Introduction

Justice, according to Plato, is nothing but the advantage of the more powerful.1 In a somewhat similar vein, the Greek historian Thucydides argued that the war between Athens and Sparta was the result of an abnormal increase in Athens' strength, thus tipping the balance of power in their favor, and concludes that the Spartans and their allies were forced to choose war out of necessity. Although from a legal point of view, Sparta had breached certain agreements, in Thucydides's mind, Athens was ultimately to blame for increasing its strength and causing enough fear to spark the violence.2
The nuclear threat first appeared in human history after World War II, in which nuclear bombs were detonated offensively for the first and, hopefully, the last time. The parameters of man-made destruction were horrifically altered after nuclear bombs were dropped first on Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945, and three days later, when "Fat Boy" was dropped on Nagasaki. For almost half a century since then, nuclear weapons have claimed their place on the national security and foreign policy agendas of several states. The level of mastery reached in weapons technology with the advent of the nuclear bomb meant that it could be used a tool for political pressure by the nuclear-armed states against their adversaries-with the understanding by some that the bomb was a symbol of "prestige" in international political discourse.
The discussion on nuclear proliferation should not be confined to a discussion on bilateral security threats between two states alone. Given the immediate and longer term effects of a nuclear explosion on civilian populations, the environment, infrastructure, and bordering as well as regional countries, the threat of nuclear weapons has far wider implications and breeds anxiety in the national security assessments of states that fall within the range of nuclear missiles.
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions and Israel's Necessity of Last Resort
Iran's nuclear program constitutes a major headache on the global political and nuclear security agenda. It was initiated for peaceful purposes in 1957, with the help of the United States. In 1958, Iran became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in 1968, the U.S. established a 5-megawatt research reactor at Tehran University3. With the 1973 oil crisis came increasing oil revenues and Iran enjoyed greater economic opportunities. It was not only the U.S., but West Germany and France that also helped Iran with its nuclear energy projects. Although the nuclear program entered a lull following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, it was restarted after the mid-1980s and accelerated after the 1990s.
With the alarming announcement by Iran in February 2003 that it was developing its nuclear energy plan in line with national capabilities, came heightened anxiety in the international community. During investigations the IAEA found nuclear contamination with uranium-235 enriched up to 36 percent. In a November 2003 dated report, the agencyi4 states that at least 9 unreported foreign-sourced (know-how, equipment, facility components etc.) components had been identified with the related finding that the aid came from at least four different states. These findings created a breach in trust towards Iran in the international community and Iran was designated as part of the "axis of evil", by former U.S. President George Bush. From then on, mostly with the support of the Israeli-minded western media, an intense anti-Iran campaign was launched.
Iran has repeatedly stated that its nuclear policy is crafted for peaceful purposes like research and development, medicine, agricultural innovation, and production of electricity, and has highlighted the fine line between nuclear weapons5 and nuclear energy. The official line coming out of Tehran is that the enrichment of uranium is not a quest for producing nuclear weaponsi. On the foreign relations front, Iran has followed a policy of counterbalancing the pressure that is exerted by the U.S., Israel and EU by allying with Russia and China.
Any evaluation of Iran's nuclear ambition that does not simultaneously consider Israel's hegemonic objectives in the Middle East and the policies it has adopted towards that end would be inadequate. Israel has the largest and most comprehensive nuclear armament program after the five nuclear states, (the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China); it is in possession of four thousand km ranged ballistic missiles (Jericho-3), hundreds of nuclear warheads and warplanes and submarines that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons6. Retired General Oded Brosh acknowledges two cases where Israel would opt to use its nuclear weapons during a war. First is the "last resort" option. This means that Israel would use its nuclear weapons arsenal when either it is defeated or defeat is imminent in a conventional war. The second option would be if Israel should face the threat of an unconventional - meaning a nuclear- attack. Under Brosh's view, the Jewish state would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in any scenario other than the two abovei7
However, Israel's nuclear build-up is not the only motivation behind Iran's nuclear program. One cannot overlook the regional implications of the host of security threats owed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the ensuing ethno-sectarian violence. But national ownership of weapons of mass destruction has two other significant effects: prestige and the means for political pressure. In the Iranian case, prestige carries a special meaning and is a cornerstone of national pride. Iranians see Pakistan as inferior in terms of politics, economics, societal and political maturity; and thus Pakistan's hold of advanced military technology is viewed as unacceptable from the Iranian point of view. According to many in Tehran, having a nuclear program strengthens Iran's hand in negotiations with Washington. The collapse of Saddam's regime helped lessen Iran's most serious security threat. However, regime change in Iraq brought the threat of chaos to even closer to Tehran from its western borders and anchored the U.S. at a highly strategic position for exerting influence over the region. In this light, Tehran did not benefit from the collapse of Saddam's regime, but instead came to face increased tensions with the U.S. Jargon used by the U.S. such as regime change, rogue states, pre-emptive strikes and regional strategic balance have only increased the potential deterrence value of "the strategic weapon".8
A nuclear Iran -especially under the current regime- is unacceptable for the U.S. and Israel; and that they would be willing to take all necessary measures within their reach to prevent this from materializing would not be a farfetched assumption. Iran's nuclear program is also dangerous for Western states and the Middle East for several reasons9: (1) Iran has sway over a key geographic location, important energy resources, has a young population, Shiite allies in key neighboring states, and a strong state tradition. With the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran could easily become one of the most powerful actors in the region. The direct or indirect nuclear threat could become a permanent feature of its foreign policy and Iran could opt for an increasingly hardline and aggressive stance in regional politics; even resorting to nuclear blackmail and intimidation tactics. (2) If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it will become "untouchable". Empowered by the view that no one could retaliate, Iran would be more prone to use conventional force. (3) Nuclear Iran could ignite other regional states' motivation for nuclear weapons, which would damage the present nonproliferation regime. (4) If the current hardliner Iranian regime acquires nuclear weapons, the possibility of regime change and democratization in Iran would take a disastrous blow.
For sure, the international lack of trust towards Iran's nuclear program presents obstacles to its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian government is aware of the problems that it stands to face in the international arena and its own national security; which is why it repeatedly buying time and reiterating that its program is for peaceful purposes only. At the same time, Iran benefits from difference in international interests and politics and is careful to refrain from actions that would provoke a military response from the U.S.. While on the one hand, Iran tries to disguise the depth of its program with an eye towards keeping its options open for as long as possible, it is simultaneously trying hard to be convincing in its commitment to cooperation with the IAEA.
However, Iran is having trouble garnering support for its nuclear program among international actors. The closure of the tactical gap between Europe, Russia, China and the U.S. has forced Iran to seek other alternatives. The apparent confidence Iran displays against the threat of economic sanctions stems largely from the economic ties is enjoys with China, India, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asian states.
The Russian Federation is building Iran's nuclear plants, thus it is not in favor of any type of sanctions against Iran. Chinese support for Iran is a new development; and the reason lying behind it is the energy agreement between the two states, seen as the "agreement of the century" by some analysts. With the energy deal signed by Iran's Minister of Oil, Bican Zangene, and Head of Chinese National Development and Reform Council, Ma Kai, China will buy oil and natural gas from Iran and operate the Yadavaran oil basin. China is set to purchase 10 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually over a period of 25 years via the Chinese State Oil Company (SINOPEC), and may join drilling, exploration and development activities in Iran's oil and gas basins, invest in petrochemical and natural gas industries, pipelines and related services and be permitted to establish joint ventures. According to some forecasts, Yadavaran could produce as much as 300 thousand barrel crude oil per day in the next four years and 150 thousand barrel will be exported to China. Consequently, China would satisfy a significant amount of its increasing need for oil from Iran.10
In light of these conflicting economic and political interests, the international community is carefully watching the relations between the U.S. and Iran and the implications it will have for the region. Time will tell how U.S.-supported measures will be in the effective solution posed by the Iranian nuclear challenge.
That Iran assumes that it holds a significant place in the U.S. blueprint for global hegemony and that the U.S. is open to every option--including war-to lock its position will surely have an effect on the region. It is said that if Iran successfully completes uranium enrichment and conversation facilities, it will become a "gray area" for nuclear armament. Even if Iran opens its facilities to the IAEA, it could withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) anytime that it wants -as in the case of North Korea- and would produce needed materials for nuclear weapons within 6-12 months time after the IAEA inspectors leave the country.
Another threat for the region is related to Iran's timing for initiating fuel loading to reactors and testing. Any war from this point forward would most certainly result in a catastrophe. If the U.S. and Israel were to attack and bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, the reactor could explode like an A-bomb-resulting in an explosion mimicking the Hiroshima and Nagasaki catastrophes for the densely populated region and causing long lasting damage even greater than the Chernobyl accident.
Interestingly, the model of thus far unbroken animosity between Washington and Tehran presents a somewhat bizarre sense of stability in a region that is characterized by perpetual disorder and political uncertainty. U.S-Iranian tensions have been ongoing now for a quarter of a century, and have become a somewhat warped symbol of a frozen relationship, rather that heated or violent confrontation. Given the already extremely complex challenges ripe in the region, Iran's nuclear ambitions threaten to tip the regional scale almost irreversibly towards instability and an open-ended period of turmoil. Moreover, when Iran's tradition of a strong state identity, regional influence and ideological position are thrown into the mix, the potential problems multiply in number. Iran's nuclear policies endanger the security of the Iranian people as well as regional stability.
Is Iran's Nuclear Program a Threat to Turkey?
Iran does not hold a particularly harsh place in the Turkish public's collective memory. Turkish-Iranian relations saw an improvement in recent years, particularly following the U.S. occupation in Iraq. The two states cooperate in the field of counter-terrorism against the separatist terrorist organization PKK. Iran supplies a significant amount of Turkey's energy demand and improving economic and political relations are welcome developments for both states.
Nonetheless, Turkey does not have the luxury of saying "Iran's nuclear activities are the concern of the U.S. and Israel, not ours". An Iran that is equipped with nuclear technology and technical know-how for the production of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to Israel, the Gulf States, as well as Turkey. This capability would strengthen Iran's hand in both regional and international politics. Given that the Iranian regime has for decades pursued its ambitions of regime export, and is empowered to do so by its constitution, it is no surprise that a real Iranian threat to Turkey exists and will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is known that in past years several terrorist attacks targeting Turkey were launched from Iran. In other words, Turkey is aware that Iran has in the past supported PKK terrorism.
If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the target states, in the order of which they are in danger are: Israel, the U.S. (if the range capability obstacle is overcome) and U.S. military bases around the world, Gulf States and Turkey. So even if Turkey is not in immediate danger, it does not have the geographical or physical advantage to remain unharmed from the effect of an Iranian nuclear attack.
Research on Middle East sourced threats towards Turkey shows that Iranian ballistic missiles-even without nuclear warheads- poses a threat to Turkey. The bulk of Turkey is in the range of Iranian ballistic missiles and political problems that could pave the way for the threat or the usage of ballistic missile exists between these states, with the possibility open for new strategic disputes to emerge in the future. Chief among these is the recharged influence a nuclear Iran would hold over Central Asia and the Caucasus, which would undermine Turkey's energy policy. In such circumstances, regional security challenges will become increasingly complex and require more difficult solutions.
Another aspect of this issue is whether the existing or potential problems caused by Iran's nuclear program will have a negative impact on Turkey's plans for nuclear technology transfer for peaceful purposes. Turkey has taken important steps in preparations to build a nuclear power plant, which is expected to be completed by 2012-13, for meeting some of its energy demand. Turkey's legitimate objective in doing so is to diversify its energy resources as well as widen its options in terms of supplier countries in order to minimize its energy dependency.
But due to the cloud of suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear activities, international authorities are proposing that nuclear fuel should be sourced by specific suppliers. Plans for sustaining supply security and prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation both become serious obstacles in terms of technology transfer goals (enrichment and conversation) for states like Turkey, Poland, Indonesia and Vietnam. This could usher in a new dependency corridor (based on restrictions placed on power plant model and technology) for states that are on the verge of using nuclear energy for the first time. States that will encounter obstacles in acquiring nuclear technology will be stripped of the strategic value promised by nuclear energy from the onset.

1.Platon, "Devlet", (çev.), Sabahattin Eyüboğlu ve M. Ali Cimcöz, İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000, s.29
Uğurlu fatih, "Adana Mutabakatı'na Giden Süreç ve Sonrasında Türkiye-Suriye İlişkileri", Ankara, 2005
Mensur Tarcai, "Şah ve Etom", Gozareş, Sayı 155, 1383, ss.36-37
Peter Crail, Jean du Preez, "IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failure to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?", 2004.http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_48a.html
Joby Warrick, "Iranian Nuclear Plans Found; U.N. Team's Discovery Raises Doubts about Tehran's Vow of Candor," Washington Post, 13 Şubat 2004
Zia Mian, Controlling the Bomb, Economic and Political Weekly; February 22, 2006
Shahak Israel, ss.51-52
Zbigniew Brzezinski/Robert M. Gates, "İran'ın Zamanı Geldi", 2004, ss. 42
See Silahların Kontrolü ve Uluslararası Güvenlikten Sorumlu Dışişleri Bakan YardımcısıRobert G. Joseph'in Temsilciler Meclisi Dış İlişkiler Komitesi'nde yaptığı açıklama, "İran'ın Nükleer Programı", 8 Mart 2006.
Bkz.http://www.pozitifhaber.com/nshow.php?newsId=180&pageId=4&categoryId=17