It is assumed that formally recognized or not, a state is a legitimate political authority if it fulfils some basic principles. The Montevido Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), largely accepted as a feature of customary international law, sets out that "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states." Similarly the Badinter Commission of the European Union defines a state in terms of (a) territory, (b) population, (c) a political authority. It can easily be argued that all these criteria for statehood have been present in Abkhazia since the end of the Abkhaz-Georgian War in 1993. But still Abkhazia's statehood and its international recognition remains an unresolved problem for the global community of states. Moreover, since the August War of 2008 that took place between Russia and Georgia over the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Russia's recognition of the independence of both republics, questions surrounding the de facto states have emerged on the international agenda with greater urgency.

The upcoming presidential elections in Abkhazia, due in December, will take place at a critical time considering the developments in the region. Abkhazia recently celebrated two major events: the first international recognition of Abkhazia's independence by the Russian Federation on August 25, and then the September 30 Victory Day, marking the anniversary of the military defeat of Georgian forces and the end of the Abkhaz-Georgian war. Exhilarated by these two celebrations, now Abkhazia awaits the presidential election with apprehension. As the elections come closer, the intensity of political stress in the country is mounting.

Although Abkhazians enjoy international recognition by three states, Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and are now feeling more secure than ever before, the critical question lies ahead: what now? The debates concerning the future political status of the republic focus on an amply optimistic picture, namely recognition by more non-Western states, especially by those countries where North Caucasian diaspora hold an upper hand on the direction of domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, Abkhazian authorities rely on the fact that the Georgian government, by using military means to resolve problems in the region has lost its prestige and reliability as a future NATO candidate country. The Geneva talks resumed, and Abkhazian authorities, with the help of their Russian counterparts, are beginning to make themselves heard on different international platforms. The forthcoming Sochi Winter Olympic Games is another advantage, as nearly more than three million Russian tourists deserted Sochi in favour of a joyful holiday in the Soviet-era tourism centre of the Black Sea, i.e. Abkhazia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Abkhazia on August 12, and promised the leaders of the republic economic, military, social and political support, which was even met with surprise by the Russian public. Therefore, considering these and other developments, how can the unrecognized (in the eyes of the world, "undemocratic") republic of Abkhazia be worried about a presidential election, while no one but the far away countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua together with Russia are the only countries who seem to be paying attention? Or, why should we carefully observe the Abkhazian elections?

One of the major reasons for the Abkhazians to worry about the forthcoming elections is the uncertainty as to how the results will turn out and broader questions over the possibility of any Russian interference in the election process. The last presidential elections in Abkhazia took place in 2004 and resulted in a most unexpected way. The opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh emerged victorious against Vladislav Ardzinba's candidate Raul Khadjimba. This is explained by the fact that Abkhazians, although sympathetic towards Russian support, are not comfortable with the idea of Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Abkhazia. Thus both domestically and in the international arena, the common observation about Ardzinba's candidate was that he was evidently supported by Russia, which created a negative response to Khadjimba's presidential ambitions.

Russian involvement in the republic's domestic politics had been a determining factor in the presidential elections of 2004, but since Russia doesn't seem to interfere in the process this time, the level of uncertainty increases as for the forthcoming elections. This non-interference is suspicious, in the sense that Raul Khadjimba, who is known as an ex-KGB officer and a politician supported by Russia, does not seem to receive any backing in this election. In Abkhazia, it is possible to hear different interpretations on Russia's two-sided policy. One interpretation of Khadjimba's loss is that by supporting Khadjimba openly in 2004, Russia was in fact trying to eliminate him from the presidential race, so that a more "congruent" candidate such as Bagapsh won the election. Thus, he is well-known for his prudent attitude when it comes to cooperation with Russia, as he has been the loudest critic of the recent agreements with Russia. It can easily be argued that Abkhazia's relations with Russia have never been so much interdependent. Bagapsh's policy choices and Russia's regional policy has proved "pro-" or "anti-" positions in Abkhazia meaningless, as it has resulted in increasing dependence on Russia in all spheres.

As we can see, Abkhazian domestic politics do not represent a monolithic structure. The fragmented domestic political space in the republic creates competition and sometimes conflict between different fractions, which is another factor that is causing concern before the election. Before the 2004 presidential elections, different groups both from the opposition and the government came into conflict. Although from 2005 to 2009, the country has experienced unchallenged dominance of the Bagapsh team, opposition leaders have been more active, frequently raising their voices to question the current government's policies. What is clear, especially as the election date draws closer, is that the policy positions advocated by both the opposition parties and pro- government forces, and their ability to defend them, on major challenges such as Abkhazia's foreign policy, relations with Russia, the course of democratic reforms, the status of Georgians in Abkhazia and relations with diaspora will become more important. To summarize, there are four major issues that are of great importance concerning the election process.

Russian Military Base

Two months after Russia recognized Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence, on November 17, 2008, the Abkhaz parliament ratified a bill which authorized the construction of a Russian military base in Abkhazia in 2009. The ratification received mixed responses from within Abkhazia, while Western countries and United States harshly criticised the Russian Federation's move. And on September 15, Russia signed agreements on military cooperation, according to which Russia "has the right to build, use and improve military infrastructure and military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and create and maintain joint military contingents [in both republics] in times of peace and war."

Border Protection Agreement

The April 30 agreement under which Abkhazia entrusted the protection of its borders with Georgia to the Russian Federation has triggered a standoff between the government and the opposition in Abkhazia. In addition to the agreement, Bagapsh announced in May 14 that his administration was considering authorizing Russian companies to manage Sukhum airport-which they have already been modernizing-and Abkhazia's railways for the next 10 years. Two opposition groups, with the support of other opposition parties and organizations responded harshly as they criticized the border agreement and the following promises from Russia to invest in the banking sector, and also questioned the Bagapsh administration's ability to rule Abkhazia and maintain its statehood.

The Status of Georgians in the Gal Region - The Problem of Citizenship

On July 31, parliament adopted amendments allowing "people, who returned to the Gal region before 2005 to the places of their previous permanent residency" to gain an Abkhaz passport, provided they had not "with anti-constitutional methods fought against the sovereignty of the Republic of Abkhazia". Khadjimba and his political party, as well as other parties and groups criticized the amendments, expressing that "at this moment, there are as many citizens of Abkhazia of Georgian ethnicity as there are of Abkhaz ethnicity. The law has reduced those who fought for the independence of Abkhazia to the same level as those who for many years assisted Georgian colonial interests. The vast majority of residents of the Gal region have Georgian citizenship, and they are being awarded Abkhazian citizenship without having to reject their Georgian citizenship." Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Stanislav Lakoba's resignation on August 25 came as a reaction to the crisis over the status of Gal residents.

Land and Estate Sales to Russian Citizens

Although Abkhazian law prohibits foreigners, including Russians, from buying property in Abkhazia, Russian and Abkhazian companies or agencies both in Sukhum and Moscow have found ways to get around the legislation. It is now not uncommon to spot spam e-mails about "trophy" homes for sale in Abkhazia, or real estate agencies in Russia selling property with vineyards and apricot trees in their gardens for about $50,000. In order to stop the growing illegal real estate market, Bagapsh has called for legalizing the sale of land and property to non-Abkhaz citizens. This has been met with dissent by opposition parties who claim that such a move would mean that low-income Abkhazian citizens would become vulnerable to the influx of Russian newcomers. In Abkhazia, people talk about the Russian buyers of the beautiful villas with frustration and they do not seem to be pleased to see Russian military elites and politicians buying land and houses in Abkhazia. Khadjimba's National Unity Forum and Aruaa war veterans also raised their concerns about the problem of sales to Russians: "We are sincerely grateful to Russia for recognizing [our independence] and for everything it is doing for Abkhazia. However, we believe that our relationship must be built on a close union of equal rights. It must serve Russia's geopolitical interests and, at the same time, help further consolidate our state."

The approach to these critical matters will likely be a determining factor during the elections. However, apart from these present considerations, the most important factor-which was pivotal in the previous elections, but was overlooked-rests with the fact that the search for stability within the country comes prior to matters relating to reforms or dependency on Russia. Following the 1992-1993 war, Abkhazians have been able to survive despite being economically isolated by embargoes, locked in confrontation with Georgia many times, and have even refrained from painting their own houses due to the fear of war breaking out again. This has increased their desire for stability, and even more, brings the risk of taking unexpected decisions to achieve this long awaited stability. First of all, it can be said that in Abkhazia, the rule of Sergei Bagapsh and his prestige remains weak, especially in the Abkhazian community. However, this factor should still not be seen as a determining one before the elections. This is because Abkhazians are aware that domestic political chaos can weaken the country during a time like this.

More importantly, no actor has definite views that can lead to their classification of either being a supporter or opponent of Russia. Business relations, political interests, and similar factors have a greater effect over the political authorities in the country. Within the government and the opposition camp, groups exist which either try to take advantage of close relations with Russia or approach Moscow with caution. Due to an important war and embargo, Abkhazians live isolated from the outside world and under difficult economic conditions. The idea of independence and national sovereignty is important for both Abkhazians and minorities (those besides Georgians) in Abkhazia. Along with the role of political leaders, the influence of societal forces, especially given their composition and structure rooted in history, should not be overlooked.

At this point, another crucial subject before the elections concerns relations with the Abkhazian diaspora and the diaspora's ability to impact the course of events in Abkhazia. The prominence and capacity of the Abkhazian diaspora, especially in Turkey, can clearly be seen within Turkish politics as well as in Abkhazia. In Turkey, approximately 500,000 Turks of Abkhazian origin exist and have started to rebuild their ties with Abkhazia again. The Abkhazian diaspora, being the descendants of Abkhazians emigrating from their countries under the Great Exile, reminds Abkhazians of their history, traditions and customs and their national identities. Therefore, the views of the Abkhazian public towards the diaspora and the attitude of the government in its relations with the diaspora is an important factor that should be taken into account. Under the Presidency of Sergei Bagapsh, although the Abkhazian diaspora strengthened their ties with Abkhazia, their claims to have a say over critical issues has either been prevented or disregarded. The Abkhazian diaspora who will vote during the upcoming elections will express their sensitivity regarding the attitude over relations with Russia and this may emerge as a determining factor.

Aslan Yavuz Şir is with the Centre for Eurasian Studies (Avrasya Incelemeleri Merkezi - AVIM) in Ankara.