that democratic convictions are only as good as the actual practices of democratic political representation into which they are actually translated. As things stand today in many parts of the region, there is still a long way to go.

i Carlotta Gall, "As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans Are Already Talking," New York Times, March 11, 2009.

ii Ali Ahmed, "Seizing the moment: India and the ‘moderate Taliban,' " Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis Strategic Comments, June 8, 2009.

iii Farhang Jahanpour, "How to end the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan," Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, June 3, 2009.

iv Huma Yusuf, "Truth or reconciliation?" Dawn, Aug 24, 2009.

v Ibid.

vi IFAX, "Russia open to moderate Taliban contacts," Mar 25, 2009.

vii Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, United Nations Development Programme.