Introduction
The ousting of leadership in three Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in a space of less than two years through what is known as "coloured revolutions" has added a new dimension to US policy in the former Soviet space. Not content with NATO's East-Ward expansion, acquiring military bases in Central Asia and building a pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, the US has moved in overtly to oust Russia from its own neighbourhood and minimise its external role. American policy is to have pliant regimes, be it through forced democratisation or political and economic pressures. Regime change is now an official policy of the US, whose Senate Appropriation Committee has even approved $565 million in aid programmes to former Soviet states in 2006, underlining that "authoritarian Russia poses a growing threat" to those countries.
Most of the governments in the CIS countries have failed to deliver either on the socio-economic or on the democracy front. The US has cleverly manipulated the situation to advance its strategic goals. This paper seeks to argue that "export of democracy" is part of a larger geopolitical objective and regime change actually promotes US interests in the region.
US Strategic Interests in the region
There has been a dramatic shift in US strategic interests in the Caspian and Central Asian region since late 1994, soon after the US department of Energy produced a report estimating the potential of Caspian Sea oil reserves. The need to diversify US imports and break free from dependence on the Gulf supply made the former take active interest in the region.
The US policy subsequently veered round to integrate the Caucasian/Central Asian states into the Euro-Atlantic orbit by increasing American involvement including military engagement and promoting regimes that are friendly and encourage free market, trade liberalisation and Western investments. The priority is geopolitical influence and control of energy resources and their transportation routes.
American moves in Central Asia and the Caspian region include an all out effort to find alternative oil routes as well as explore the possibility of future NATO enlargement to Central Asia. These moves are seen to be in direct contradiction to Russian, Chinese and Iranian interests. The joint NATO-PfP (NATO's Partnership for Peace programme for former Soviet republics) programme has been holding military exercises since 1997 in the region. All the Central Asian republics have also joined NATO's North American Co-operation Council (NACC). US has also promoted a regional grouping GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) that was formed in 1999.
However, the transportation of most of Central Asian oil and gas through Russian pipelines made energy for Western markets vulnerable to the vagaries of relations with Russia. To secure itself against such a possibility the West has made the issue a geopolitical one, meaning the source of oil and its transportation routes should be secured by political and strategic control over relevant states. This can be done either by drawing closer those states which do not have the best of relations with Russia or installing pro-Western regimes in states that are still friendly to Russia.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent US campaign in Afghanistan in October of the same year changed the entire scenario in the Central Asian region, which came to have US military presence. Prospects of fulfilling Washington's strategic goals in Central Asia brightened following Uzbekistan's lead to allow its southern air base in Khanabad to US troops, Kyrgyzstan followed suit. US-led coalition forces are stationed in Ganci airbase near Bishkek's Manas international airport.
Russia's moves in Central Asia
The US push into the region in the mid-1990s threatened the long-term economic, security and geo-strategic interests of Russia and prompted the latter to strengthen its engagement in Central Asia. Since NATO expansion had already made Russia's western borders vulnerable, its security critically depended on a "strategic depth" that can be provided by the ‘near abroad'. In any case it could not afford to have a vulnerable Southern and Eastern border, across which the destabilising forces threaten Russia's territorial and social cohesion. The threats have to be countered by close co-operation with its Central Asian neighbours. The presence of US troops and bases after September 11 were creating huge gaps in the Eurasian security complex.
Russia under Putin is attempting to strongly focus on the CIS. The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation, adopted on 10 January 2000, is a testimony to the significance Russia attaches to former Soviet Republics. Referred to as ‘Near Abroad', the CIS partners are expected to form a good-neighbourly belt along the perimeter of Russia's border, to promote elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflict in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation.
Under Putin, Russia's economic policy in the "near abroad" today is more active. Russia wrote off energy debts of Kyrgyzstan. The Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and three other Central Asian states was upgraded to Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC). In October 2000, three countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) along with Russia and Belarus signed an agreement setting up the Eurasian Economic Community in Astana and one day later in Bishkek the same five along with Armenia took part in a Collective Security Treaty Summit. The two economic and security structures and their goals seemed closely intertwined. The first one was a replacement for the loosely-knit Customs Union in existence since 1996.
Tajikistan agreed to allow a permanent Russian military base on its territory, while Kyrgyzstan has allowed an airbase at Kant that housed mainly Russian troops and military aircraft. The Collective Security Treaty, which was transformed into an organisation, CSTO, has an Anti-terrorist Centre in Bishkek. Another regional grouping Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), which also includes China, had been upgraded to a security organisation with an anti-terrorist centre in Tashkent. Annual military exercises, named Commonwealth Southern Shield, that began in 1999 has continued on a very large scale and involves thousands of Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tajik troops in the mountains of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These exercises are intended to prepare for anti-terrorist campaigns in mountainous terrain.
However, as Russia picks up more stakes in the region in terms of security and economic advantages, the US is making efforts to bring these states into its sphere of influence by a more subtle method, creating non-governmental networks to effect regime change. The successful regime changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan, are to a large extent the result of external manoeuvring.

Pattern of "coloured revolutions"
In all these "coloured revolutions" (Rose, Orange and Tulip) a visible pattern has been the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and student movements linked to and funded by the West. Apart from local NGOs, foreign NGOs like US-based Freedom House and Open Society Institute have been very active. Western governments have openly funded NGOs. Just before the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, the British Ambassador declared that his government would give $92,000 to NGOs in that country to "ensure free and fair elections".
The US Agency for International Development (USAID), an instrument of US government overseas, has spent millions of dollars in Central Asia to create local NGOs that are committed to promote liberalisation and pro-Western policies. In fiscal year 2002, US spent $3.8 million in Turkmenistan, $11.4 million in Kyrgyzstan and $12.4 million in Tajikistan on "Democracy Programmes".
Western governments have focussed on orchestrating campaigns to discredit the election process and its outcome. In Kyrgyzstan even the US Ambassador publicly made critical comments on the election. A new democracy fault line has emerged between Russia and the West. While the West celebrated the "revolutions" as expressions of popular anger and as "democratic", Russia looks at the events as cynical manipulation of media and masses to install regimes that would serve US geopolitical objectives in Eurasia.
The case of Kyrgyzstan is strange. It faithfully implemented the prescribed reforms and in the process created greater social discontent among the population. Kyrgyzstan was dubbed as the "Island of Democracy" in a region where authoritarianism prevailed otherwise. It was rewarded with WTO membership, while the rest were denied so, for its pro-liberalisation economic reforms. The US and other Western-funded NGOs were freely active in the republic.
People of course have a right to change a corrupt and authoritarian regime. But people also should have a system that gives them a decent social and economic existence. Otherwise the discontent remains even if the leadership is changed. In any case if the changes are managed by external agencies, because the regime does not serve the geopolitical objectives of one power or another, then the implications can be negative.
Dangers of US-sponsored Regime change
"Managed" protests and regime changes can derail the democratic process itself, create greater social conflicts and disturb regional stability. The Kyrgyz events might prompt leaders of other countries to further restrict civil society. Leaders in the region have perceived the Kyrgyz events as symptoms of state weakness and outside manoeuvring, not a result of popular anger against authoritarian rule. After the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, opposition parties were not allowed to register in Uzbekistan. Kazakh president ensured that four out of five parties that managed to win seats are pro-presidential. The lone successful Ak Zhol member even resigned from parliament. Tajikistan denied registration to Freedom House before the elections. Uzbekistan had denied registration to some international NGOs like Open Society Institute and filed a case against the International Republican Institute after denying it accreditation in March 2004. The Kazakh parliament passed two bills on 29 June 2005 intended to regulate the activities of NGOs.
In May 2005 Uzbekistan informed its decision to withdraw from GUAAM and closed the American bases in its territory. It is likely that Uzbekistan will move closer to Russia, thus strengthening Russia's influence in the region. The post-Andijon developments have expedited this process.
There are strong regional divisions within each of the states where "coloured revolutions" took place. Forced regime changes can deepen these fissures. Use of force by both the government and the opposition sides in certain cases may exacerbate these social fissures and diminish democratic space in real terms.
These "coloured revolutions" could lead to greater involvement by external powers in internal affairs of CIS states. Russia has a reason to feel that this trend of regime change by orchestrated protests affects negatively its interests in the post-Soviet space. It may also genuinely feel encircled by states whose present regimes are close to the West and aspire for NATO membership.
Conclusion
The involvement of external powers in bringing about regime changes in the former Soviet republics could complicate the democratisation process in these newly independent countries. Since the US has strong geopolitical interests in the Central Asian as well as the Caspian region and their neighbourhood, its use of a democracy plank has to be seen in the context of advancing those goals. Regimes have gained or lost US favour depending on their usefulness in promoting US strategic interests in the region. Issues of democracy and human rights have been sidelined or ignored in countries that are US allies though gross violations on these scores have been reported.
US-inspired regime changes have prompted other powers, especially Russia, to focus on this region as an arena of geopolitical competition. This also creates the danger of derailing democratic changes in Central Asia. Regimes threatened by US "export of democracy" are likely to lean on other powers and resist any change towards a more liberal system. Great power rivalry insulates the ruling elite in post-Soviet states since both camps are likely to ignore the shortcomings of their respective allies.
"Export of Democracy" and the resulting regime change only replace leadership, which may not necessarily be democratic. It can skew the democratisation process by activating fissures in societies that are already divided on the basis of regional/clan or ethnic identities. Competing powers can use these fault lines to intensify social instability and political crisis. To prevent such possibilities Central Asian states must guard themselves against democracy being used as an instrument of geopolitics and instead let it be a cherished goal towards which each society must proceed at its own pace and specificities.

Endnotes
1Vladimir Radyuhin, "Are the coloured revolutions fading out?", The Hindu, 1 October 2005
2R. Hrair Dekmejian and Hovan H. Simonian, Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region, I.B. Tauris, London, 2001, p. 134; S. Neil Macfarlane, "The United States and regionalism in Central Asia", International Affairs, Vol.80, no.3, May 2004, p.450
3For example, Strobe Talbott's address, "A farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia", delivered at Central Asia Institute, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on 21 July 1997, cited in Strategic Digest, Vol.27 (9), 1997, pp.1379-80; Testimony to the Congress on 17 March 1999 by Adviser on the CIS to the US Secretary of State, Sestanovich; and, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 22 July 1997 by Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for European Affairs, cited in Bradfort R. Mcguinn and Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "American drive to the Caspian" in Hoosang Amirahmadi (ed.) The Caspian Region at a Cross Road, Macmillan, London, 2000, p.189
4EURASEC, formed in October 2000 at a CIS summit in Kazakhstan and ratified in Minsk in May 2001, has its origin in a series of free-trade and custom agreements concluded within the CIS and is structured on the framework of a 1996 Customs Union. Russia has 40 per cent of the voting rights and is supposed to cover 40 per cent of the budget. Kazakhstan and Belarus contribute 20 per cent of the budget and has a similar vote share. The other two have 10 per cent each.
5The Southern Shield 2000, a joint military exercise started in 1999, involved seven nations and thousands of troops, the largest of its kind held in Central Asia involving Collective Security Treaty members and Uzbekistan. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 March 2000
6RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.9, No.16, Part I, 26 January 2005
7US Department of State: US Assistance to Turkmenistan, fiscal year 2002, Fact Sheet: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affair, 6 June 2002, Washington DC, http://www.state.gov.p/eur/rls/11037.htm; US Department of State: US Assistance to Tajikistan, fiscal year 2002, Fact Sheet: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affair, 6 December 2002, Washington DC; Gulsara Osorova, "Kyrgyzstan - the siege within", in Indranil Banerjee (ed.) India and Central Asia, Brunel Academic Publications, U.K., 2004, p.75
8Nine CIS states made a statement strongly criticising the OSCE on 3 July 2003.
9RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Vol. 9, Part I, No. 88, 10 May & No.160, 24 August, 2005

*Professor; Centre For Russian & Central Asian Studies, School Of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi - India