The activity of Iran in Iraq, the rise of esteem in the Arab world of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite organisation, following their struggle against Israel and hearing the names of Shiite minorities or groups being frequently mentioned, that we, until now, did not know even existed. What do all these mean? The indisputable start to the appearance of the Shiite on the global political scene was the Iran Islamic Revolution of 1979. However, developments aroused by the aftermath of the American invasion, brought out the existence of Shiite outside of Iran through a much more different equation. The world started to hear the phrases of "Shiite crescent" or in other words "The Shiite axis" more frequently. Although who initially used this definition is arguable, it took its place within literature with the words of the King of Jordan: "The Shiite crescent is threatening the world" Examining Iran's policies over the Shiite would be a more precise method to envisage if such an axis/crescent really exists, would it exist in the future and how it registers. The number of those who saw that nothing was going to be as it was before in the Middle East when the movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini dominated the streets of Tehran and toppled the Shah in 1979, was few. In time it was seen that the new model of power in Iran would not be confined to within its own borders, on the contrary, it would arouse influence throughout the Islamic world. The years that have passed have exposed a series of assaults from squeezing Iran into a corner to international embargoes. One of the most important vehicles/actors used to attack Iran was Saddam Hussein who was years later sent to the gallows with the American occupation of Iraq1.
There was no victor to the 8-year long Iran-Iraq war. However, the loss to Iran whether in regard to economic aspects or to "political activity" and "regional expansion" was huge. On the other hand, fighting against a Sunni Arab power, it fell into a position of a country that carried the codes of a traditional sect clash to a much wider region. Actually, within the parentheses of this separation, there were concerns over power especially by the Sunni dynasties/administrations of the Arab world. A religion-based movement's rise to power by overturning the dynasty had really disquieted the formations that were the ruling powers within the borders drawn up by Britain following the First World War. That is why Saddam received a great deal of support from the Arab world during the war.
Two countries here did not take place at the front against Iran. They rather deepened their relations with this country: Syria and Lebanon. In fact, relations with these two countries were serious expansions of the foreign policy Iran executed over the Shiite. Certainly these policies that bring these discussed relations with Shiism to the forefront are not limited to these two countries. Although there hasn't been any totalitarian research on it, briefly glancing at the developments within the Islamic world will introduce what kind of a population policy Iran imposes on the Shiite population in the world. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon being foremost; Shiite communities living in countries like Kuwait, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, have been the focus of intensive interest for Iran. As for the efforts of Iran on Turkey, they failed to produce any serious results2.
Shiite Solidarity in the Example of Lebanon and Syria
Sunnis are the majority in Syria and a type of Shiite community called the Nusayri3 are a minority. Nusayris who consist of only 15% of the population have dominated the administration of the country for a long time. Iran, soon after the revolution lead by Ayatollah Khomeini, sought ways of developing closer relations with Syria by using intensive diplomacy, intelligence and most importantly religious activities. Most interestingly, Nusayrism which exists in Syria is defined as "perverse" or "infidel" (nonbeliever) especially by the traditional Shiite scholars. However, this disparity was not enough to prevent Iran. A fatwa given just before the Iranian revolution by Imam Musa Sadr (The lost Imam); who was a legendary name of the Amal organisation in Lebanon and later mysteriously disappeared; had announced that the Nusayri sect and the Imamist sect to whom the Shiite in Iran and Lebanon belong to, were fraternal. Adroitly using Sadr's fatwa, Ayatollah Khomeini by forming a "spiritual bridge" between the Shiite living in both countries, was preparing the ground for the strategic alliance that would quickly develop between Iran and Syria. Upon this foundation Iran took such important steps that the outcome of them could only be properly identified after 10-12 years.
• By ensuring closer relations with Syria, Iran managed to eliminate its political isolation within the Islamic world that had arisen from exclusion by the Sunni sector.
• It has penetrated Lebanon through Syria and by gaining the alliance of a part of the Amal Organisation, the most effective organisation of the Shiite there, set the foundation for Hezbollah.
• Again by using its affinity with Syria, it has made the Hezbollah of Lebanon a frequently heard name in the Middle East and a partner in the administration of Lebanon as well as an effective weapon against Israel. Whilst realising these aims the Shiite of Lebanon being Arabs did not constitute a very serious problem for Iran. Iran, based on the Shiite foundation, has gained itself an extremely important operations zone in the Middle East. After the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Shiite in the South of Iraq has become the new area of influence for Iran. However, this influence of Iran in Iraq has a long-standing history.
Iraq Shiism and Relationship to Iran
How and to what extent Iran can carry its influence over the Shiite will no doubt become evident from the Iraq example. Iran's policy toward the Shiite of Iraq also existed before the revolution. However, efforts for using the Shiite of Iraq as an effective political corridor, gained momentum and became more planned and multi- dimensional after the revolution.

This new policy carries a meaning going beyond the project of supporting an opposi tion that threatened the Iraq regime as was before. Iran's new target was to create itself an extensive and in depth field of influence in Iraq. When looking at the recent history of Shiite opposition in Iraq today, we can get an idea of the type of strategies that Iran has been operating on them. From this position we can see that Iran has just as many difficulties as it does advantages. If we rule out minor and indistinct formations, it is possible to identify two important Shiite organisations in Iraq. The Islamic Call (El-Dawa), and El-Mujahedin. El-Dawa is quite an old formation. It is generally accepted that it was established at the end of the 1950s. However, its appearance in the city of Nejef was in 1960. The biggest worry for El-Dawa, which is far bigger and extensive in financial resources and membership than the Mujahedin, is its connections with the Shah regime in Iran. As for El-Müjahedin, which took form with the Iranian revolution, be it for its active and energetic structure or for its ideological definitions, it has succeeded to come into prominence far more than El-Dawa. The influence of important religious functionaries in the leadership structure of El-Dawa is excessive. Within this leadership group as well as ethnically Iranian and Lebanese religious functionaries there are also Arab functionaries. However, the most important distinctive aspect of this complicated structure from the Müjahedin is that following the Iranian Revolution, it did not accept the leadership of Khomeini. Although the organisation later came closer to Iran, their relations with Tehran have never been very close. In fact, after Iran established the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, it reduced its ties with El-Dawa and tried to form small groups of supporters within this organisation. The Müjahedin Organisation lead by the El-Hekim family followed a much closer line to Iran and Khomeini. As a result, El-Hekim became the leader of a formation directly supported by Iran. The El-Hekim family, who consider themselves as direct descendents of the prophet, like many other ethnic Iranian Arab families, have been living in Iraq for centuries4.
Among the leaders of El-Dawa, ideas especially against the Iranian Revolution have frequently emerged; and in time, these ideas have formed an opposition against Khomeini.
However, Iran has intervened at this point and by taking the core of the Müjahedin movement into the centre, it has gathered the Iraqi Shiite opposition under the title of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq5.Just as with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran has played a direct determining role in moulding the political culture and economic sources of this formation.
Shiism and Poverty
Let us point out another important factor that ensures the influence of Iran over the Shiite. Apart from a few exceptions, the fact that the Shiite are excluded from decision making and political processes as well as suffering from poverty and low levels of education draws major attention. For instance, In Iraq the expression "being Shiite is being poor", that virtually became an epigram in the 1950s, signifies this. It should be remembered that until the 1970's, whether in Baghdad or in the Southern regions of Iraq, the Shiite lived in true poverty. Apart from the partial improvements the Saddam administration had implemented by "investing" in the Shiite, (because they were afraid of the effect the Iranian Revolution might have on the Shiite), even today it can be said that their economic conditions are much worse than those of the other communities in Iraq.
The influence of the Sunni Arabs over the upper echelons of the Iraqi administration carried the same meaning as the exclusion of the Shiite from this framework. Indeed apart from low level positions, the Shiite has never been involved in the Iraqi administration. As a matter of fact, Iran's most emphasised point used in its political policy over the Shiite in Iraq has been the "inequality imposed by the Sunni minority".
Problems Between the Shiite of Iran-Iraq
Well, starting with the Iraq example, can we find a contribution to the above question? I wonder if the Shiite is a structure that shows homogeneous characteristics throughout the world and rapidly creates political affinity? Without doubt, it is possible to mention about many disparities among the Shiite who live in a very extensive area from Pakistan to Tajikistan, from Iran to Kuwait, Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, and Syria to Lebanon. Race, ethnic disparities, the deep differences between the diverse interpretations of Shiism, their feelings of identity and state of belonging to the country they live in, are all extremely important. It is also the indication that it is impossible to keep all Shiite within the same parenthesis. Contradictions in the Iran-Iraq equation are a bit different. Despite all of Iran's political success, we cannot overlook the depth of the disparity and problems between Arab-Persian Shiism. The Iran Revolution and the charismatic leadership of Khomeini, was one of the most important reasons for the sympathy the Shiite living in Iraq had for Iran, but has now given way to a very different Iran. Iran, for being conservative-reformist, experiences serious arguments within, has economic problems and above all is at the brink of a serious clash with the US. In brief, the Iran that enchanted the Shiite has now been replaced by "political realities". However, a more important clash than this new situation is a historic one. This situation is the historic rivalry and competition experienced between the Arab-Persian Shiite. Nejef being a religious priority as a Shiite centre, and cities that are considered holy such as Karbala being in Iraq, increase this disparity even more. The increase in importance of Kum as a religious centre together with Khomeini, Nejef remaining in the background, could not have been an easily acceptable situation for the ethnically Arab Shiite of Iraq. Moreover, this tension has been experienced among the ethnic Arab and ethnic Persian religious functionaries in Nejef and is still continuing. Even if not expressed directly, it can be said that the process in Iraq of becoming a nation, and especially the efforts of Saddam to ideologically keep Arab nationalism alive has had influence over the Shiite. And as a matter of fact, despite Iran's entire efforts, even in the Iran-Iraq war, apart from certain exceptions, Iraqi Shiite remaining loyal to their country is an important example. Does this mean that the national identity of the Shiite in Iraq is above their religious identity? A more correct approach could be that even if the Shiite do not see themselves within a national identity we can say that they have a strong "native" identity.
How much of a role this deep and important struggle in differences will play in the character of the Shiite opposition in Iraq will be better understood in time. The most correct determination at this point can be expressed as: the fates of the Shiite in both countries are interconnected. However, this relationship, more than one side being an extension of the other, will be formed through a serious religious-political struggle. Future developments of the regime in Iran, for example the reformist wing be coming more successful or in fact the opposite, are among dominant aspects that will determine the fate of the Shiite in Iraq.

Conclusion and the Near Future of the Shiite Crescent
We have drawn attention to the point that the sympathy Iran gained with the 1979 revolution had with time transformed into political realities. However, it is clear that the policies Iran followed against the USA following the 2003 occupation has raised a new wave of sympathy. Attention can be drawn to the parallel between the escalation of American opposition in the region and the increase in sympathisers for Iran. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the military success against Israel of Hezbollah, who is openly supported by Iran, has a dominant role within this process. Another point which should not be overlooked is that the Shiite, who have lived as minorities in different measures within the Islamic world, had been kept outside the decision making process virtually for centuries. This situation had been such from the Umayyad Dynasty right up to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait are considered as non existent. Despite being a majority in Bahrain and in Iraq, they share the same fate. The Shiite are excluded from bureaucracy, the military and the police force; they are again considered non-existent in the sharing of oil revenue. This is why it is not surprising to see extensive attention being given to the Shiite Power in Iran. From Iran's point of view the problem may be very different. The priority aim of this country, which uses diplomacy so well and acts with an accumulation that comes from the depth of history, is to form its field of defence on the Shiite populated lands that surround it. As such, it has ensured this development after the Iraq crisis and has carried its struggle against the USA to Lebanon, Iraq and even to Afghanistan. World public opinion has only recently managed to comprehend that this axis stretches as far as Pakistan. The situation for the Shiite communities in different countries is much more complicated. Securing the participation of each to the system of the country they live in for both political and economic aspects will bring with it a long and formidable struggle. Iran's contribution for instance to the struggle of the Shiite living in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain can only be within the circle of protecting its own advantages. The Iraq example is the most blatant evidence for this. Use of this situation by the Iraqi Shiite as a serious bargaining chip for themselves shows that they have at least long overcome the way for being very influential in the future of Iraq. The futures of the communities considered within the Shiite Crescent seem bound to these types of complex balances and to international relations. Saying that Iran's main concern in dominating such an extensive area is more for its own security rather than the formation of a soveriegnty would be the correct approach.

*Journalist-author

Endnotes
1) It was an ironic example that with the ascription to the Arab-Persian clash, Saddam Husein announced himself as the Hero of Kadisiye.

2) Iran's influence on the Alevi (partisans of the Caliph Ali) is almost as little as none. However, it cannot be said that members of the Caferi sect, a community with population of almost 150,000 in Turkey, especially in Igdir and in Istanbul are away from this information. However, one should bear in mind that Ceferi in Turkey has more close connections with Iraq and Nejef centered Shiite.

3) Nusayrism, or with its occasionally preferred name Syrian Alevism is a religious sect that generally is accepted as out of bounds within the Islamic world, rather a blending of Christianity and the Shiite belief.

4) Being descendents of Mohammed that is being Seyyid is not only an important peculiarity for the Shiite but also for the Sunni world. However, the Shiite give more importance to families who are descendents of the prophet, and these people among the religious men express their social distinction by wearing a black turban.

5) Saddam Hussein was trying to take measures especially against Iran's efforts. While in one hand he was increasing the accent on Arab nationalism, on the other hand he had tried to take some steps towards the Shiite, and for example by announcing that he was descended from Hussein he tried to approach them. However, the Sunni centred structure of the Baath and lack of distinctive alterations in socio-economic conditions of the Shiite has left these efforts inconclusive.