Israel's latest three-week long operation in Gaza and the high number of civilian casualties prompted global reaction and harsh criticism. In human terms, the Israeli offensive meant severe loss of life and suffering, thousands of injured Palestinians, virtually no remaining infrastructure to speak of, and loss of homes and property under heavy bombardment. Global audiences will continue to talk about the unproportional use of force in densely populated urban areas and the Israeli army's careless and even, as they are accused, deliberate attack on civilians.
Almost immediately, the International Red Cross Committee was very vocal about the realities on the ground in Gaza. Chief among the issues was the Israeli army's block on the transit of medical supplies to injured Palestinians and the bombing of the UN school on January 6th, which resulted in the death of 40 civilians taking refugee there. Such images will remain at the fore of the collective public memory and has led to severe condemnation of Israel and even calls to charge Israel with having committed war crimes.
From Israel's perspective, it is clear that Gaza is still viewed as a conflict zone in need of a solution. The question of how to deal with the tunnels at the Egyptian border, of which there may be as many as 1,500 and which are used for smuggling materials for building missiles, will remain at the top of the Israeli agenda in the foreseeable future. Egypt has not increased the number of troops necessary for the control of the Gaza border as was agreed in the 1979 peace accord, while simultaneously refusing offers to provide technical aid by the United States and Germany on account of not wanting foreign troops stationed on Egyptian territory. As a result, the problem pesters on with little hope of a lasting solution in sight, while simultaneously enabling Israel to occupy the narrow passage known as Filadelfi Road that extends throughout the border. A proposal that was earlier put on the table by the international community to ensure control of the tunnels, a sticking point for Israel, was the deployment of Turkish troops at the border region. But this was an idea that seemed feasible at a time when Turkey was acting as a disinterested mediator and the two parties had a positive view of Turkey's role. Today, the state of Turkey-Israel relations is still in flux and Turkey is unlikely to volunteer to assume responsibility for military control of the border anytime soon. In other words, the problems posed by the tunnels, one of the thorniest issues in Israeli-Hamas relations, will likely remain unresolved for a long time to come.
A more realistic approach would be to negotiate for the permanent closing off of the tunnels, contingent on the lifting of the economic embargo over Gaza and Hamas. The tunnels are not only used for transport of ammunitions and weapons to Hamas militants but also used for bringing every kind of medicine, food and even oil to the people of Gaza. If the tunnels are to be shut off, a viable economic lifeline has to be thrown to the local population to ensure sustainable livelihoods.
Changing Strategic Approach
Although fundamentally, Israeli politics and strategy are driven by the unchanging forces of the state, policies and views on the military approach to Palestine, and especially to Gaza, have shown important differences depending on who is in office. From a military perspective, this has meant problems for foreign policy, relations with other states and even resulted in Israel's isolation. That military solutions do not yield results in the resolution of the Palestine problem is easily discernible by the years of conflict and the proliferation of Hamas-like radical Palestinian fractions. In 1982 Lebanon, then-Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon initiated a harsh operation against Al-Fatah only to realize that it did not work. When he became Prime Minister in 2001, he chose to follow relatively softer policy; going as far as to withdraw Israeli forces from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. But when the militarily inexperienced and historically weak Ehud Olmert came into office, he opted to use aggressive force against Hamas and Hezbollah provocations. This approach has only strengthened Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran ties and resulted in a loss of Israel's prestige in world public opinion.
While the weight of Gaza in the Middle East balance has tipped dramatically in the aftermath of the Israeli offensive, the echoes of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) operation against Hamas lingers. An important observation that has been made when analyzing the operation is that Israel had full U.S. support, which encouraged Israel to employ new military tactics-resulting in the use of new techniques of warfare in Gaza like the use of controversial white phosphorus shells and octopus like fireballs. Although Israel, which failed against Hezbollah's missiles and rockets in 2006, is known to be developing new anti-missile systems against short range missiles such as Kassam, Grad, Oghab and Fejr-3/Raad, there is currently no information on whether Israel used this system in the latest operation.
During the war against Hezbollah in July of 2006, Israel was targeted by 4,200 Hezbollah missiles which it failed to prevent, proving that Israel did not have an anti-missile defense system. Claims that the number of missiles has increased from 5,000 to 40,000 since 2006 only make it more clear that Hezbollah and Hamas-based missiles attacks are Israeli's worst nightmare. Some argue that Hamas has only two weapons against Israel: stones and missiles. The necessary building materials for these missiles are said to be smuggled through the near 1,500 tunnels at the Egyptian border or via sea routes and are produced illegally. In particular, development of short-range Kassam missiles began during the second intifada or in other words El-Aksa Intifada that was declared in 2000. One of the most significant reasons behind Israel's offensive is that Hamas started to produce long-range missiles like Grad and Kathusya, which have a range of 40-45 km and can hit targets deep into Israeli territory. Improvements in missile range of weapons in Hamas's arsenal means that the Israeli population under the threat of these missiles increased from 200,000 to half a million. It also shows that the new missiles could hit deep into Israeli territory to cities like Ashdod, Kiryat Gat and Beersheba and even Israel's most important nuclear research center, Dimona.
Evidence of the radical shift in military tactics that Israeli military circles have adopted recently and which unleash severe civilian suffering and a humanitarian crisis can be recognized simply by looking at the results. Months before the Gaza operation, Israeli military officials were highlighting that it is impossible to fight against insurgency groups that blend into the civilian population by means of conventional tactics alone. As a result, proponents of this view not only leaned towards the doctrine of "unproportional force" but also enabled its implementation. However, this is not the first time that this approach has curried favor with Israeli military strategists, as it was previously tried in the summer 2006 offensive in Lebanon against Hezbollah. In that operation, IDF destroyed infrastructure with intensive airstrikes and made Hezbollah-controlled regions uninhabitable. But although Hezbollah at the time launched intensive missile attacks on Israel, causing some damage to the IDF behind the frontlines and a loss of Israeli prestige in the international arena, in the long term, Israel's tactic paid off. While the world was criticizing Israel's operation against Hamas, Hezbollah could not dare retaliate in an attack similar to the one in 2006 in support of Hamas. Today, the application of unproportional force which was previously tested in 2006 on Hezbollah was used against the people of Gaza causing disastrous damage.
While Israeli officials were insisting that "only Hamas leaders and logistic bases are being targeted," in reality, attacks that targeted infra- and supra-structure damaged approximately 24 schools, tens of hospitals, ambulances, factories, power plants, bridges, sewage system and even farms. Twenty thousand houses became uninhabitable and the total cost of damages have been said to reach 2 billion dollars. Up to 100,000 people in Gaza, who are already refugees, were uprooted and forced to migrate once again. With this operation, Israel more broadly applied the deterrence strategy which was tested during the Hezbollah war, and inflicts severe civilian casualties and collapses the economy. However, the unproportional force doctrine caused an unacceptable human tragedy that will not easily be forgotten.
Israeli Military Doctrine
Analysts often reiterate that Israel can only handle one defeat in war owing to its small army and high population density. Consequently, a second defeat and the real possibility of the country's occupation would prompt Israel to consider its nuclear option. However, because the Israeli population is in such close range and in danger of the nuclear fallout, the use of nuclear weapons is a means of last resort in the Israeli military doctrine. A more likely scenario is that Israel would opt for political and diplomatic measures to resolve an outbreak of conflict first; followed by saber-rattling and the presentation of a credible threat of the use of its nuclear weapons. In any case, Israel would ideally prefer to prevent an escalation of hostilities (even though in Gaza, it seems that Israel did not pay much heed to this principle). Moreover, according to the doctrine, the struggle against terrorism is given priority in the struggle against regional adversaries. According to its defensive strategy, while air and naval forces are kept at normal operational levels, the army is structured to have small units with high mobility capabilities and early warning systems. An effective mobilization system and transportation network is seen as vital to support the strength of ground forces in particular. A highly coordinated relationship between air force-navy-army is put in place. A central feature of the doctrine is that wars should be fought on the territory of the adversary, be time-efficient, with lowest possible levels of casualties the priority. Speed in achieving established war goals is a fundamental tenet of the doctrine.
In application, the military doctrine means that the IDF is composed of a highly mobile army with cargo aircrafts and attack helicopters; a very effective Air Force that can provide air superiority and hit strategic targets when necessary; and a navy that is capable of controlling and securing the Gaza coastline. The nuclear option, or "the last resort" in Israelis view, is an important deterrence function. Although Israel has never officially declared its nuclear capabilities, it holds onto this option, especially its "second strike" capability, as a trump card in its foreign policy tactics.
Where is Israel heading?
Occupation, years of a crippling embargo and loss of thousands of Palestinian lives in the latest operation in Gaza. Nearly all of them are civilian, women and children. Some of the Arab and Western states are silent, even pleased with the operation that was directed against Hamas and the civilian population in Gaza. As was expected, the United Nations was an ineffective bystander as usual. The European Union applies double standards and the United States openly backs Israel. Encouraged by these dynamics, Israel moved the IDF into Gaza and applied new military tactics. It first initiated a series of aerial attacks to break the resistance, and then tanks moved in with targeted assaults to selected regions to effectively divide Gaza into two.
Intelligence gathered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and HUMINT was transferred to AH-64A Apache attack helicopters and army units, enabling attack helicopters to hit selected targets with anti-tank missiles. Tanks from the flanks opened machinegun fire to selected targets.
It may be expected that Israeli operations will continue for some time, showing Hamas provocations and missile attacks as justification, in line with the principles of its military doctrine. The new urban warfare strategy that foresees the use of army units in the open field and not getting involved with street fighting in order to minimize casualties is significant.
In light of this, Israel is likely to refrain from a permanent occupation of Gaza. Such an occupation would mean making Israeli troops vulnerable to street-to-street urban confrontation, which undercuts its military doctrine. On the other hand, in the absence of strong opposition from the international community, the Arab world, Iran and Hezbollah, it is very likely that Israel will continue to hit Hamas targets from protected sites. However, the prolonged absence of a political solution to the conflict and a possible renewal of military aggression will mean hundreds of more civilian casualties and in the long run, Israel's isolation.

(Kutu Icine Konulacak Bilgiler - (2009) "Chapter Five: Middle East and North Africa" The Military Balance, 109:1, pp. 249-251)
Israel Defense Force
Capabilities - Active: 176,500 (Army 133,000 Navy 9,500 Air 34,000) Paramilitary 8,050
Reserve: 565,000 (Army 500,000 Navy 10,000 Air 55,000)
Defence Budget 9.26bn (2007)
Strategic Forces
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability - delivery means include ac, Jericho 1 (SRBM) and Jericho 2 (IRBM)
Warheads: up to 200 nuclear warheads
Strategic Defenses
17 batteries MIM-23B Improved HAWK
6 batteries MIM-104 Patriot
3 batteries (24 launchers) Arrow/Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post. Launchers sited Hadera and Palmachim (N and C Israel)
1 US EUCOM AN/TPY-2-X-band radar at Nevatim, SE of Beersheba
Army 26,000; 107,000 conscript; 500,000+ on mobilization; (total 133,000-633,000)
Organization and structure of formations may vary according to op situations. Equipment includes that required for reserve forces on mobilization.
Forces by Role: 3 regional commands each with 2 regular div; 1-2 regional/territorial div; 2 regular bde
Armd 2 div; 15 bde
Inf 4 div; 12 bde
Para 8 bde
Arty 4 regt
SP arty 4 regt
Equipment by Type:
MBT: 3,501 (Merkava MkI; Merkava MkI; Merkava MkIII; Merkava MkIV; Magach-7; Ti-67 (T-55 mod); M-60/M-60A1/M-60A3; Centurion; T-54/T-55/T-62S; M-48A5)
RECCE: 408 (RBY-1 RAMTA, Tpz-1 Fuchs)
APC: 10,419+
ARTY: 630 Self-propelled
456 Towed
Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript; 10,000 on mobilization (total 9,500-19,500)
Submarines 3
Corvettes: 3
Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 56
Naval Aviation: AC: 2 C-130
Helicopters: ASW: 9
SAR/UTL: 17
Naval Commandos: appox: 300
Air Force 34,000
Aircraft: 435 combat capable
Helicopters: ATK: 103
ASW: 7
SPT: 65
UTL: 113
UAV: 44+
Air Defence: SAM - Towed 48+ (PAC-2; MIM-104 Patriot; MIM-23 Hawk)
Guns - Self-propelled: 165
Towed: 755