A central tenet of Islamic Shiite doctrine is that Imam Mahdi, or the Hidden Imam, the 12th Imam of a direct bloodline from the Prophet Muhammad who disappeared in 874 AD, is a savior who will one day reappear on earth to guide humanity towards peace and prosperity. During his 2005 campaign for the presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad indicated that his administration would play a critical role in preparing for Imam Mahdi's return. At times during his administration, he praised the Imam for directing the nation's affairs-alienating most pious Iranians and even conservative hard-liners for invoking such a holy figure for political leverage. With the presidential election on June 12, 2009, Iran will be handed a choice: either continue with politics run under the influence of the Mahdi or flirt with the U.S. invitation to enter into dialogue.
The political landscape in Iran is divided among the reformers and the conservatives, and neither is a homogeneous mass. The conservatives are defined with the more extremist right-wing forces associated with Ahmadinejad on the one hand, and the traditionalists, moderate conservatives and pragmatics on the other. For now, Ahmadinejad is the conservative bloc's only candidate. The reformist wing has taken some relatively important steps in consolidating their own front of influence. Former President Muhammad Khatami's decision on March 16 to withdraw from the race raised hopes that consensus may soon be reached on fielding a single candidate, thus allaying anxiety that the reformist vote would be split.
Although Mehdi Karoubi, the leader of Iran's National Confidence reformist party and former parliamentary speaker, announced his candidacy months ago, negotiations are underway to persuade him to follow Khatami's example, in favor of the candidacy of former prime minister, Mir Hussein Musavi. So far, there appear to be mixed-signals as to whether he will oblige. Karoubi failed to win the presidency in the last Iranian election in 2005. This time around, he may be more amenable to stepping aside. Any cause he may have to drag his feet in doing so stems from the support that former president Hashemi Rafsanjani-a man with a great deal of political clout in Iran-has thrown behind him. Musavi, on the other hand, served as the country's prime minister during the turbulent eight year Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. Known for his criticism of Ahmadinijad's economic programs, he has support among working class voters and with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce. Although Musavi may not be the only reformist candidate, he is the strongest one.
If the reformists fail to agree on a single candidate, this will play directly into the hands of Ahmadinejad. In addition to his traditional conservative constituency, he is unopposed in the poor rural areas of the Islamic Republic, thanks to investment and basic services Tehran was able to channel there over the past four years. But if anything, this presidential election has accentuated the fissures within the conservative alliance more than ever before. There is a sense that the conservative establishment is struggling to put up a united front, perhaps even more so than the reformers. Until recently, fear among the conservatives around the ascendency of a strong and charismatic reformist candidate, such as Khatami, was incentive enough not to run rival candidates against Ahmadinejad. But a faction of pragmatic conservatives has emerged over the last few years that is more moderate than Ahmadinejad and is keen to pull Iran out of worldwide isolation and distance it from his legacy of inflammatory and confrontational rhetoric.
Among those who may be serious contenders among the conservatives are Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and former commander of the Revolutionary Guard; Ali Ekber Velayeti, former foreign minster; and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran. Qalibaf appears to be the most likely rival to Ahmadinejad among the conservatives. Loyal to ideological doctrine on fundamental issues with other revolutionary elites, he offers a change in tone. The divide between pragmatic conservatives and Ahmadinijad's hard-line conservative supporters is deepening. A public debate is going on in Iran on the prospect of an alternative conservative candidate who will re-establish Iran's legitimacy and credibility in the world.
There had been high-hopes that Khatami's election as president in 1997 would herald an ‘era of reform' in Iran both in terms of domestic and foreign policy-making. But expectations were short lived as Khatami's platform of liberalization, strengthened civil society and political reform suffered serious setbacks. The impasse created by the dominating clerical establishment were heightened further by international developments such as the invasion of Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan, and the rise of Islamophobia that swept across the West like brush fire following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only to fuel hostility among a discontented Muslim world.
Even Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was resigned to acknowledge the rise of the reformers in the aftermath of the popular movement that carried Khatami to the presidency. Khamenei's response was a reinvigorated dose of ideological rhetoric, essentially drawing a distinction between how to interpret reform in the Islamic Republic. He denounced demands for liberalizing the political system on grounds that they were fomented by the U.S. to destabilize the country. Dealing a blow to the ‘Western' brand of reform, he signaled support for controlled and limited measures acceptable to ‘Islamic' norms. This rhetoric would constitute the central feature of political discourse for the next generation of young conservative supporters.
Young conservatives threw their energy behind slogans calling for social justice, a current of political rhetoric that had been neglected by the reformers. The emphasis on social justice and certain fundamental principles paved the way for lesser known conservative politicians to emerge on the scene, a process that spurred the dawn of ‘principled conservatism' in Iran. This explains why Iranian conservatives frequently refer to themselves as "fundamentalists" or sometimes "principled" or "value-oriented" (arzesh-gara) politicians. It is meant to highlight commitment to fundamental values shared by Iran's polity, such as its Islamic credentials. The Guardian Council under Khamenei's authority, the judiciary, and the security-military establishment favored this political philosophy, and it proved useful in the 2003 municipal, 2004 parliamentary, and 2005 presidential elections.
The Iranian public has become increasingly disenchanted with Ahmadinijad's policies; even though rudimentary reform has been attempted on some foreign policy issues, less attention has been paid to improving social and economic living standards. Advocates for reform are mostly among the bureaucratic elite and middle class voters. Poorer segments of Iranian society still stand firmly behind Ahmadinejad. But amidst inadequate economic policies, the middle class is frustrated. Another force commanding influence over the outcome of the upcoming presidential election are the moderate conservatives. Borne out of the traditional camp, the moderates defend the industrial bourgeoisie on economic matters. Favoring economic integration with the international financial system, they maintain that in its foreign policy, Iran should embrace a pragmatic approach, rather than an ideological one. Rafsanjani is identified with this current and has earned support among Iranian bureaucratic circles.
Conservative politics was defeated in the 1997 presidential, 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections. Ahmadinejad was able to emerge as president in 2005 following a campaign that was charged by populist promises on social justice, the fight against poverty and an egalitarian distribution of oil revenues among the populace. But since then, Ahmadinijad's fiery politics has tested how much political radicalism is too much, even among hard-line clerics. Apparently, there is a limit to how much extremist rhetoric can be swallowed, even in Iran. Ahmadinijad's insistence on allowing the issue of Israel to take the Iranian domestic agenda hostage; the impact of the sanctions regime resulting from Iran's nuclear program; and an economy with soaring inflation has frustrated many ordinary Iranians. But it was his insisting that the Twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, whose return on earth at the end of time is eagerly awaited by all Shiites, watches over the day-to-day affairs of the Iranian nation that angered much of the clerical establishment as well. Combined, these factors have made Ahmadinejad project an unfavorable image of a government that is far from meeting the needs of the Iranian people. The flow of as much as $200 billion capital out of Iran is an important indication of this trend. Prevalent cronyism in the state apparatus and signs that the real holders of wealth are high-level bureaucrats has hollowed out claims that Ahmadinijad's government is putting up a fight against endemic corruption.
Despite Ahmadinijad's rhetoric on his role in consolidating a stronger Islamic state, hard-liner conservatives and clerics have become increasingly uncomfortable with him. Revolutionary conservatives had endorsed Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election process, but in the four years that have since elapsed, the military wing has been expanding its influence in the country. In the days ahead, this may signal a confrontation between the clergy and the military.
The Ahmadinejad presidency has been marked by the way it split the conservatives from within. His maneuvers to isolate the moderate and traditional strands in the conservative camp has unsettled existing alliances and set the stage for political confrontation. He may end up paying the price for this in the upcoming election. But even if he manages to be re-elected, Ahmadinijad's claim to power and influence may be constrained by hard-liner clergy who are fed up with his antics. And given the unique characteristics of Iran-style government, conservative candidates who may end up losing the presidential race to him, such as Qalibaf, will likely retain their influence over the political scene even in the post election climate.
President Obama's gesture of goodwill towards Tehran on the occasion of Nowruz will not be enough for Iran, at least for now. What Iran does next hinges on what America will do first. Iranian officials have issued statements that Iran expects to see concrete steps on Obama's part that would indicate a real change in U.S. policy towards Iran. What this means is that Iran is looking for a face-saving formula to be able to change its own policies towards the U.S. It is abundantly clear that at least for the time being, the U.S. intends to thaw the freeze in relations with Iran through diplomacy and dialogue. Time will tell how long the U.S. will maintain this approach, especially if is not met by acceptable reciprocity from the Iranian side. Obama may find himself facing greater domestic pressure if Iran does not soften its hard-line rhetoric against the U.S. Whether Turkey will play a role in the U.S.-Iran rapprochement will be seen. But the early indication is that Iran will not stray far from its traditional rejection of offers made by regional powers to play a peace-broker or facilitator role.
Washington's policies in the Middle East, especially over the past eight years, have altered the balance in the region in favor of Shiite forces. The toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan were rewards handed to Tehran on a golden platter. U.S. policies in the region and alliances with repressive Arab regimes have resulted in not only an emboldened Hezbollah in Lebanon, but reignited Shiite politics across the region. As policies toward the region evolve, Iran's sway over Hamas should not be overlooked. The U.S. clearly intends to focus its political energies on Afghanistan in the near future, and it will most likely come to realize that it needs Iran if efforts are to be successful. That it has invited Iran to attend the international ‘big-tent meeting with all the parties who have a stake and an interest in Afghanistan' as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton described it, is a significant development.
Given the complicated dynamics defining the region and the decades-long confrontation between the U.S. and Iran, it is no surprise that Tehran is thinking twice about America's intentions in extending an invitation for dialogue. Tehran needs to know the priority issues that the U.S. will bring to the negotiation table in the first round of any future talks. More than anything, Iran want to know whether ‘regime change' is on the agenda. Iran is well aware of its power and more importantly, its potential. It sees itself as having the upper hand and a genuine say over the future of the region. The truth of the matter is that the U.S. cannot determine the fate of the Middle East without taking Iran into account.
Many outside observers may question whether the outcome of Iran's presidential elections really matters. While there will not be a dramatic reshuffling in Iranian politics, even a breeze of moderation may be enough to turn events in the region and relations with the U.S. in the right direction. In the end, 46.2 million Iran voters may opt to cast their vote in favor of change of their own.