After three decades, the Iranian revolution is still unsettled. Iran's politics is the scene of conflicting interests, ideologies and penchants. Moderation is still losing to radicalism and moderate and pro-democratic leaders and successive governments have failed to strengthen civil society and support full-fledged processes of democratization. The revolution was carried out under the motto of Azadi, Istiqlal and Jomhuri-e Islami (Freedom, Independence and Islamic Republic). It put an end to over two thousand years of monarchical rule but settled for, at least for the time being, the ascendancy of clerics who have relentlessly buttressed the creation of a theocratic-authoritarian state. Elections are held on time but the results are not timely, failing to measure up to the expectations of the majority. Results at the ballot are not aligned with the needs of the nation in developing democratic institutions and a working economy.

The real question is how could this have happened in a country that had the first-ever constitutional revolution (1905-1911) in the Middle East with the goal of establishing a parliament (Majlis), spreading democratic norms and eradicating authoritarianism? The question is even more puzzling given that Iran can boast impressive university attendance rates and high adult literacy compared to its neighbors, at 79.4% after 86.5% in Turkey. The answer to this anomaly comes by following the patterns of three main dynamics on Iran's political history.

Oil, Foreign Influence, and Shi'ism in Iranian politics

First, oil has played a detrimental role in the nation's politics. Iran has been a rentier state from the time oil was first explored in this nation in 1908. Sky-high oil revenues emboldened governments to tighten control and spend this resource irrespective of their people's will and long-term needs. In democratic systems, government revenues are generated mostly from taxation. Taxation imposes responsibility and accountability on the government and its institutions. In rentier states, governments do not rely on taxation for generating revenue, henceforth, become unaccountable and unresponsive to their citizens. Under the Pahlavis, governments benefited from the availability of oil and used it to strength the foundation of their authoritarian regimes. The Shah's government benefited copiously from oil revenues in the 1970s. With the increased revenue and total reliance on SAVAK, the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization, the Shah did not contemplate any reasons for compromising with the opposition, made up of the educated middle class striving to open up the country politically. After the Iranian revolution, the price of oil fluctuated but the dependence of successive governments on oil revenue stayed the same. Oil prices reached $39 per barrel in 1981 and fell to the lowest of $9 in 1986. This price stayed around $20 per barrel for the late 1980's; rose to $32 in 1991 and fell lower than $10 in 1999. The price picked up after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, reaching more than $30 per barrel. The price climbed to $100 for the first time in February and reached $147 in July 2008. It settled around $40 in the first quarter of 2009. Oil revenues have consolidated the ability of governments under the Shah and in post-revolutionary Iran to dismiss the wishes of society and pay no heed to their responsibilities toward their citizens. Although Iranian governments after the revolution have gradually built a system of domestic taxation, their main source of revenue firmly relies on oil.

Second, external influences on Iran's domestic politics have encouraged state authoritarianism and radicalism. Historically, Iranians were subjected to exploitation and ill-treatment in their relations with foreign governments, dating back to the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925). In 1891-1892, the Qajar conceded to an Englishman the monopoly on the sale and export of tobacco for fifty years. In 1901, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah offered another concession, this time for oil exploration, to the Australian financier William Knox D'Arcy. As oil was discovered in Iran in 1908, D'Arcy's interest was accommodated by the newly established Anglo-Persian Oil Company. With the advent of WWI, the British government increased its share of the company to 51 percent. The Iranians did not benefit from oil revenue until the 1930's, when the agreement between the British and the Iranian government was rearranged. In each of these cases, British and other foreign influences prevented the Iranians from a fair share of their own resources that would benefit the national economy.

When Muhammad Musaddiq, the Iranian nationalist leader and the democratically elected prime minister, resolved to put an end to this exploitation by nationalizing the country's oil industry, a collaborative coup planned by the Pahlavis, the British and the Americans ended his government. American involvement in this coup and Washington's full support for the Shah's authoritarianism radicalized a society that would later topple the monarchy in a revolutionary upheaval in 1979. America's hesitation in recognizing the legitimacy of the Iranian revolution and the will of the people in dismantling the autocratic reign of the Shah led to further radicalization in Iran's post-revolutionary society. Furthermore, the support of the United States for Saddam Hussein's war against Iran from 1982 during the course of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) rallied the Iranian nation behind the government. This foreign intrigue further strengthened radical forces to establish their hold on Iranian politics. Under the banner of "war, war until victory," Iranian politics was fully submerged into radicalism.

Third, Shi'ism as it has been interpreted, framed and institutionalized by the conservative clergy has historically maintained a very strong emotional, authoritarian and radical slant. The dogmatic clergy used popular emotional ties to Islam as a formidable tool in mobilizing lay religious people in protesting norms, individuals and institutions that were not amenable to their definition of what is proper and fit. Iraqi Shiites and many in the Persian Gulf states follow Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Shiites in Lebanon adhere to Ayatollah Hossein Fadlullah's teaching and edicts. These and other Shiite communities have had the freedom to choose and follow the teachings and decrees of any Shiite religious authority. The exception to this rule first emerged with Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (1902-1989) who dominated the office of Shiite religious authority and incorporated politics and the government apparatus into his domain. Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary theory of government, Velayat-e Faqih (the guardianship of religious authority), was not only ground shattering in Shiite theology, it was also an attempt to establish the right to rule for a specific class, the clergy, in Iran. The bigoted and discriminatory precept of this theory paved the way for the dominance of the clergy in Iranian politics.

Politics in the wake of the Iranian Revolution: A mix of Democracy and Theology

From the early days of the revolution, two opposing ideologies and visions for the political future of the nation emerged. The clerics favored a government under the authority of Faqih. Others, composed of Muslim intellectuals who had received a modern education mostly abroad and been exposed to Western ideologies, participated in reforming cultural and religious conventions, opposed authoritarianism, and cherished democratic norms in politics and society.

The first government after the revolution was formed under the premiership of Mehdi
Bazargan (1907-1995). In February 1979, he founded a government of national unity representing both religious and secular nationalists, and the clergy. Bazargan had relentlessly tried to impose a moderate course on the revolution to no avail and resigned in protest to the taking of hostages at the U.S. embassy. He had opposed the hostage-taking on ethical and legal grounds and deemed it against Iran's own national interests. With the resignation of Bazargan's government, hopes for moderation faded in this phase of Iran's post-revolutionary politics. The government was replaced by the Revolutionary Council, consisting mainly of radical conservative clergy who had rallied behind the hostage-taking crisis and favored militancy in running the internal and external affairs of the nation.

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the current Vali-e Faqih, was elected president of the country in October 1981, and Mir Hossein Musavi, a radical Muslim intellectual with egalitarian tendencies, was appointed his prime minister. Together with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was the speaker of the parliament or Majlis, and under the instructions of the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, they brought back order and stability to the country and secured control over the government. The country was heavily involved in the war with Iraq. Radicalism was on the rise and the new regime took advantage of the situation for the mobilization of the war efforts.

In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini recommended the establishment of the Expediency Council (Showray-e Tashkhis-e Maslehat-e Nezam) to mediate between the Majlis and the Guardian Council (Showray-e Negahban), which was constitutionally in charge of overseeing the legality of bills passed by the Majlis. This council was established to prevent gridlock between the two institutions.

From 1980 to 1989, when Ayatollah Khomeini died, post-revolutionary politics was dominated by the conservative clergy. They pushed for the establishment of a political culture that was new, exclusive and alien to the dominant political culture of the nation. They coined and used concepts such as Mahareb (combatant against religion), Monafeq (hypocrite), Taquti (idol-worshiper), Mofsed-e fel Arz (perpetrator of corruption on earth), Liberal (West-intoxicated) and Mostakbar (arrogance in excess wealth) to radicalize politics and eliminate opposition to their power and rule. They cleansed government institutions from voices of dissent and arrested and imprisoned many who had participated in the revolution but later formed less favorable opinions of the ruling clergy. In the first Majlis convened in 1980, religious nationalists were the voice of opposition to radicalism and government policies restricting freedom of expression and liberties. But in the second Majlis, moderate forces were barred from participation in the election by the institutions dominated by the conservative clergy.

The war ended in 1988 and in July 1989, Hojatolislam (a Shia clerical rank just below that of ayatollah) Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the leaders of the previous Islamic Republican Party and close confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini, was elected president of Iran. In 1992, the Guardian Council vetoed leftist and progressive-tending candidates from election to the third Majlis. The Majlis was dominated by radical laymen and conservative clergy who prevented the government from laying the foundations for economic reform. The country needed a break from past ideological and radical approaches and Rafsanjani, and most in the country's leadership, were in favor of instituting some changes within the system.

Those who adhered to a leftist leaning political orientation and were engaged in Iran's post-revolutionary power struggle were also those who had, at the time, supported the hostage taking of the U.S. embassy and lent support to policies clamping down on personal freedoms and moderation. From the 1990s onwards, they increasingly became advocates of reform. They established newspapers and journals independent from the conservative clergy and other radical groups, and demanded greater political reform. For the first time since the revolution, currents of moderation and support for democratic rule found a base among the generation of the 1979 revolutionaries. This was the force that mobilized for the election of Muhammad Khatami as president in 1997.

Khatami's landslide victory, his agenda for political reform, commitment to the rule of law and democracy, and his popularity among the public made the conservatives in power uneasy. They soon responded by obstructing his policies, arresting reformist leaders, shutting down reform-minded publications and waging a political campaign against Khatami and the reformists. By the end of Khatami's first term, the reformist movement was severely bruised by the conservative camp which had aggressively rallied to prevent meaningful progress on his reform programs.

If nothing else, Khatami's presidency, which lasted until August 2005, underlined the severe challenges facing the pro-reform agenda in post-revolutionary Iran. The political system in Iran is based on a mix of democratic institutions and theocratic influences. This said, Khatami's election set the wheels in motion for a discourse on the necessity of democratic reform in the Iranian government and its political institutions that goes on unabated to this day.

The Reformist and Conservative camps in Iran

Currently, four shades of political thought influence the debate in Iran, divided between the reformist and conservative camps. The reformists are split into two groups; one is in favor of the separation of religion and the state and the other backs reform within the existing framework. The first group argues that in a democratic society, government is the reflection of the public's will and religious voters maintain the opportunity to cast their choice at the ballot box through a legitimate political process. This group argues that the institution of Velayat-e Faqih should be eliminated from the constitution. The ‘Freedom Movement of Iran represents this approach and its General Secretary, Ibrahim Yazdi, has announced repeatedly that his party is in favor of constitutional change.

The second group in the reformist camp advocates a democratic system that could accommodate the theory of Velayat-e Faqih in government. This group clings to the belief that if the rule of law and democratic institutions are established, the theocratic polity could be kept in check and held accountable. Khatami, the former president, advocates this approach and expects that under a religious democratic (Democracy-e Dini) system, society would respect the role and responsibility of democratic norms represented by government.

The conservatives are equally divided between two spectrums of opinion. One group advocates a conditional democracy gaining its legitimacy from the institution of Velayat-e Faqih. But according to this view, Vali-e Faqih would maintain the authority to meddle with people's votes and disqualify their elected representatives, or conversely, expand the power of government under the absolute authority of the Faqih if it is deemed appropriate by the Ayatollah. The other group questions the legitimacy of democratic norms and institutions in government all together and favors a political system modeled after the caliphate system dating back to the dawn of Islam. According to the Iranian constitution, Vali-e Faqih oversees the regular army, the Revolutionary Guard, the judiciary and the Mustazafan Foundation, which enjoys the ‘spoils' of the post-revolutionary period: the capital incorporated from the nationalization of factories, as well as wealth and property confiscated from those who were affiliated with the Pahlavi monarchy. Both groups have aided and supported the extra-constitutional power of this institution in the last three decades after the revolution.

The rules of the political game in Iran in the post-Khomeini era are dictated by the overpowering personalities of Khamenei and Rafsanjani; and three institutions-the Guardian Council, the office of the president, and the parliament. It is safe to say that their activities have unyielding impact on the nation's politics; and it is the nature of their interaction over time that has shaped the ongoing struggle between the reformist and conservative camps. The Vali-e Faqih, the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, inherited the mantle of power from Ayatollah Khomeini and rests somewhere above the political fray, working to keep the political system in balance. He has mostly sided with the conservatives and attempted to influence the nation's politics, particularly at times of escalating crisis, by flipping over his double-edged sword. He indirectly supported Ahmadinejad in the last election and remains devoted to his government.

Ali Akbar Rafsanjani is the second most influential and visible figure in post - revolutionary Iranian politics. Rafsanjani has held a wide variety of political posts, including membership in the Revolutionary Council. He has also served as the speaker of the parliament, the chairman of the Expediency Council (Showray-e Tashkhis-e Maslihat-e Nezam) and the chairman of the Council of Experts (Majlis Khobregan), an institution charged with the task of overseeing the performance of the Vali-e Faqih.

One of the legs holding up the main frame of the Iranian power struggle is unquestionably the Guardian Council (Showray-e Negahban). This twelve member council, dominated without interruption since its formation by conservative clergy, has established a formidable power structure overseeing the approval of bills from the Majlis and screening candidates for various elected positions at all levels of government. Reformists argue that the Guardian Council has evolved into an organization that is very distant from the founding idea and role for which it was originally envisioned. The Guardian Council's influence on the election process has become very controversial in the politics of the theocracy. With an extended power structure by way of the hard-liner conservatives in the Islamic seminaries of Qum, the Guardian Council has been converted into a strong political tool leveraged ruthlessly by the conservatives against reformists and their measures to implement social and political reform.

As the head of the executive branch of government, the influence that the president can realistically command is limited by the degree of cooperation and support that he is granted from Khamenei and Rafsanjani, as well as the Guardian Council. Unfortunately, Khatami did not receive the much needed support to put into practice his platform of liberalization and political reform; unable to thwart the hard-line elements of the clerical establishment and the formidable Guardian Council. The sixth parliament, dominated by Khatami's supporters, failed to push more vigorously in the direction of reform, mostly as a result of the Guardian Council's measures to reject critical legislation.

The third leg of the power structure is the Iranian parliament. But this institution can only exert power if the majority of its seats are filled with reformers. Currently, the reformers have a minority in the Majlis. Although the current speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani, is a conservative, he has been known to stand up against ultra-conservative views associated with the current president, Ahmadinejad, and his pressure in cases where the legislature and executive branch have had differing interests.

Ahmadinejad's presidency

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, beating former President Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karoubi, he was an unknown figure in Iranian politics, except for his previous tenure as the mayor of Tehran. He ran on a platform of anti-eliticism and anti-corruption, promising to develop the nation's economy and eradicate pervasive poverty. He won in an election where many were barred from nomination for the candidacy and some credible individuals and institutions claimed that the election was rigged in Ahmadinejad's favor. Soon after his election, it became obvious that Ahmadinejad had established fundamental links with the most conservative elements of the clerical establishment in the seminaries of Qum. It also became obvious that an ideologue, he was even less competent as a leader and incapable of managing the complexities of governance. Ahmadinejad and his mentors in the conservative religious establishment share an allegiance to the second line of thinking within the conservative political ideology: they do not value democratic norms and do not believe in representative government.

The conservative camp's long-standing project of purging reformists from power in Iran's political game culminated in rewarding Ahmadinejad with the presidency. His victory was the result of a flawed election, backed by hard-line radical conservatives, the Guardian Council, part of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force controlled by Iranian hard-liners. He rose to power by resorting to carefully crafted populist slogans, accentuating the injustices of unequal wealth distribution and corruption in society.

Ahmadinejad's presidency marked the beginning of two new phases in Iranian politics. First, his election initiated another round in the power struggle between the conservatives and reformers and highlighted an internal conflict within the conservative camp itself. The conservatives are currently split into five groups, including Ahmadinejad's Rayehe Khosh Khedmat (conduits to good services). The Mayor of Tehran, Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf and Ali Larijani, who had both run against Ahmadinejad on the conservative ticket, currently oppose him on major issues. Second, it rattled the reformists' faith in the likelihood of formal organized politics taking root in Iran. Ahmadinejad's political conduct both in domestic and foreign affairs has alienated the majority of Iranians, and sparked a backlash from among even conservative voters.

Personalities in the 2009 presidential election

The upcoming presidential election is a critical turning point in the politics of post- revolutionary Iran. The extent of the damage to Iran in terms of political turmoil, mismanagement of economic policy, high inflation and rising unemployment under Ahmadinejad have been so great that even the conservatives have vocalized their disgruntlement with his major policies. But for now, Ahmadinejad is the sole conservative candidate. The reformists nominated two candidates, Muhammad Khatami and Mehdi Karoubi, the General Secretary of the National Trust Party (Hezb Etemad Melli). Khatami withdrew in March in favor of another reformist candidate, Mir Hussein Musavi, who had served as prime minster for two consecutive terms after the Iranian revolution. Khatami's bowing out of the race was taken as a sign that he did not want to split the anti-Ahmadinejad vote.

Both Musavi and Karoubi belong to the second strand of thinking in the reformist camp, among those interested in keeping the system in tact but with mild alterations to conform to the rule of law and semi-democratic institutions. Neither have any intention to push for fundamental reform within the existing system. Karoubi has been active in national politics even after his defeat to Ahmadinejad in the last election, but Musavi has been absent from the political scene for the last two decades. With fewer opponents among the conservatives dominating Iranian politics, he calls himself Isalhgar (in favor of reform) but not in the tradition of Islahtalaban (reformers) who supported Khatami.

Karoubi is a moderate political clergy and has shown signs that he may be somewhat bold in challenging authoritarianism, but lacks a keen understanding of how modern state apparatus can facilitate the institutionalization of the rule of law and accountable government. He has also shown naïveté towards how to formulate viable economic policy to deal with rampant unemployment, high inflation and ineffectual production capacity. He mostly favors informal political processes, like traditional methods of dispute resolution under the authority of elders rather than an institutionalized structure guaranteeing checks and balances within the system. Musavi, on the other hand, grasps the significance of institutionalizing democratic norms in modern government, but is not fully capable and willing to challenge the entrenched power structures of authoritarianism. He is not a clergy, unlike Karoubi and Khatami, who rose from the clerical ranks to challenge the more conservative definitions of law, the role of government, and rudimentary civil society. In a country where authoritarianism prevails in the mantle of religion, the fight for power and control is not only political but also ideological.

The conservative religious establishment may not tolerate Musavi's proposals for political reform nor accommodate his views on the significance of civil society and democratic institutions in government. On economic matters, Musavi is largely identified with the wave of post-revolutionary nationalization of Iranian industry. His past egalitarian views on the economy may be his strongest asset in challenging Ahmadinejad's populism. Khatami's withdrawal in favor of Musavi may also encourage conservatives to support other conservative candidates challenging Ahmadinejad in this election. Khatami's candidacy had galvanized conservatives with various persuasions to stand with Ahmadinejad against the very popular Khatami. If elected, Khatami's presidency would have spurned massive conservative obstructionism to his government, as had happened the first time around. Khatami's support for Musavi's candidacy is meant to curb the hard-liners, for the sake of making some minor strides in reforming the system, although still not fundamentally.

The era of Ahmadinejad has come to an end. In a country with a median age of 26 and 70% of the population under the age of 30, most do not remember the days of the revolution. The expectations among the younger generation, more than 1.5 million of whom are attending universities inside the country and some more abroad, remains very high. The intensity of discomfort, discontent and disconnect with the current regime is colossal. The next generation is actively demanding better life standards and seeks opportunities to participate in building a nation with a more transparent and accountable political system and a vibrant, growing economy. Both Karoubi and Musavi understand the severity of the current situation in Iran and offer hope for modest, but not drastic, change. Both are in favor of establishing closer and more reconciliatory relations with neighboring countries in the region and the West. Both would like to repair the damage the current government has inflicted on the internal and foreign affairs of the country and adhere more closely to the policies which made Khatami a memorable president in the history of post-revolutionary Iran.

Dr. Noorbaksh is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Coordinator of General Education at the Harrisburg University of Science and Technology. He is a Fellow at the Center for International Studies, University of St. Thomas and serves as Program Chair of the Southwestern International Studies Association.