The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about the necessity to reappraise the functions and status of NATO and its members. Turkey was one of the most important NATO allies, but in the post-Cold War era its significance for the West decreased considerably. Finding itself with dwindling power, Turkey had to transform its Western oriented foreign policy into one focusing on regional issues. Thanks to the new policy, relations with Central Asia were revived following a 70 year hiatus. There are three factors that facilitated this revival and shaped Turkish policies towards the region: dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asia's rich oil and gas reserves and political and socio-cultural factors.
Fall of the Soviet Union and emergence of independent republics
With the emergence of the newly independent Soviet Muslim periphery, Central Asia became an important item on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Turkey was one of the first countries that recognised the independence of the Central Asian republics. Turkey also declared its willingness to give them spiritual and material support which was warmly received by those republics. Bilge explained the pragmatic reasons why Central Asian Muslim republics assumed a positive attitude towards Turkey and argued that they were unwilling to dissociate themselves from the Soviet Union but Moscow withdrew its support.1 Accordingly, under the circumstances Muslim Turkic Republics felt themselves closer to Turkey and as Turkey was left out of the EU in the same period of time, rapprochement between the former and the latter had naturally flourished.
Turkey had a pragmatic approach towards its relations with Central Asia. By establishing close relations with the newly independent republics Turkey aimed to compensate for its isolation from the EU, enlarge its sphere of economic, cultural and political influence and safeguard Turkish interests in this volatile region. Bal explains the reasons for Turkey's interest in Central Asia and Caucasus (particularly Azerbaijan)2:
"The first and most important [reason] includes cultural issues such as ethnicity, religion, history and language. It answers the question, whether Turkey would be so interested in this part of the world if these republics were not Muslim in religion and Turkic in origin. The second reason includes security issues and Turkey's international relations in general".
In short the demise of the Soviet Union and the positive attitude of the Central Asian republics towards Turkey had been the most important factors that helped Turkish governments to develop relations with the Turkic republics in Central Asia.
Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy
Although Turkey began to alter its foreign policy strategy immediately after the end of the Cold War, it chose to retain the main foreign policy principles and objectives adopted during the establishment of the Turkish Republic3. During the Cold War Turkey had implemented a relatively passive foreign policy, especially after it had joined NATO. Turkey tried to align its policies with NATO in order to integrate with the West and ensure that it was protected against the Soviet Union. However, close ties with the West prevented Turkey from determining and implementing its own foreign policy preferences and Turkey's foreign policy was shaped in line with Western policy determinants.
After 1991 Turkey abandoned its passive foreign policy in favour of an active one in order to be able to affect the course of international political developments. Turkish involvement in international conflicts such as the Gulf crisis, wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia and the Armenian-Azeri dispute attests to this fact. In the beginning of the post-Cold War era Turkey was faced with unexpected and sudden developments in the region stretching from Balkans to Central Asia. It had realised that it might benefit from the new economic and social developments in its neighbourhood and create new foreign policy alternatives. Therefore, in the 1990s Turkey began to establish multi-lateral social, cultural and economic relations with countries in the region, in addition to its bilateral political and military relations with the West and the US cultivated in the Cold War era.
Economic Reasons
While disintegration of the Soviet Union and changes in Turkish foreign policy constitute the first two of the most important reasons that shifted the focus of Turkish decision-makers to Central Asia, economic concerns is the third. The main economic factors that attract Turkish interest in the region are vast natural gas and oil reserves, export opportunities for Turkish businesses and employment opportunities for Turkish workers.
Central Asia is rich in terms of natural gas and oil reserves. Proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin are currently estimated at 15 to 31 billion barrels, about 2.7 percent of total proven reserves in the world. Individual country reserves in billion barrels are estimated at 3.6 to 6.3 for Azerbaijan, 10 to 22 for Kazakhstan, 1 to 1.5 for Turkmenistan and less than 1 for Uzbekistan. While not comparable with Saudi Arabia's holdings, they are significantly greater than those of either Iran or Iraq. Future exploration may show that the region holds more substantial oil reserves, potentially as high as 60 to 140 billion barrels. Proven natural gas reserves of 230 to 360 trillion cubic feet represent about 7 percent of total proven gas reserves worldwide4. Turkey has very limited reserves and due to increase in natural gas and oil imports, Turkish decision-makers turned their attention to Central Asia. According to Winrow5,
"In 1994, Turkey needed to import 22 million tons of oil. According to BOTAŞ estimates, by 2010 Turkey will have to import 40 million tons. At present, much of Turkey's oil is transported from Russia. Iran is another important supplier. In 1995 Tehran exported 4.5 million tons of oil to Turkey... As in the case of oil, Turkey is not a major gas producer either. Turkey currently imports 6 billion cubic metres of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria and Turkish consumption will increase gradually".
Currently, the economic agenda in Turkey is dominated by seven natural gas and two oil pipeline projects carried out in cooperation with Middle Eastern and Central Asian states and Russia6. Turkish policy-makers are principally interested in transporting Central Asian natural gas and oil to European markets via Turkey. According to Miles: "The countries whose transit routes are eventually chosen will benefit not only from heavy capital inflows in terms of investment and transit fees, but more importantly, will gain considerable influence throughout the region.7" In line with this realist explanation it can be said that Turkish decision-makers expect the projects to bring Turkey not only economic but also political benefits.
Another reason why Turkey has been keen on close ties with Central Asian states is the need for finding new markets for Turkish exports. After 1990, Turkey witnessed a gradual but steady growth of its private sector and it became essential for burgeoning enterprises to expand to new export markets. The emerging markets of the newly independent Central Asian states were increasingly regarded by Turkish economic circles as the export markets Turkish businesses were seeking to expand to8.
A third economic factor that led Turkish governments as well as private enterprises to seek closer ties was the problem of rising unemployment in Turkey since the 1990s. Arab countries and others such as Germany have traditionally offered employment opportunities for Turks but lost their attractiveness in that regard in the recent decades9. Central Asia, in contrast, looked increasingly promising in terms of new opportunities for employment.

Political Reasons
Political factors that played an important role in directing the interest of Turkish decision-makers to Central Asia are fivefold. First, Turkey was in search of recovering its prestige and influence in the international arena following the end of the Cold War. Second, Turkey's thorny path to EU accession led its governments to seek foreign policy alternatives. Third, Turkey had the chance to reassert its role within the Euro-Atlantic alliance not only as a positive conduit for establishing economic and social relations with Central Asia but also as a bulwark against Russian expansion. Fourth, Turkish policy makers thought that increasing Turkey's influence in Muslim Central Asia would contribute to raising Turkey's profile in its own neighbourhood. Fifth, the concepts of Turkism and nationalism played an important role in shaping the mindsets of policy makers . These factors will be explained in detail below.
Following the emergence of independent republics Turkish decision makers began to view Central Asia as a region where Turkey could expand its influence and compensate for the loss of strategic importance it suffered following the end of the Cold War. Many political analysts agree with this assertion. For instance, Kazemi and Ajdari suggested that links with the republics would help maintain Turkey's strategic importance in the post Cold War era10. Turkey had a strategic position during the Cold War as the US assigned it the role of defender of the West against the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, Turkey tried to regain its prestige by presenting itself as a model to the Central Asian republics and as a possible bridge between the West and Central Asia in the new world order. That is one of the reasons why Central Asia came to be regarded as a region where Turkey had to be actively involved.
Delays in Turkey's EU accession process also led Turkish policy makers' to seek new alternatives. Central Asia seemed to be the new alternative as Turkey had historical, cultural and religious affinity with the republics in the region. However, admittedly, political and economic advantages to be derived from this region would not be on a par with those that EU membership could bring. Despite that, Central Asia still offered Turkey a fresh opportunity to break out of its post-Cold War isolation.
As mentioned above, throughout the Cold War Turkey consistently played the role of defender of NATO's southern flank. While this role had helped Turkey to ensure its security, it had also safeguarded Western and US economic and security interests from the Soviet Union. In return Turkey obtained many economic and military advantages. Turkey's role came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US and the West continued to follow closely what was happening in the ex-Soviet geography. They supported transition to democracy and market economy in the newly independent states and kept a close watch against possible attempts by the Russian Federation to re-establish its domination over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They also declared their intensions about getting involved in exporting oil and gas from these countries to world markets.
Turkey has the same concerns regarding the newly independent states, particularly those in Central Asia. Turkish policy makers believe that if Russia re-establishes its rule over the ex-Soviet republics, Turkey will face the same Russian threat it had endured during the Cold War. It has, therefore, continually expressed its willingness to offer these republics political and economic support. Turkey is in favour of curtailing Russia's role in transporting Central Asian energy resources as it expects to benefit financially from transit fees generated by oil and gas deliveries via pipelines in Turkey. In sum, Turkey has a dual role of working for cultivating multilateral relations with the Central Asian republics and against Russian domination in the region.
It can also be argued that through close ties with the Turkic republics populated by Muslims, Turkish policy makers expect to increase Turkey's political influence in its neighbouring regions such as the Middle East and Balkans. This is another factor that directs Turkey's interest towards Central Asia in general and Turkic republics in particular.
Finally, it may be assumed that Turkish interest in Central Asia and the newly independent states has been bolstered by politicians whose political discourse is largely based on Turkism and nationalism and Turkish political parties that adopted those two concepts as their symbols. Several Turkish media organisations have also given full support to these politicians and parties and praised their efforts for intensifying relations with the republics in Central Asia.
Socio-cultural Reasons
Common features between Central Asian republics and Turkey such as religion, ethnic origin, language and culture could also be regarded as motivating factors for developing close ties. Turkish policy makers considered it realistic and pragmatic to expect a higher level of economic and political cooperation between countries that share the same ethnic origin and religion, have a common history and speak dialects of the same language. Therefore, it can be assumed that socio-cultural affinity was an important factor in determining Turkish policy towards Central Asia.
Conclusion
In this article we presented the reasons that motivated Turkish policy makers to turn their interest to Central Asia and focus Turkish foreign policy on this region. It should be kept in mind that Turkey will never give up fostering close ties with the republics in Central Asia. While geographic proximity and socio-cultural affinity between the Turkish and Central Asian peoples are important factors, they cannot on their own account for Turkey's policy towards the region. A sound analysis should also take into account economic and political benefits Turkey expects to gain from this cooperation.

Endnotes
1 Suat Bilge, "Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu ve Türkiye", Avrasya Etüdleri (Ankara), 1995, No.4, p.96.
2 Idris Bal, "Emergence of the Turkic Republics and Turkish Reaction", Foreign Policy (Ankara), 1998, Nos.1-2, p. 59.
3 Esat Çam, "Foreign Policy Preferences of Turkey", Foreign Policy (Ankara), 1978, Nos.3-4, pp.77-96; William Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War", Turkish Review of Balkan Studies (Istanbul), 1993, No.1, pp.231-248; Kirişçi, Kemal, "The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour", Foreign Policy (Ankara), 1993, Nos. 3-4, pp.1-36; Kemal Kirişçi, "New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour" in Çiğdem Balım et al. (Eds), Turkey: Economic, Political and Foreign Policy Challenges for the 1990s, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995, pp.1-21; Oral Sander, "Avrupa'daki Hızlı Gelişmeler Açısından Türk Dış Politikası" in Melek Fırat (Ed.), Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, Ankara: Imge, 1998, pp.69-94 and pp.147-159; Seyfi Taşhan, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives", Foreign Policy (Ankara), 1993, Nos.1-2, pp.1-19; Ercüment Yavuzalp, Dış
Politikada Oyunun Kuralları, Ankara: Bilgi, 1998, pp.219-243.
4 Martha Brill Olcott, "Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society", Journal of International Affairs (U.S.), Vol.3, 1999, No.1, pp. 307-308 and Peter Sinnott, "Central Asia's Geographic Moment", Central Asia Monitor, 1997, No.1, p. 22.
5 Winrow,1997, p117.
6 Suat Özyaprak, "Boru hattı projeleri", Finansal Forum, 8 June 1999.
7 Carolyn Miles, "The Caspian Pipeline Debate Continues: Why Not Iran?", Journal of International Affairs (US), Vol.53, 1999, No.1, p. 325.
8 Ahmet T. Kuru, "Uluslararası Ortam ve Bölgesel Entegrasyon Teorileri Işığında Türk Birliği Meselesi"in Mim Kemal Öke (Ed.), Geçiş Sürecinde Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri, Istanbul: Alfa, 1999, p. 149.
9 Ibid.
10 Farhad Kazemi and Zohreh Ajdari, "Ethnicity, Identity and Politics: Central Asia and Azerbaijan between Iran and Turkey" in David Menashri (Ed.), Central Asia Meets the Middle East, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, p. 58.

* Dr Gamze Gungormus Kona, Foreign Policy Specialist