Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University
History has witnessed how great wars have triggered seismic realignments in the international order. In the 21st century, however, the economic order, not the eruption of warfare, stands to dramatically reshuffle the international order. The current global financial crisis has already, and will continue to, show that whether we like it or not, the financial crisis will have significant repercussions on the international system. Developments have shown us that financial crises are the recognized symbol for the collapse of the first and second-worlds. The demise of the first and second-worlds triggered the rise of the third world. It is clear that the current financial crisis will shape new centers of power in the international order, and importantly, cause a shift from a unipolar to a multi polar international order.
The effects of the financial crisis over the third world were more repairable than in the developed countries. Despite the negative effects of the crisis, the third world emerged as the new battlefield between "old" and "new" powers. Since the mid-1970s, China has been calling itself a member of the third world under Mao's classification of the world under the three world theory. Mao Zedong suggested that the world is politically and economically divided into three worlds, but Mao's theory differs significantly from the traditional ideal of a "third world". According to Mao, the first world consists of the superpowers, the second world of the wealthy allies of the superpowers, and the third world of the non-aligned nations. Deng Xiaoping introduced this view to the world in his 1974 speech to the United Nations. During an interview with analyist Fareed Zakaria on CNN International, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao reaffirmed that China is part of the third world and that it is not a superpower, but a developing country. But today many scholars debate whether China can really be classified as a third world country or not; despite Wen's adamant position that China is not part of the first or second-worlds.1
It should be accepted that China has been affected by the financial crisis but not as severely as the U.S., Russia, Europe and Japan. Despite downturns in its economic growth and exports, China is still an economic giant. Despite some economic losses, China is not without some political gains. First of all, with the financial crisis China legitimized its regime and political and economic system at the international level. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the West had been critical of China's political system and state-centric economy. According to Wen, that the U.S. has had to resort to strong measures to tackle the financial crisis proves that China has been doing something right for the past 20 years.
The financial crisis has revealed new possibilities for a more prominent and resurgent China in international politics. In October 2008, Beijing hosted the 43-nation Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), where China was called on to take a larger role in halting the global financial crisis. China's support is seen as key to any global response because it has the world's fastest-growing major economy; holds the world's largest foreign currency reserves; and is the leading actor capable of helping Asia weather the potential damages of the economic downturn. In the summit, European countries, chief among them France and Germany, lobbied for greater financial reform and backing for the world economy as well as endorsement for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its role in helping to resolve the financial woes. German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked that the IMF must become a "guard for the stability of the international finance system." China accepted to support these efforts, albeit cautiously, and in principle. In return, instead of high interest rates, China demanded certain geopolitical concessions in Eurasia and asked to be treated as an equal partner when it comes to relations with the IMF and World Bank along with the U.S. on global governance matters.
During the third Sino-Russian Economic forum soon afterwards, with a view to winning strategic concessions, China announced it would lend 10 billion U.S. dollars to the Russian state pipeline giant "Transneft," and 15 billion U.S. dollars to "Rosneft" Russia's biggest oil producer, in exchange for a long-term oil supply deal that commits Russia to exporting 300 million tons of crude oil to China over the next 20 years via a 68 km pipeline extending from Eastern Siberia to China. The deal has been long-awaited with China and Russia locked in negotiations for a long time, with Russia hesitant to deal with China earlier due to geopolitical reasons. But with the onset of the financial crisis and drop in oil prices, Russia could no longer ignore the prospect of injecting Chinese capital into its economy. This symbolizes an important step for China in gaining a coveted foothold in Eurasia. In addition, China consolidated its strategic position in Eurasia by provide assurance for supporting the world economy at the G-20 summit.
At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November of 2008, China was declared as the new development model for the third world by Peruvian President Alan Garcia, where he remarked that China's recent measures to stimulate its economy had not only facilitated the restoration of the Chinese people's confidence but also helped the world to regain confidence and that the world must learn something from the Chinese experience. In turn, Russian president Medvedev emphasized his belief that "many APEC countries will become leaders in the post-crisis period and will gain new positions in key markets"adding that "the world will not be same as the previous one" at the end of the financial crisis, Another note-worthy assessment comes from Parag Khanna, author of the book The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. Khanna's intriguing post-hegemoinc assessment essentially is that U.S. global hegemony will soon be divided by the new "Big Three": The E.U., China and itself, while the "second world" will be the geopolitical marketplace that will decide which will lead the 21st century.
Meanwhile, the geopolitical struggle over Eurasia, Africa and Latin America continues to play out. China, the U.S. and Russia are the leading powers in this struggle to fill the geopolitical power vacuums. The Bush administration chose the Middle East, and in part, Africa as its priorities; but the newly elected president Obama will choose Eurasia. Obama's mentor Brezinski played an important role in this strategic policy choice. When Obama was elected as the new president of the U.S., we once again were reminded of Brezinski's The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, the book that is well-known as the roadmap for the U.S. domination of Eurasia in the 1990s. Obama's statements about Eurasia are neither a coincidence nor a ploy. When we look at The Grand Chessboard, some questions emerge: namely, why did Obama point to Eurasia and why is Eurasia so important? In response, Brezinski offers important answers: "Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known energy resources...for America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia"2 In fact, a very similar assessment came from China a few years ago. In the chapter on political goals in its 9th five-year economic development plan, China attached special significance to Eurasia.
Interest in a ‘new' Eurasia is not recent and certainly did not appear in conjunction with the current financial crisis alone. Russian premier Primakov had raised the concept of a refashioned new Eurasia during his visit to India back in 1993. Primakov had proposed a strategic partnership between Russia, China and India in order to prevent the U.S. from becoming a sole global power. In 2004, Putin proposed the same tripartite partnership during his official visit to India, although he refrained from making mention of Eurasia directly. Since then, the Eurasia concept has often been raised, under sometimes different banners. Putin's criticism of the U.S. and NATO during the Munich Security conference in 2007 offered insight into where the debate was headed. In essence, what the new Eurasia means for China and Russia is a Eurasia free of U.S. and NATO influence. Clearly, this stands in stark contrast with the reality that the U.S. and NATO forces are anchored deep in Afghanistan, at the heart of Eurasia, and seated in between Russia and China.
Since the mid-1990s, China has highlighted Eurasia as a strategic gem owing to its rich energy resources. With a 9.8 percent growth rate and a population of 1.3 billion, China faces an unprecedented growth in energy demand. China controls two vital energy basins in Eurasia: the Caspian and Central Asia. The September 11 attacks and the occupation of Iraq has kept the U.S. preoccupied elsewhere, and out of Eurasia; with Afghanistan as its only connection to the region-a fact that is not lost on Obama and his mentor. This is precisely why Obama has plans to deploy more troops in Afghanistan and focus on the reinforcement of NATO. By the way, it should be noted that the U.S failed to contain the southern flank of China via sea and hopes of igniting a ‘colorful revolution' in Tibet and Myanmar via Buddhist movements fizzled. This was due largely to China's improved ties with littoral states such as Myanmar, India and Japan.
Brezinski points out in his book that the Sino-Soviet bloc dominated most of Eurasia but could not control its peripheries; which this then necessarily predicts the U.S. policy to do just that. 3 This point is very important to fully understand the current American policy approach towards Iran, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Japan, South Korea and Eastern Europe. With similar logic, China has been following the same policy since 2000. Specifically, China has been improving its relations with the periphery and core countries of Eurasia. For instance, during President Hu Jintao's November 2008 visit to Greece, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis pointed to strengthened political dialogue on a wide range of bilateral and global issues, and growth in trade as well as cultural exchanges.
The main challenge presented by the Eurasia option is the absence of lasting confidence building mechanisms tailored to the region. Russia and China have attempted to address this, and the best known among the possible solutions has been the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), formed under China's initiative. However, this has not come without challenges of its own. Disagreement over leadership of the organization between China and Russia has been difficult to overcome. A heftier problem was the near-deadlock on the identity of the organization, where Russia refused to see it as a security block, as opposed to China, opting instead for the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Despite such early troubles, SCO has come to be seen as a means to curb U.S. influence in this strategic region. However, the Georgian crisis last summer created new challenges.
Russia tried to pull the SCO into the Russian-American crisis in the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Although SCO and China partly supported Russia, they did not recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Uzbekistan was not pleased with the Russian intervention in South Ossetia, and approached the U.S. to re-open the issue of American military bases. So while on the one hand, the U.S, and its NATO allies jointly resisted Russia, the SCO was divided on how to respond. According to Chinese scholars, the SCO is not a functional body because of the absence of the "primus inter pares principle", unlike NATO.
But why did China refrain from extending its support to Russia? The answer lies in Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's remarks that "a possible problem or recession in the American economy will certainly have an impact on the Chinese economy, because 10 years ago China-U.S. trade volume was 102 U.S. billion dollars, while today the trade volume is 302 U.S. billion dollars. American finance is closely connected with Chinese finance. If anything goes wrong in the American financial sector, we are anxious about the safety and security of Chinese capital." This is the pragmatic answer to why China has not supported Russia on various issues against the U.S. Amidst fears of a global economic recession and ensuing political instability, China opted to avoid a possible clash with the U.S. at this critical juncture. China is the largest holder of U.S. Treasury bills. In fact, it holds almost 1 billion of them. This makes Americans uneasy, and just how reassuring Chinese claims that it would never use this as a tactical weapon in some form or another are, is open to debate.
As a third world country, China will emerge victorious from this economic crisis, with its 2 trillion U.S. dollar foreign exchange reserves and 1 trillion dollar U.S. Treasury bills. The Chinese premier attributes the success of the ‘China model' to experience gained and lessons learned from the Cold War period. With the financial crisis China will take on the role of first among equals, empowered by its economic prowess in the SCO. Russia has no choice but to accept. It should be noted that to recover its economy, the U.S. may want to maximize profit generated through its military industrial complex which is the locomotive of the American economy. It is known that war brings profit to the military-industrial complex. For that reason, the post-financial crisis world could see the unraveling of new ‘for-profit' wars.
In this climate, the third world needs an organizational structure to address joint political, military and economic challenges, similar to the European Union and NATO. Should China become the foremost global economic power, the rules of the game in the third world will change. To control Eurasia and in order to prevent foreign meddling in the third world, China and Russia must cooperate without preconditions.

Baris ADIBELLI, " Borsayi enerji Dengeledi", Cumhuriyet Strateji, Vol.5, No. 228, 10 Kasım 2008.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard : American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives, (New York), Basic Books, 1997, pp.30-31
Ibid., p.6.