The June 12th election in Iran better resembles a coup than a legitimate legal electoral conduit for choosing an individual for the country's presidency. Millions of Iranians went to the ballot boxes with the hope and expectation of electing a new president who represented the majority, would lead to a change in the country's direction. At the core of their demand for change was a desire to end the ruling elite's continual attrition of democratic norms and increasing tendency towards diminished rights and authoritarianism; as well as to end the mismanagement of the nation's economy and radical course of the nation's foreign policy. But instead, Iranians witnessed a rigged election with massive fraud committed by the top leadership of the country. The supreme leader, Ali Khamenei and the former president, Ahmadinejad, along with their functionaries in government, media, military and seminaries joined forces in planning fraud to change the outcome in their own favor. They claim that Ahmadinejad won 64 percent of the votes, while the reformist challenger, Mir Hossein Massive won 34 percent. In order to diminish the role of another reformist candidate, Mehdi Karoubi, in national politics and imply his negligible public support and inconsequential impact on the election, they allocated less than 2 percent of the votes to him.

Mass demonstrations of millions in the street ensued, challenging these election results and supporting the reformist candidates, mainly Mir Hossein Mussavi, who by all indications had won the election. These peaceful rallies were followed by the government's determination to brutally suppress this movement, and were met with the brutal violent forces of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij (the paramilitary loyal to Khamenei). Khamenei had broken election laws by congratulating Ahmadinejad as a newly elected president one day after the result was announced, before the legal deadline following elections whereby election complaints can be filed and investigated. Khamenei then delivered a sermon on June 19th threatening a crackdown on street challenges, while attempting to justify brutal violence to suppress any dissent. Masses of demonstrators poured into the streets to defy him and the election results. Hundreds were killed and thousands injured in the streets, while many reform leaders and the supporters of the Green Movement were arrested. With an order from Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guards and paramilitary Basijs attacked people in the streets, in their homes and at work with tear gas, bullets, knives and axes. They also stormed several university dormitories, where they killed and detained scores of students. The bulk of the victims were young adults encouraged by the hope embodied in the reform movement for change, if they participated in the election instead of boycotting.

The ensuing crisis in Iran has already severely undermined the legitimacy of scores of institutions. Among those threatened include Khamenei himself and his institution of Velayat-e Faqih (or rulership of the jurist), the Guardian Council, and some other institutions, which will consequently change the political structure of the polity. The nation's politics will also be impacted in a way which ultimately may change the political culture of the nation. This is the first time in the three decades following the Iranian revolution that the true nature and the anomalies of theocracy have been exposed, the sham of democracy under theocracy has been revealed, and the elite fragmentation has been divulged. The masses now have the moral authority to question the legitimacy of autocratic rule and expect the leadership of the reform movement to openly challenge the established mores under theocratic-authoritarianism. Khatami, Rafsanjani and many other leaders associated with the reform movement can no longer remain passive against the onslaught of Khamenei and his supporters within the system. They will either resist this system or will be vanquished from the nation's political scene, because this is also a test of their relevancy. They are painfully aware that if not for the masses and the country, for their own survival and self interest, they have no choice but to resist this autocratic wave. Khamenei has succeeded to some extent in quelling the protest and rebellion with Basijis' brutality in using bullets and axes, but has failed to assuage the emotion of a wounded nation and establish peace. Following this crisis, Iranian society will remain highly vulnerable to discontent, turmoil, and violence.

The current crisis in Iran must be understood in the context of Iran's post revolutionary politics, its power struggle and the battle between reformists and the conservative right for the ascendency of power and survival of their ideologies. Since the inception of the Iranian revolution, three generations have been involved in this power struggle and predicament. The first post-revolutionary battle among the first generation of the elite began between conservatives and the liberal-minded nationalist Muslim intellectuals such as Mehdi Bazargan, who advocated a government by the rule of law, accountability and democratic norms. In this battle, the conservatives included puritanist clerics who intended to establish a polity ruled by clergy, among them Mohammad Beheshti, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei, who were ardent advocates of this orientation and ideology. Beheshti formulated the concept of Dictatori-e Solaha (the dictatorship of the pious) as the source of power and manifestation of a state institutional hierarchy. Along with Rafsanjani and Khamenei, he established the party, Hezb-e Jomhouri-e Islami (the Islamic Republican Party-IRP), to mobilize and contest for power in the post revolutionary politics of the nation. The goal behind organizing such a party was to dominate Iranian politics through a one-mass party organization modeled after the communist block. Mir Hossein Musavi was one of several high ranking IRP members who later broke with the party as clerics within the organization dominated decision-making and expected other member to follow them.

IRP and its leadership supported the 1979 American hostage-taking. The goal behind this act was to purge Bazargan and his moderate pro-democratic group from power. The Bazargan cabinet resigned, giving Beheshti, Khamenei and Rafsanjani victory in the first round of power struggle. The hostage-taking, later called the second revolution by Ayatullah Khomeini, paved the way for a radicalization of the nation's politics. Reform and liberal minded individuals went through difficult and challenging times during this period. Their lives, livelihood and organizations underwent unremitting physical and media attacks by the dominant clerics in power. For this decade until 1989, when Ayatullah Khomeini died and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the president of the country, Iran witnessed the worst of its politics, as the politics of terror, intimidation and restriction of all rights and liberties dominated the country. Musavi served as the prime minister under Ali Khamenei, but developed differences with Khamenei over politics and the economy, particularly in the area of redistributive policies, but Ayatullah Khomeini sided with Musavi and supported his government during those critical years of war with Iraq (1980-1988).

In 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani took over the realm of power and presidency. For the previous eight years he had been speaker of the parliament, and politically close to then president Ali Khamenei. Rafsanjani, Khamenei and Ayatullah Khomeini's son, Ahmad virtually ran the country during its war with Iraq. Although Musavi was prime minister for most of this time, the real power was held by these three individuals. Rafsanjani propelled Khamenei to his position as Valiy-e Faqih or supreme leader after Ayatullah Khomeini's death. During the Rafsanjani presidency (1989-1997) the country witnessed major changes in its politics and economy. The second generation of revolutionaries, who by this time were in their 30's, returned from the war front to find major faults within both the economy and the politics of the nation. Some members of this generation spent their time building institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard and the Ministry of Intelligence, to help the revolution to consolidate itself. Others participated by taking of the American Embassy or managing government ministries and other institutions. The dust of the war had settled down and the reality of the nation's politics and economy had been exposed. They witnessed a colossal economic crack and political breach in the country. Many were idealists who were visualizing the creation of an equitable society, bridging the gap between have and have-nots, and ending the discrimination within national politics.

Rafsanjani's politics of patron-clientele and monopolization of power under the clergy instigated resentment and encouraged a group among this second generation of revolutionaries to establish their own civic organizations to advocate reform towards more participatory politics and to end the domination of one group in the nation's politics. This group was strongly discouraged by Rafsanjani's advocacy of a model of government resembling the Chinese. Rafsanjani was disposed to developing the nation's economy and opening it to foreign investment while keeping the politics restrained, controlled and closed. Although this tendency alienated one group among the second generation, it did not discourage another group for the same reason. This second group did not challenge Rafsanjani on politics but on his economic policies. Rafsanjani's son and relatives benefited from the economic cracks in the society, amassing tremendous wealth. This group grew antagonism toward him, among them Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although both politically and economically his own hands were dirty, he developed a deep personal enmity toward Rafsanjani.

These two groups within the second generation began to resent and challenge some among the old guard for different reasons. The first group among the second generation revolutionaries became ardent supporter of political and economic reform, while the second adopted the politics of conservatism to block change, aligning themselves with the conservative right in economic policies. The conservative right was predominately made up of Bazaari's who are import-oriented, and not industrious in nature. Through his involvement in imports, Ahmadinejad's Interior Minister, Sadeq Mahsouli became one of Iran's newest billionaires while Ahmadinejad was governor of two West Azerbaijan cities.

Rafsanjani's presidency paved the way for the next explosion in Iranian politics in 1997. Through the support of first and the second generation of reformists and the mobilization of Iran's youth and women, Khatami was elected as president. His unexpected landslide victory sent a shock wave through the core of the conservative religious establishment. Khatami's advocacy of political freedom and democratic norms emboldened many to establish reformist newspapers and civic institutions. Civil society began to develop and strengthen. The conservative religious right also stepped up its efforts to curtail the activities of reformers and diminish the impact of their reform measures in the nation's politics. In 1999, the Revolutionary Guard and Basij cracked down on a student uprising aimed at challenging the judiciary, which had closed down a few reformist newspapers. The Guard and Basij brutally crushed the student movement by killing and maiming many students inside universities. Khatami could not and did not effectively challenge the suppression, giving the upper hand to the conservatives to develop bolder attitudes towards restricting the activities of political groups and reformists attempting to politically open Iranian society. In 2000, during the sixth parliamentary election, reformist candidates dominated parliament and elected Mehdi Karoubi as speaker of the chamber. This new reformist platform and their agenda alarmed conservatives. The Guardian Council obstructed bills passed through the parliament, and prevented Khatami from using parliament to push his reform agenda. In addition, reformist members of parliament failed to instigate their agenda and the president's agenda effectively. The majority was barred later by the Guardian Council from reelection in 2004, and many were later imprisoned with spurious cause.

At this point, the conservative religious right was determined to put an end to any reform movements. Their success in their crackdown on the student movement emboldened them to try to make Khatami's presidency irrelevant and his reform agenda a failure. Although Khatami succeeded in promoting debates over the necessity of democratic norms in Iranian society and provided a breathing milieu for its civil society, he failed to withstand the onslaught of the religious conservative right. Rafsanjani was conspicuously absent in backing Khatami and supporting the reform movement. His inaction and Khatami's failure emboldened the religious conservative right to take over the politics of the nation at last.

The religious conservative right then invested in an unknown political figure, choosing Ahmadinejad and his group, Alliance for the Construction of Islamic Iran (E'telaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami). Ahmadinejad began his political career in the 1980's as governor of Khoy and Maku in the Azerbaijan Province. He served as an advisor to the governor of Kurdistan Province for two years, and in 1993 was appointed governor of Ardabil Province. He was removed from his post in 1997 by Khatami, but in 2003, conservatives promoted him for the mayor of Tehran. Reform supporters lost hope in Khatami and his reform movement and boycotted the elections, allowing conservative candidates to seize control of the major city councils in various parts of the country including Tehran. Ahmadinejad took this opportunity to be elected mayor of Tehran. At the time he was under investigation for fraud, but this was quietly concealed by the judiciary conservatives. Khatami's Interior Minister, Mujtaba Musavi Lari, reluctantly approved Ahmadinejad's credentials under the pressure from the judiciary.

In 2005, conservatives pressed forward with Ahmadinejad's candidacy for the presidency. Ideologically, Ahmadinejad closely identified with a group of the religious conservative right who questioned democracy, its compatibility with Islam and advocated a system of Islamic government devoid of an electoral process or voting rights. The mentor of this messianic group in Qum, Mesbah Yazdi, opposed the Iranian revolution and Ayatullah Khomeini's theory of Velayat-e Faqih. For Mesbah, republican government, elections and democratic norms contradicted his reading of Islam. The Guardian Council members supported his ideas, and joined forces with Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, to abolish the democratic component of the theocratic government in Iran.

Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 under a cloud of suspicion that his election was questionable and with evidence of fraud. The other two candidates, Rafsanjani and Karoubi, objected to the election results but were silenced by supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Rafsanjani went to a run off with Ahmadinejad for the second round, but was embarrassed, discredited and defeated. Many reformist groups, including the student movement boycotted this election. Between 2005 to 2009, Ahmadinejad and his supporters cleansed ministries, imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties, including the freedom of gathering and assemblies, banned even mildly critical publications, and effectively halted the momentum and vibrancy of the fledgling civil society. Scores of journalists, reform activists and university students who opposed his policies and advocated an open society were arrested. Under his administration, the nation's $300 billion oil revenue, unprecedented in the history of the country, was spent without proper accountability or measurable achievement. Both his internal and external policies alienated some conservatives, including the Tehran mayor Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani, and another conservative candidate, former Revolutionary Guard commander Mohsen Rezai. They were ignored by the more powerful figures of the religious conservative right, the men who had put together this alliance with the political leader as Ali Khamenei, ideological mentor Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad as functionary, the institution of the Guardian Council for legality and legitimacy throughout the fraud and manipulation, and the Revolutionary Guard and Basij, as instruments of brute force and violence against dissent.

Musavi and Karoubi, who had never disguised the fact that they strongly believed in the legacy of Ayatullah Khomeini, and would protect the system under the current constitution, came short in proving their credentials for membership in the revolutionary establishment. Although the presidential debates encouraged mass participation in the elections and succeeded in adding 300 percent more voter participation than the previous election, it underlined another reality in the way politics was managed, manipulated and controlled by the ruling elite. Ahmadinejad attacked conservative political figures and clergy, including Nateq Nuri, the previous speaker of the parliament, and Rafsanjani, head of two significant intuitions, the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council. Khamenei's silence during the debate was a further indication of a broader campaign of discrediting anyone who could pose a potential future threat to the total control of Iran's political machine.

Today, a third generation of Iranian youths have entered the political scene. They have transcended the first and the second generation, and became pivotal in bonding reformists together to form the Green Movement in Iran. A major force in the youngest nation in the world with a median age of 26, students most recently came out in force to vote for the reformist candidates. The electoral fraud has bruised the collective dignity of all Iranians, questioned their integrity and removed their right to a fair and free election, posing fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the government in Iran. Musavi and Karoubi are just two leaders of this movement whose social base is much broader than the appeal of these two individuals. The reform movement will this time certainly rise to the challenge of this coup d'état, and have a chance to impact the course of politics in Iran. The movement has the support of a young generation, the fragmented political elite and many within the religious establishment who have questioned the legitimacy of this government and the supreme leader. This is the first time after three decades since the Iranian revolution that the nature of Iran's theocratic authoritarianism has been exposed and the movement for reform has the emboldened support of a large and varied cross-segment of the Iranian population.

Associate Professor of International Affairs
Harrisburg University of Science and Technology
Fellow, Center for International Studies
University of St. Thomas
Program Chair, Southwestern International Studies Association