Doubtlessly, the Georgian-Russian crisis last August will be remembered not for the civil losses it inflicted or the demolition caused by the militaries of both sides, but rather the long shadow it will cast on the political legacy of the tie-chewing Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili was not alone in his anxiety, the Western, Abkhazian and Ossetian, and even the Russian leadership felt the consequences of the war that took hold of the Caucasus region. In important ways, the Georgian-Russian conflict threatened global stability and the principles of international law.
Today, it is still hard to estimate the full extent of the damage dealt by the war in the Caucasus. Although the immediate conflict is over, the political, social and economic aftershocks are clearly not through yet. Georgia's ongoing internal turmoil, financial instability, as well as ongoing tensions with Russia, has put its leadership under a great deal of stress both from the international community and domestic opposition groups. Saakashvili's promises for further reforms still remain unfulfilled. The opposition seems more well put together and focused today than at anytime since the Rose Revolution of 2003. Now, there is an increasing risk of another possible revolution, this time to oust Saakashvili and his regime, increasingly blamed for not taking effective measures to overcome the effects of the economic devastation or proposing genuine reforms for political reconciliation within the country's fragile political scene.
Fragile Government, Decisive Opposition
The Georgian government does not have an impressive record of tolerance for any opposition movement. Recently, Saakashvili and his inner circle have tightened their grip on power by repressing opposition groups and the media, while the government's popularity is beginning to fade. Having lost the support of the followers who contributed to his rise to power in 2003, Saakashvili is trying to reassert his authority by resting on state security structures. The continuing influence of Vano Merabishvili, the Minister of Internal Affairs, within the government is perceived as a sign of this mutual support. Saakashvili has also replaced the heads of two strategic ministries, namely defense and foreign affairs, while he has also sacked Alexander Lomaia, the General Secretary of Georgia's Security Council. Grigol Vashadze, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the fourth this year to be assigned to this post.
Following the death of Zurab Zhvania, a prominent politician and former Prime Minister who served for almost a year from 2004 to 2005, Saakashvili's consolidation of power accelerated its momentum. In the 2006 elections the National Movement's overwhelming victory strengthened Saakashvili's popular mandate. Still, Saakashvili's political support remains dependent on the life line of his inner circle, namely the ministries of defense and the interior, who are directly appointed by the president and who hold greater influence over policymaking than the prime minister. This is significant in a system where other government ministries responsible for economic and other political issues are already marginalized from decision-making processes.
The August War
One such important political decision was made in August 2008, as Saakashvili attempted to retake control of the breakaway province of South Ossetia and led to a brief but crushing war where Georgia suffered defeat at the hands of the Russian forces. The conflict resulted in a ceasefire mediated by French president Nicolas Sarkozy on behalf of the EU, and Russia promised to withdraw all of its forces deployed in Georgian territory, except South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Following the conflict the Russian Federation recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Georgia's failed assault has had disastrous consequences for the Saakashvili government, with the conflict stirring heightened doubts over Saakashvili's decision-making and authority. Although after the war he seemed to be successful at keeping the opposition silent, it gradually became obvious that the conflict motivated the re-organization of the opposition groups, and this time with the support of notable followers of Saakashvili who are now disappointed with his rule.
While trying to regain personal prestige and trust in his leadership, Saakashvili seems to have suffered a blow to his image as a democratic reformer. Saakashvili's decision to retake South Ossetia by military means and risk direct confrontation with Russia not only tarnished his international reputation but also gave the opposition the necessary grounds to finally overcome internal bickering. Consenus among the once fragmented opposition that Saakashvili should be removed from power has become a unifying rallying cry.
Until the August war, the opposition movement in Georgia did not have the organizational and political basis to effectively stand together against the Saakashvili government. Saakashvili's handling of the anti-govenment protests in 2007 and the controversies in the 2008 presidential elections effectively silenced opposition forces. Disorganized and divided along the political spectrum at the time, the opposition lacked the political capacity and popularity it has since consolidated. Opposition groups seemed to lose sway in the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections , but recently with the help of heavy-weight politicians and bureaucrats joining the cause, a more intact and well-focused opposition determined to remove Saakashvili seems to be within sight. The break off of influential names from the Saakashvili government and their alignment with the opposition will be a critical turning point for Georgian politics and a possibly irreversible loss of prestige and credibility for Saakashvili.
One of the most influential figures in the opposition is the ex-advisor to the president on the Georgian-Abkhaz talks, Irakli Alasania. During the negotiations with the Abkhazian side, Alasania gained public popularity among the Georgians and was respectfully recognized by the Abkhazia leadership, while he successfully managed to establish the basis for efficient dialogue for a possible solution to the frozen conflict. However, Saakashvili's surprising decision to appoint Alasania away from the negotiation process to the post of Georgia's Ambassador to the United Nations, interrupted the peace process. Alasania's increasing popularity is seen as one of the major reasons for the controversial appointment. In December, Alasania resigned from his UN post and returned to Georgia to declare he will actively engage in politics and now heads the Alliance for Georgia Party.
Another prominent figure in Georgian politics, Nino Burcanadze, is one of the two leaders who survived 6 years on from the Rose Revolution. The revolution's second-most powerful figure, she held the position of Parliament Speaker between 2004 and 2008, until she and Saakashvili broke their alliance over a disagreement on party lists before the May 2008 elections, among other issues. She resigned from the ruling National Movement to launch the United Georgia Democratic Movement, and has declared that she has presidential ambitions of her own. Still, Burcanadze's image as one of the two leaders of the Saakashvili government initially made her position in the opposition ambiguous. In March, Georgian authorities arrested nine members of her party on weapons charges just days ahead of planned anti-government protests. Burdzhanadze discredited the charges, saying that the government was using any all methods at its dispostal to stifle the opposition.
Saakashvili's Response
Saakashvili's attempts to contain the opposition's pro-reform demands has had limited success. His promises made in the aftermath of the military offensive have largely gone unfulfilled. There are many reasons for Saakashvili's inability to maintain stability in the country, and while criticism for his disastrous handling of the August war may be the most striking example; it is not the only one. The rise of the opposition is not a cause for his flailing leadership, but a consequence of his failure to deal with the country's essential problems.
Economic Policy
Today, one of the most pressing priorities of Georgian economic policy is to recover from the August war, although this is not the sole cause of the country's financial troubles. Critical issues such as reform of the banking sector, inflation, unemployment and the instability of the Georgian Leri have yet to be solved. The Georgian economy is increasingly dollarized, while unresolved risks and the international financial crisis make the country more and more ill-suited for foreign investment. Acknowledgement that the Georgian economy has experienced notable growth since the Saakashvili government came to power aside, the domestic economic volatility makes Georgia more vulnerable to a possible economic crisis.
Immediately after the war, it was reported that Georgian investors pulled out as much as $500 million from the banks, 70% of which has not yet returned. This problem is seen as a factor that may amplify the possibility of a crisis in the banking sector. State expenditures increased in the post-war period partly to meet the needs of internally displaced persons within the country and deliver social security aid, a burden on the government budget that had not been planned for earlier. In addition, agriculture and industry have been neglected under the Saakashvili government. And today the average monthly pension of $47 remains well under previous promises to raise it to $100 dollars.
The degradation in Russian-Georgian relations, especially after the Georgian government arrested and deported Russian soldiers for espionage, resulted in an embargo on Georgian wines and other products. The embargo dealt a severe blow to the Georgian economy, while the remittances from the approximately 1 million Georgians in Russia, which are of vital importance for the economy, also declined significantly.
Georgia's relations with the EU have also became fraught as the Georgian government failed to fulfill the economic and political reforms required for inclusion in the EU Free Trade Area. So essentially, Georgian-Western relations seem to go little beyond rhetoric these days.
Foreign Policy
Georgia's relations with the West continue to be a serious concern for Russian ambitions in the Caucasus. But a closer look reveals that the Saakashvili government's emphasis on integration with the West is a tactical policy designed to overcome Russian influence rather than a sound commitment to Western political, economic and security structures. Georgia's attempts to lessen Russian meddling may not be in vain, but the Georgian leadership has used inadequate and seemingly irrational means to overcome this problem. An aggressive policy towards Russia together with unmeritorious policies towards NATO and the EU resulted in the recent conflict with Russia. Moreover, the role of the West in the resolution of the crises remained limited. As it became apparent that NATO's revised enlargement plans do not include Georgia and Ukraine in the near future, the Saakashvili government's integration promises have faced yet another severe blow.
Georgia's military campaign and Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence has proven that the current Georgian leadership is unable to keep up with its international responsibilities. It is now obvious that Georgia's hopes for reintegration with break-away Abkhazia and South Ossetia is more distant than ever.
Attempts for Democratic Reform
After Prime Minister Grigol Mgolablishvili resigned from his post citing poor health on January 30, rumors circulated that his relationship with Saakashvili had been tense. In an attempt to prove that the Saakashvili leadership is dedicated to democratic reform, the Ministry of Finance, Nika Gilauri, was reappointed as the new PM, with a slightly reshuffled cabinet that was approved by the parliament in a confidence vote shortly thereafter.
The two new ministers, Kakha Baindurashvili, who was appointed in February as finance minister and Dmitri Shashkin, previously the resident country director of the US-based International Republican Institute who dealt with the promotion of dialogue between political parties, who was appointed as the Minister for Penitentiary System and Probation, are both tasked with coordinating Saakashvili's promises of reform and the ‘second wave of democratization.'
Saakashvili's proposal for a resolution to restore state funding to a number of opposition parties was met with a positive reception. Another step towards reform seeks to limit presidential powers to dismiss parliament, but the conditions for the dismissal still remain undefined.
What Next?
On February 23, David Gamkrelidze, the leader of New Rights, David Usupashvili, the leader of the Republican Party and Alasania announced the formation of a new opposition alliance called the Alliance for Georgia. Alasania's leadership within this new alliance was recognized, as he was seen as holding real potential to unseat Saakashvili. The main point of reference for the opposition alliance is the handling of the war in August. Moreover, the opposition has been harshly criticizing Saakashvili's government for pushing the country into a financial crisis in which unemployment has reached nearly 9 %.
The new opposition alliance seems confident that unlike previous attempts to challenge the government, this time public discontent is more intense. The protests that began on April 9 are still continuing, although the crowds are scarcer than they were in the beginning. The Saakashvili leadership is trying to be cautious, offering dialogue from time to time, and not directly interfering with the protesters. Still, talk of non-interference does not seem to be holding up, as there are reports that the protesters have been assaulted by various groups, while security officials condone the attacks. On April 16, Gia Karkarashvili, who was a commander of the Georgian armed forces during the Abkhaz war in 1992-1993, declared that the protesters would set up "self-defense committees" if the authorities fail to provide adequate security.
This and similar developments are evidence that the re-energized opposition is pushing its way harder and more convincingly to present its case both internally and in the international arena. Moreover, the opposition's attempts seem to be successful so far in drawing foreign attention to the situation in the country. Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative, has recently voiced anxiety about the possibility of a direct confrontation between the security structures and the protesters.
The international attention is a sign of the Saakashvili government's failure to establish a durable relationship with the West. The current government established a domestic political system that rooted its legitimacy in its relations with the West, which now seem to be damaged after the August war and Barack Obama's coming to power in the U.S. Therefore Saakashvili is left with no choice but to return to his country's own internal dynamics to redefine the basis of his leadership. This means that the opposition will likely gain more legitimacy and momentum, as their demands for democratic reform and Saakashvili's resignation will increasingly put him in a difficult position. The possibility of calling parliamentary/presidential elections seem inevitable in the forthcoming months, as Saakashvili's attempts to divert attention to the 'enemy' is becoming more and more irrelevant.