The rise of the newly independent nations in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union witnessed a period marked by severe violations of human rights and legal treaties, which, if observed duly could have shielded the Caucasus from the numerous tragedies and humanitarian catastrophes that it had to endure. It is as if the basic right of the modern nation to self-determination and so called territorial integrity are no longer recognized as international principals. While the right to self-determination has no practical implementation, the territorial integrity principal is universally respected and has more significance in the area of international politics, relatively speaking. Territorial integrity, unlike self-determination, practically can be respected through different measures, which at times have been exercised through oppression, discrimination, manipulation of inter-ethnic conflict and minority policies defined by aggression by the countries that have inherited territories from the once standing, now long collapsed empires.

The euphoria and rally for the democratization of the corrupted and totalitarian regimes and the transformation of the former tyrants into democrats gained momentum when the international community inconsiderably recognized states like Georgia. As long as the territorial integrity of Georgia, created by Stalin and his followers during the Soviet period, is respected, Georgia will be a constant threat to itself and its neighbors. The continued recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity in its Soviet borders will assign this country to a quasi-Soviet status, thereby widening the gap between its current status and its goals of sustainable development of the economy and democratic institutions, while at the same time detaching its elites and population from the present realities on the ground. By recognizing the territorial integrity of Georgia, the international community has prolonged the continuous sufferings of the people of Abkhazia that led a century long struggle for independence from Georgia, ever since Abkhazia's union republic status was reduced to ‘autonomy' by Stalin in 1931. Georgia's acceptance to the United Nations against the backdrop of Georgian preparation for war with Abkhazia in 1992 was a tragic historical decision which immediately ignited long-term confrontation between Abkhazia and Georgia, undermining the entire Caucasus for decades. Many observers claim that the recognition of Kosovo or Abkhazia may create a potentially destabilizing precedent, but in reality the recognition of Georgia within the Soviet borders established a pattern that caused a perpetual climate of confrontation and the collapse of Georgia as a country.

Even today, it remains difficult to estimate the ultimate consequences of that decision. In simple terms, Abkhazia was given to Georgia like a gift - one which resembles the one by Stalin. Even despite appeals to the UN where Abkhazia repeatedly indicated the absence of any legal grounds to consider Abkhazia as part of Georgia, the so called and widely internationally confirmed territorial integrity of Georgia was recognized. According to the Soviet Law of 3 April 1990, Abkhazia had the right for secession, which Abkhazia fully implemented. By the time of the formal recognition of Georgia, Abkhazia was no longer a part of Georgia. Over the past 15 years of UN led negotiations, Georgia repeatedly launched 6 military full-scale attacks against its two "breakaway provinces": in 1990, 2004, 2008 in South Ossetia and 1992, 1998, and finally, 2001 in Abkhazia. If those aggressions were given an objective assessment, any future violations of signed peace treaties could be avoided. Despite the continued aggressive rhetoric and military buildup on the part of Georgia, the international community has continued to shape its peace efforts and confidence building projects based on commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia, and has provided unfairly disproportionate humanitarian support to Georgia over Abkhazia. None of the rising concerns in Abkhazia and South Ossetia about their security, stability and protection were addressed during this time. The recent developments in South Ossetia and the disclosed military plans of Georgia to take Abkhazia by force before Georgia joins NATO, clearly indicate the Georgian leadership's intentions to solve the problem by force, even at the cost of thousands of civilian casualties and an upsurge of refugees. The past decade has been one of lost opportunities characterizing international humanitarian efforts and what may be called a peace-building industry, which concluded with the Georgian-South Ossetian war in August 2008. The 15 year Geneva process was launched at the time when the "Moscow Agreement" was signed and the modalities for non-resumption of the conflict were identified. However, after so many years of negotiations, the outbreak of war in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia became inevitable. Independent experts confirm that behind the widely articulated peace proposals tabled by Saakashvili, his administration was actively preparing to regain the lost territories by force.

The Abkhaz side repeatedly informed the international community about its concerns which were only heard after the situation took a turn for the worse towards escalation of the conflict. Such concern was expressed during the visit of the European High Commissioner for External Affairs, Mr. Javier Solana, in June 2008 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Mr. Steinmeier, later next month. Even such high and close international attention to the rising tensions in the region could not stop Georgia from launching the aggression against South Ossetia. There is a need to identify the impulse that moved Georgia into this military adventure which turned into an international relations crisis pitting the West against Russia - a crisis of trust towards international mediation efforts. However, this was a definite point of no return in the history of what was deemed by Georgia as a countdown to the restoration of its territorial integrity. In reality, the moment that Georgia had ignited its army to prepare for war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was the day of Kosovo's recognition which sounded the alarms in Tbilisi to reconsider the time frame for an attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The preparation faze started with the flights of the Georgian Unmanned Air Vehicles over Abkhazia in early spring 2008. The data from these UAV's cameras, later found in the captured Georgian military plans, explained in a power point presentation the course of the operation called "The Rock" scheduled on 9 May 2008. Early May 2008 was a time of intensive accusations leveraged against Russia by many in Georgia and in the West for the increase in the Russian peacekeepers presence on the Georgian-Abkhaz border in accordance with the mandate of the Russian Peacekeeping Forces. This increase was a message to Georgia that Russia would interfere in case of aggression against Abkhazia. However, this move was interpreted in the West as purely a symptom of Russian military build-up to confront and undermine Georgian moves towards NATO membership.

During the entire spring and early summer months of 2008, Georgia made a number of clear indications that it was preparing for war, however, when it finally erupted in August it was treated as a surprise by many. But what was surprising? The surprise was the Russian reaction but not the Georgian aggression, since everybody in Georgia, including representatives of the international community, knew it would ultimately come to bear. It should also be noted that besides the visits of high ranking diplomats, Abkhazia was visited by a number of other Ambassadors appointed to Georgia. During these visits, the Abkhaz side seriously voiced its concerns regarding the intensive militarization of Georgia and its preparations for war. At the time, many Western diplomats openly stated that Georgia was not likely to start a war and if: "... Georgia starts the war there will be a very, very harsh reaction from the international community and Georgia will have to forget about NATO and the European Union". However, this scenario was not realized and an intensive pro-Georgian media campaign unfolded following the conflict in South Ossetia, exhibiting the weakness of the international mediation and conflict prevention mechanisms which were in place for over than 15 years.

Needless to say, the money that was spent for confidence building projects collapsed in one night after the Georgian aggression in South Ossetia. There is a feeling in the Caucasus that Georgia's international advisors agreed on so called police operations to restore "Georgian constitutional order" and fight the insurgency caused by the "Russia backed South Ossetian separatists". According to this scenario, Russia was expected to provide low-scale support to resistance groups operating in South Ossetia and finally West-backed Georgia could gain control over the whole territory. Such a scenario could easily fit the breaking news lines of various international media outlets which jumped at the opportunity to excuse Georgia for its extensive use of force and the casualties among the peaceful population, which actually was reflected exactly like this by many news agencies in the West. However, this deliberate project did not bear fruit as planned and an event changed the fate of the Caucasus for future decades to come: The mass killings of civilian populations in South Ossetia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia and Nicaragua changed the status-quo and the reality in the Caucasus.

Georgian territorial integrity is no longer recognized by two members of the United Nations, one of them a member of the UN Security Council. New peace initiatives and the Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreement created a new framework for future peace and conflict resolution processes, thus granting the European Union a more active, and less neutral, role than it had before. The EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia, deployed in line with the Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreement, made the EU a party to the conflict and the EU took a strong and active position against the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia-conducting a policy of unilateral support to Georgia. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) mandate is not clear and transparent and provides that the EUMM would have to be present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to monitor the situation and provide reports exclusively to their respective headquarters. This then raises questions regarding the need for this organization to be present in the conflict zone. There have been no objective reports issued by the EUMM about the situation in Georgia after the August 2008 war and the Georgian military build-up does not raise any concern from the perspective of the EUMM. The EUMM mandate covers only the whole of Georgia and excludes Abkhazia; however, the EU is adamant in its claim to enter Abkhazia as before, notwithstanding the new reality and recognized status of Abkhazia. The general EU position concerning the de-facto states is quite ambiguous. While the issue of the recognition of Kosovo by the EU has been fragmented, the EU is united against the recognition of Abkhazia. But what can denying recognition bring to Abkhazia or to the EU? By not recognizing Abkhazia, the EU alienates itself from its own formulated European Wider Neighborhood Policy - a policy that identifies the EU's Eastern strategy. The EU's failure to recognize Abkhazia does not just affect Abkhazia's institutions and legitimacy, but it also significantly affects the cultural, social and religious rights of ordinary people living in those countries. Adhering to a policy of rejecting its neighbor, the EU can hardly develop a common strategy, respond to challenges or prevent future conflicts.

A better shaped and balanced EU role in the Caucasus could foster a process of democratization. But as it stands today, EU policy in the Caucasus can unfortunately no longer be viewed as neutral after the crisis last August. Direct EU involvement in Georgia and its active non-recognition policy limits the EU from developing direct non-political relations, which Abkhazia is seeking to establish. It is extremely hard for Abkhazia to continue the transition and succeed on the way towards a full-fledged democracy, while being limited by economic, political and partly, information sanctions imposed by Georgia. By keeping Abkhazia in the shadows and promoting its buffer status, the EU in the framework of the Black Sea Synergy program will be constantly facing new challenges which will undermine security and economic links in the Black Sea region. It has to be clarified that stability in Georgia cannot be achieved with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as its parts or with the absence of any feasible way to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into Georgia's folds after the tragic events of last summer. The EU should promote development in Georgia without taking on huge military burdens and concentrate its policies on social and economic challenges facing the country.

Indeed, the whole region needs some positive impetus and more creative thinking from the side of the international community. However, all mediators in the Caucasus are very far from realizing the obvious means that could bring peace for all. The Winter Sochi Olympics of 2014 is still considered by some of Georgia's supervisors as a tool to irritate Russia for its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At present, international mediators are still far from observing the peace-building impact, and the economic, social and cultural benefits in bringing about stable relations as a result of the 2014 Winter Olympics. This could bring real prosperity and peace for all, including Georgia. Abkhazia is most interested in a stable political environment which would not be undermined by another severe internal political conflict in Georgia with the consequential overthrow of the President. Here is the opportunity to give Georgia and many others in the Caucasus a chance to promote peaceful and economic initiatives. The upcoming presidential elections in Abkhazia in December 2009 will mark a starting point for another five years of rapid development accelerated with the Olympics. Despite strong opposition, the current President of Abkhazia, Mr. Sergei Bagapsh, is likely to stay on for a second term in office which will determine another period of stable Russian-Abkhaz relations and growth of investment interests in Abkhazia.

The coming five years will strengthen ties between Abkhazia and Russia, but there is room for other players, in particular Turkey and the European Union, who are invited to join the process. Abkhazia considers Turkey, where most of the community of Abkhaz Diaspora resides, as one of the most potentially strong partners in the Black Sea. Turkey does not restrict itself from cooperation with Abkhazia and Russia after the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation. Even more, Turkey is initiating a process which would help to find a way forward in the Southern Caucasus which may involve making some hard choices for Turkey. The 2014 Winter Olympics could serve as one of the deciding factors for Turkey's proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, in which Abkhazia is keen to participate. The presidential elections in Abkhazia and the Sochi Winter Olympics will determine a period of stable economic growth and separate those partners who have a stake in the stability and prosperity of the Black Sea region and identify those who contribute to isolation and alienation in the Caucasus.