There is a growing demand for the European Union to be more active in the sphere of security and defence. Many EU member states as well as other significant international actors, such as the UN or the United States, stress that the EU should be an effective, global provider of security, capable of undertaking prompt and effective actions during crises. Yet, it is evident, that in its current shape, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), does not live up to such ambitious demands. Thus, many different initiatives aiming at changing and strengthening the ESDP have appeared recently, including the ideas of establishing a European Army, as an ultimate military tool for European Union.
The idea of European Army is, however, not a new concept. As a matter of fact, it was born at the beginning of the European integration process in the 1950s. At that time, the so-called Pleven Plan, aimed at establishing a common European armed force, was developed. After it had collapsed, the idea was abandoned for a long time. Now it has been revoked to influence the development of the ESDP, which is currently a subject of a fierce debate among European politicians and experts in the field of security. Can the current evolution of the ESDP really lead to the speedy establishment of such a common armed force of the EU? To answer this question one needs to look at the weaknesses of the ESDP, the concepts of a European Army and the prospects of the French presidency, which aims at the reform of the ESDP.

European Security and Defence Policy: a diagnosis

The main problem of the ESDP is the lack of political will of many EU member states to participate in both: EU expeditionary missions and in projects developing the EU military capabilities. This reluctance stems from a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a group of states with distinct, narrowly focused security policies, which prevent them from participating in operations considered marginal for their national interest. Other concerns arise from the fear of undermining the role of NATO in European security by strengthening the ESDP. Some governments, in turn, pursue a policy of neutrality and are anxious about a possible alteration of their status in the international arena, which could derive from their engagement in a high-intensity combat operation. Secondly, the mechanism of financing the ESDP missions does not ensure a fair distribution of costs. States which provide large contingents and key capabilities bear most of the costs of the operations, while these, which contribute much less, bear modest costs, but often gain political profits disproportional to their engagement. This situation discourages states with major military capacities (thus being able to significantly strengthen a mission), from engagement in operations. Thirdly, costs of defence systems as well as maintenance and use of skilled, mobile military forces, are very high. Meanwhile, EU member states struggle to meet demands of their national transformation strategies, commitments made in the framework of NATO and requirements of the ESDP at the same time. Restricted and sometimes ineffectively constructed defence budgets seriously hamper these efforts. Finally, European societies as well as politicians are very sensitive to human costs of operations. Whether the casualty is a European soldier or a civilian, who dies accidentally during a skirmish, the reluctance of the public opinion and politicians to support the expeditionary operations grows continuously.
These factors result in practical problems when an ESDP operation using the military assets is being launched. The process of generating forces lasts long, since many governments are not willing and able to contribute significantly to the mission. Lack of strategic and in-theater transport as well as problems with organization of planning and commanding HQ, delay deployment phase. Financial constraints hamper missions' scope, scale and duration. Eventually, even if sufficient number of forces is in place, there are still interoperability problems and, most importantly, national caveats, which undermine the effectiveness of undertaken activities.

Two concepts of a European Army

The reflection on the shortcomings of the ESDP has caused the reappearance of the issue of European Army. Over the last 12 months it has been raised by the Polish president Lech Kaczyński and prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, and the German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. These concepts, although differing in details, were based on the same principles. Member states, particularly those with the most significant military capabilities, should enhance their military capacities to participate in expeditionary operations, specialize and pool national defence assets, launch joint projects in order to obtain key capabilities (such as strategic airlift), and establish common, European command (HQ). As a result, a ‘European Army' should emerge, though it would be a flexible, multinational structure comprised of different national defence assets selected to perform ESDP operations, pooled voluntarily, and staying at the EU's command. This should allow the EU to easily acquire forces to be used for military-type missions of the ESDP, as well as to improve their effectiveness.
These concepts have triggered an ardent discussion on the prospects of establishing common European forces. However, it quickly became clear, that there is a lack of common approach to such an idea among the EU member states most capable in military terms. A few governments, most notably Great Britain, raised objections against the establishment of any structure under the heading of a European Army. Also France abandoned the original idea presented by president Sarkozy and eventually stated that its presidency's proposals regarding the ESDP would not aim at creation of a European Army "any more than there is a NATO army". This way, it has become evident that currently in the EU there is consensus only on the limited development of ESDP, by means of gradual improvement of its mechanisms and slow build-up of EU military capabilities.
It is possible however to envisage a different conception regarding the character of such a European common armed force. It is a bold idea, seldom discussed among politicians and defence experts. Instead of pooling and specializing national defence assets, member states could try to build a dedicated European armed force. It would be a genuine European Army, not based on a concept of multinational force, but rather conceived as a supranational structure comprised of units operating under a single, European command, formed with professional soldiers. These would not be soldiers assigned from the national armies for a specified period, but rather EU nationals willing to pursue a professional military career by means of individual contracts. As a European force, it would possess its own distinct uniform, single working language and internal military chain of command, involving officers recruited according to the same procedure. It would be a supranational armed force staying at the exclusive disposal of the EU. Still, it would not aim at replacing national armed forces of member states, as its sole task should be to perform expeditionary ESDP missions, particularly those requiring high-intensity combat. It should be a rapid reaction force able to enter a theatre of a conflict and execute combat operations in order to stabilize the security situation in the area, protect civilians from acts of violence on a large scale, allow humanitarian aid to be delivered and ‘make room' for the follow-on peace keeping and state-building operations. Thus, the Army should build-up its own, specific combat and combat support capabilities. The decision to use the Army should be taken by the EU Council, acting in accordance with its relevant procedures, although there should be a separate, political body providing strategic guidance for the Army's military command. Although it is likely that the project establishing the Army of such a character would be launched by only a group of the EU member states, it should eventually involve majority of the EU member states, so that the Army could be incorporated into the framework of European Union and become its full-fledged armed forces.

Prospects of ESDP: re-launch or stagnation ?

Although president Sarkozy's propositions regarding a European Army were eventually weakened, France, preparing to take over presidency in European Union, has very early announced, that "re-launching of ESDP" would be of its top priorities. Fulfilling these announcements, France has recently presented ambitious initiatives, aiming at solving current ESDP weaknesses and allowing the EU to act more efficiently and independently when it comes to expeditionary missions.
The presidency wants to significantly build-up military capabilities of the EU by new initiatives of pooling and specializing national units on a voluntary basis. It proposes launching exclusive projects (led only by groups of member states) aiming at the creation of key assets (such as strategic and in-theatre air transport, maritime surveillance and transport assets or satellite imaging systems), which should serve the needs of ESDP. It also proposes an improvement of managing the ESDP missions, possibly by establishment of a permanent EU planning and commanding cell (initial proposition of an independent EU HQ was rejected inter alia by Great Britain). Moreover, France wants to review the mechanism of financing the ESDP operations in order to assure more fair distribution of costs, and seeks the update of the European Security Strategy, to assess the threats to the European security anew.
The initiatives of the presidency are prominent, though two major problems concerning them emerge. The first one is the limited probability of their speedy and full implementation. Negative results of the Irish referendum, which suddenly put the future of the Lisbon Treaty in question, complicated the situation in the EU, what may discourage member states from a difficult discussion focused on the ESDP. As a result the presidency's proposals may be left virtually untouched. The second problem concerns the character of these propositions. France has drawn a very ambitious vision of the ESDP, which should be capable of conducting simultaneously a variety of expeditionary operations of different scope and scale (military stabilization and rapid reaction missions along with humanitarian, evacuation, surveillance/interdiction operations and up to 10 civilian missions). Yet, the call to the EU members to make obligations to develop the ESDP to such an extent currently risks falling on deaf ears. Therefore, the possible outcome of this vision may be limited to non-binding, general declarations, containing a roadmap for the future development of the ESDP. Though, it is not excluded, that a group of EU member states will begin a couple of capacity building projects. Still, even if these, or similar initiatives were implemented at some point in the future, the functioning of the ESDP would be improved, but its fundamental character would not change. This, in turn, would mean, that at least some of the current problems would remain unsolved. Thus, it seems justified to state that without the political will any true breakthrough in ESDP is actually very unlikely.

Conclusion

The best possible tool for the European Union, seeking significant improvement of the ESDP, would be the European Army of the supranational character, briefly described in this article. It could become the EU's dedicated, efficient, highly integrated force, eliminating problems of national caveats and insufficient contingent contributions, as well as establishing effective ways to finance the ESDP operations. Yet, current approach of the majority of EU members towards the ESDP could hardly result in the establishment of the European Army of such a character in the foreseeable future. It seems that the ESDP will be developed gradually, by means of small improvements. Thus, the debate on the European Army is actually a discussion on the insufficient European military capabilities, ways of overcoming them, and strategic choices which the EU will have to eventually make. Nevertheless, at some point in the future, the need to possess a dedicated armed force at the EU's disposal may come to the fore. Then, it is very likely that the EU will build an armed force resembling the idea of the European Army presented above.

[1] Marcin Terlikowski - analyst at PISM, main areas of expertise: European Security and Defence Policy, European defence industry issues, ICT technologies and national security of modern states, space assets and systems in defence policies of states, private military firms in current conflicts.
- PISM - Polish Institute of International Affairs is a stated funded entity, conducting research and analysis in the field of international relations, European matters and Polish foreign policy. It publishes a variety of books, journals and papers, as well as organizes conferences and workshops. For more information visit: www.pism.pl
- The details, regarding the concept of the European Army possessing the supranational character, have been presented by the author in the PISM Strategic File No 4. available on-line: http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/Strategic_File_4.pdf