The question of whether Turkey is moving away from the West is certainly not a new one. Quite the opposite, it has often been a troublesome thorn in the side of Turkey's relations with the United State and Europe. It harps back to the essential question of Turkey's identity and where it is anchored-firmly in the West or with one eye still looking eastwards. The recent Gaza war and Turkey's harsh criticism of the 23-day Israeli military offensive brought this question to the fore of the popular imagination again in the West as well as in the Arab world.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's stern condemnation of Israel throughout the course of its offensive on the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip was no secret, but it reached a public climax at the World Economic Forum at Davos on 29 January as Erdoğan exchanged harsh words with Israeli President Simon Peres before storming out of the by now infamous panel. Immediately, the all-too familiar questions began to shimmer: How deep would the wound in Turkish-Israeli relations run? What did this mean for Turkey's role as honest peace broker in the Middle East? Did this mean a break with the West? Soon afterwards behind-the-scenes diplomacy began to churn and signals were given by both sides that bilateral ties would not be severed, putting strategic importance as the priority.

As Prime Minister Erdoğan was met with a heroes welcome in Istanbul on his late-night return from Davos by party-flag waving crowds-whether a natural reflex by his support base or not-his words on being a spokesperson for the repressed and downtrodden rang true to many Turks who were up listening. But more so than an unbridled show of support for Hamas ideology and politics; Erdoğan's words hit a chord with the public's empathy for the Palestinian people and their historically frustrated cause. This is where the real significance of the Davos incident lies, in what it reveals about public opinion in Turkey. Aside from the instinctive and humanitarian response against the Israeli offensive that caused severe civilian casualties in Gaza, the Turkish public's sympathy towards the Palestinians does not translate into unequivocal support for Hamas. The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that positive views of Hamas are scarce in Turkey, where just 6% expressed a positive opinion, down from 14% in 2007. Warmth towards the Palestinians rose by 2 points to 44 degrees according to the 2008 Transatlantic Trends survey.

The 2008 report showed that on a scale of 100, Turkish warmth toward the European Union increased seven degrees to 33 degrees and relations with the US stood at only at 14 points, albeit an improvement of 3 compared to the year before; Israel stood even below the U.S. at 8 degrees. These figures show a slight slowing down of the trend of cooling since 2004. A total of 48% of Turkish respondents felt that, Turkey should act alone on international matters, compared with 20% who felt it should act with the countries of the EU, 11% who felt it should act with the countries of the Middle East, 3% who felt it should act with the US, and 1% who felt it should act with Russia. Anxiety over regional instability in Iraq, PKK terrorism, the growing disillusionment with the EU (Turkey trails behind Europeans in terms of perceptions on the likelihood of EU membership), and growing nationalist sentiment likely contributed to the view that Turkey should act alone. Nonetheless, Turkey shared much of the same concerns as its U.S. and EU partners, including concerns about economic insecurity, global warming, international terrorism and energy dependence.

Turkey and the Middle East after the fall out of Gaza

Even if overwhelming consensus were reached that Turkey is turning a cold shoulder to the West, this would necessitate the obvious question, is Turkey swaying towards the East? Hailed as the new Nasser of the Middle East by the Arab street following the Davos debacle, can Erdoğan live up to this expectation and more importantly, should he even try?

In the flurry of diplomatic shuffling in the wake of the Israeli pull-out of Gaza after the offensive, Arab reports suggest an emerging consensus on the need for Arab and Palestinian reconciliation and a focus on Arab unity. Whether the Egyptian-led mediation is close to producing a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, a unity government and a truce with Israel remains to be seen. Within the course of days, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa met with Hamas political bureau leader Khaled Meshaal in Damascus; Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas announced plans to visit Qatar; Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah applauded Arab-Arab reconciliation and praised "moderation"; and Saudi King Abdullah vowed to overcome all obstacles to reconciliation. The rationale appears to be that costs of the alternative is simply too high; including the concern that inter-Arab strife is playing into the hands of the Iranians, a motivation particularly poignant for the Saudis. The traditional Saudi-Egyptian leadership of Arab diplomacy may be uncomfortable with Turkey's bid to set the agenda in the region. So as the Arabs grapple to put their house in order, at least in part and for the time being, this leaves the question of how and whether Turkey will be dealt a hand in the shuffling of cards?

The answer does not lie as much on the Arab street as it does with those who reign over them. Hamas militants congratulated Erdoğan; Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad praised him; but Arab leaders were visibly less vocal. The meeting between the foreign ministers of 8-U.S.-allied Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority held in early February in Abu Dhabi, was a clear rebuff for Hamas, with the reiteration of support for the Western-backed Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The ministers of the so-called ‘moderate' bloc of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates officially recognized Egypt's role as mediator between Israel and Hamas and between the PA and Hamas to launch reconciliation talks.

UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan's emphasis on the importance of creating an "Arab consensus on stopping unwelcome and unconstructive interference in our affairs by non-Arab parties," is significant. While obviously referring to Iran, the finger-pointing may also have been intended for Turkey. But when comparing Turkey with Iran, the Saudi-Egyptian bloc has drawn a distinctive line. Gamal Mubarak, deputy secretary-general of the ruling Egyptian National Democratic Party remarked earlier this year that, "Turkey has positions of its own, but it is largely in agreement with Egypt with regard to its regional vision, the need for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the settlement of the conflict through a two-state solution, and so on. This is in contrast with Iran, which wants to take us back to the 1960s and 1970s, attacks Egypt for its peace agreements, wants to throw Israel into the sea, and so on. There is a great disagreement [with Iran]." This view may lend some credence to the argument that some Arab regimes would welcome Turkey as a counterbalance to Iran, at least on a certain level.

It is not yet clear what these developments will eventually mean or whether Arab unity, otherwise claimed as dead and buried, can be encouraged to regroup in the fall-out of Gaza. Hailed as a reliable peace broker balancing delicate relations in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and the Middle East in general, the question is whether Turkey's hard-line stand against Israeli actions in Gaza has sidelined it from any transformative role in the region, at least for the time being? By moving away from its traditionally non-ideological stance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and appearing to have a partisan agenda, Turkey may have shot any realistic efforts to play the role of honest broker in the foot. Gaining recognition for its bid for greater regional influence in recent years-Turkey restored ties with Iran and Syria, mediated indirect talks between Syria and Israel and got involved in efforts for peace in Lebanon-Turkey may now find itself having to more forcefully and perhaps more often reassure Washington and Brussels that it is not abandoning its Western commitments. The indirect negotiations between Syria-Israel have been shelved, with Sarkozy and Mubarak keen to pick-up where Turkey left off.

Erdoğan has made an effort to stress at different times that "Hamas entered the elections as a political party. If the whole world had given them the chance of becoming a political player maybe they would not be in a situation like that after the elections that they won. The world has not respected the political will of the Palestinian people." This was clearly a bid to highlight Hamas's democratic credentials as the backbone of Turkey's linkages with the group, and perhaps ease some of the trepidation in the U.S. and the EU that Turkey is trying to navigate a space for Iranian influence in the region. But whether it assuaged the concerns all together will remain to be seen. From Erdoğan's point of view Turkey held out an opportunity for Israel to achieve peace with Syria by way of negotiations and saw the Gaza operation as a personal affront to these diplomatic efforts. Despite Egyptian and Saudi rhetoric to the contrary, the prospect of Palestinian unity may still be a long way off. Khaled Meshaal, the leader in exile of Hamas, has said that Palestinian unity is "the most difficult issue", adding that the Palestinian Authority [led by the President Mahmoud Abbas, of Fatah] no longer represents anything," and that the Arab street is with them. Ironically, support for Hamas among Muslim countries was declining until the Gaza war erupted. Now, it looks like Hamas would likely win a Palestinian election if it were held tomorrow.

Did Erdoğan facilitate the easing up of the West's willingness to engage with Hamas? Recent media reports indicated that two French senators travelled to Damascus earlier this year to meet with Meshaal. Two British MPs met in Beirut with the Hamas representative in Lebanon, Usamah Hamdan. Hamdan later remarked that since end-2008, MPs from Sweden, the Netherlands and three other western European nations had consulted with Hamas representatives. Does this signal a shift in U.S. or EU policy towards engagement with Hamas? That seems unlikely for the moment, especially since so much is on the line. Such a move could derail any hope of a united Palestinian leadership willing to seek peace with Israel. Engaging Syria could be a part of Obama's inaugural promise of extending a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist, but engaging Hamas would require a more complicated formula, hinging on Hamas accepting preconditions that it renounces violence, recognizes Israel and embraces past peace agreements.

What will come next depends in part on the full reveal of President Obama's Middle East approach as well as the shape of the Israeli government under Netanyahu. The next Israeli government will likely weigh carefully how

Turkey's orientation: Moving beyond the East-West rhetoric

In light of the recent Gaza offensive and its aftermath, questions about Turkey's diplomatic orientation have emerged with renewed vigor. Perhaps the way the question is asked is outdated: whether Turkey is turning East or West provides too little room to maneuver. Is it time to move away from the East-West rhetoric? There are signs that Turkey will increasingly look to set its own agenda and may be experiencing a reawakening in its foreign policy in more dynamic terms. Rather than where Turkey is looking or how far it has yet to go, it may be time for the U.S and the EU to look at how far Turkey has already come and why this matters.
It is not in the West's interest to risk losing Turkey or keep it at arms length-too much is on the line on a number of strategic fronts in the Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. The U.S. sees the Turkish-Israeli relationship as a strategic axis that counters its political opponents in Iran, Syria and Lebanon. The decision to increase the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan by roughly 17,000 troops over the next few months is a case in point of U.S. reliance on the NATO ally. President Obama is aware of Turkey's strategic significance but needs to pull Turkey closer and on more demonstrable terms. But it is also not in Turkey's long term interest to damage its ties with the U.S. and the EU or its reputation as a reliable partner in a volatile region. Given the latest developments that have revived the debate on where Turkey stands, the burden of proof now rests with Turkey.

Over the past few years, the pragmatist tone of Turkey's foreign policy approach has received attention. But while widely interpreted as policy moves to expand Turkey's regional opportunities and influence, it should not mean putting Muslim causes above Turkey's strategic national interests, either in the Middle East, with the U.S. or with Israel. Steps that may deflate the trust in its pro-Western policies will damage Turkey's aspirations for a greater say in the region. In assessing Turkey's response to Operation Cast Lead, a pragmatical reading may ask: What has Turkey gained? What has changed in Gaza? Have children and women in Gaza been spared from future Israeli artillery fire?

Treating Hamas as the Palestinian cause or reducing the entire Palestinian cause to Hamas itself is problematic. Hamas specifically advocates violence to achieve its strategic aims. Endorsing Hamas regardless of the nature of its objectives and irrespective of how their interests may be at odds with Turkey's will only damage Turkey's bid to strengthen its role as a rational and constructive regional influence.

Fostering a multi-faceted and forward-looking ‘Turkish brand' of relations with the Middle East is a valid goal. But leveraging cultural-religious references as a central pillar of dialogue with partners will not facilitate this approach. Rather it will encourage the tendency to lapse into subjective world-views, and away from the principles of international norms and tools of diplomacy driven by national interest. This could result in Turkey's isolation or the resignation of its role into a secondary state status, limited to areas of cooperation defined in U.S and EU terms. Giving the impression that Turkey is bound by solidarity to Hamas will not be in the interest of Turkey's national security; produce any progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; or promote Turkey's role as a regional mediator. The assumption that as you improve your links with the Middle East that will make yourself more valuable to America and come closer to the EU is only one side of the coin. What about the reverse? Turkey cannot hope to improve diplomatic flexibility, influence or ‘soft power' in the Middle East if it appears to be rejecting its established ties to the West. Likewise slipping towards alignment with anti-Western and anti-Israeli forces in the region will not alter regional dynamics in Turkey's favor. Turkey will ultimately be proven right in its conviction that no Middle East peace may be in sight unless Hamas is included in the process. However how to involve Hamas, under which conditions and through which interlocutors are questions for Turkey to answer by charting a diplomatically skillful course together with its Allies for the international community to accept its goodwill efforts to stop the two-way bloodshed.

A more effective way forward now would be to assess what Turkey can realistically accomplish at this juncture. This may include an aid oriented human development approach, with a focus on measures to support the emergence of a functioning Palestinian economy, civic institutions and security structure. This holds the promise of providing the Palestinian people distraught from conflict and wreckage with a choice: the choice of stability over violence and economic development over isolation.

The tendency of the West, particularly in the wake of the September 11 attacks, to define Turkey's strategic importance in Middle Eastern terms may backfire. Turkey is not defined only by its Muslim character. Emphasizing Turkey's secular-democratic tradition as a model for the Middle East will support the emergence of a more democratic dialogue in the long-haul. Explicit recognition of this by the West will certainly support this process in meaningful ways. If Turkey can present an alternative vision of governance in the Middle East and counter radical Islamist tendencies from Iran and from Sunni non-state actors, it can do so via its democratic, Westernized and secular model, albeit implementable in various political shades in different Muslim contexts. If Turkey is striving to assume the role of key regional actor, then it is this aspect of its character that it should be leveraging, and not cultural-religious binds alone. Clearly, Turkey is linked to the Muslim Middle East through Islam and historical interests; but one should not forget that the support Turkey receives from Europe is rooted in its secular model that makes it so attractive in the eyes of the moderate Middle East as a modern Muslim democracy. While Turkey will be receiving much attention in the region these days on the Arab street, when push comes to shove, Arab leaders may not give Turkey much of a say over things ‘Arab.' If Turkey loses confidence on the streets of Brussels, it will also lose its ability to serve as an unbiased interlocutor in the region.

Any role Turkey claims in the Middle East, especially on historically Arab issues, hinges on whether Turkey can trigger transformative change with the current status quo in the region, without shifts in regional political regimes or governing mentality. Can Turkey really go it alone in the Middle East? Not likely. Any new role for Turkey carved out of the Middle East that bases its legitimacy on overtly religious-cultural overtures would not only be a destructive turn in Turkey's relations with the West, it could have a destabilizing effect in the region. Regional stability can be achieved because of a Turkey looking Westwards, not in spite of it. A Turkey that is strongly anchored to its Western commitments and making strides in its EU reform process, while navigating and consolidating a multi-dimensional and strategic set of relations in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia, has a stronger chance of becoming a credible regional power. Ultimately, the rhetoric of East or West is too narrow. Turkey is increasingly setting its independent agenda, pursuing a more active diplomacy and fostering a network of strategic relationships-none of which should be construed to undermine Turkey's commitment to European values.

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The annual "Transatlantic Trends" survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo is regarded as an important indicator of the state of trans-Atlantic relations. Available at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/.

60% of Europeans and 48% of Americans thought it is likely that Turkey will join the European Union, compared with only 26% of Turkish respondents in 2008.

Marc Lynch, "Arabs Closing Ranks," Foreign Policy. February 16, 2009.

Sana Abdallah, "Discreet Meeting Tackles 'Non-Arab' Interference" Middle East Times, February 04, 2009.

Lally Weymouth, "We Believe We Can Achieve Something: Turkey's prime minister speaks out from Davos," Newsweek, February 9, 2009. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/182448/page/2.

Anne Penketh, "Europe opens covert talks with ‘blacklisted' Hamas," The Independent, February 19 2009. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/.

Among the eight countries with sizeable Muslim populations surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2008, Hamas received a positive rating in only one, Jordan, where 55% voiced a favorable view of the organization while 37% expressed an unfavorable opinion.

Anne Penketh, "Europe open covert talks..."