There was a time when the possibility that the USSR would enter Turkey's warm waters was the most feared threat for NATO's flank country. Today, the close to 3 million Russians who visit Turkey's southern beaches every year are welcomed with flowers and are sent off with wishes of "hope to see you again next year".
Similar to other areas of bilateral relations, this change in tone is visible on a larger scale on military-technical cooperation. Turkey was the first NATO member to buy arms from Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There was a lull during the period since 1992 when Turkey procured weapons for its fight against terrorism in southeastern Anatolia. This silence was broken after 16 years when Russia won the Turkish Defense Industry Executive Committee contract for anti-tank missiles in 2008. Russia was able to come out ahead of the Israeli Rafael Spike and American Raytheon TOW in the bidding. Delivery of the Kornet anti-tank missile system, consisting of 80 launchers and 800 missiles, is expected to start in 2009 and be completed by 2010.
Turkey has also approached Russia to buy attack helicopters. A delegation from the Turkish Undersecretary of Defense Industry went to Russia to discuss procurement of 12 Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters in early June. Following this, a Turkish military delegation conducted studies in Russia. The Russian offer entails more than 30 million US dollars per helicopter. This means a total cost of approximately half a billion US dollars. The Turkish side has tried to lower the cost, but remains determined to buy the Mi-28s. Restrictions on the sale of such weapons, which are a necessary component of Turkey's anti-terrorism missions, that are imposed by the United States and European states and stem from contentions over alleged human right violations has only brought Ankara closer to Moscow.
The biggest share of Turkey's market is currently made up of low, intermediate and high altitude missile systems, with the total worth of the contracts at 9 billion US dollars. Russia seems to have the upper hand for all three contracts on the table, along with Israel and the US. Form the perspective of the Turkish Defense Industry and Army, the American PAC-3 in high altitude, the Israeli Spyder L in intermediate range and the Russian Brahmos in low altitude systems, seem to be the leading contenders. If the Russian bid is successful, Turkey will have selected Russia in three significant contracts in a short period of time: the Kornet, Mi-28, and missile defense systems.
Psychological Obstacles to Cooperation
Although military-technical cooperation between Turkey and Russia is seen as an inevitable mutual necessity, there is a lack of will that has been acknowledged by officials on both sides. According to Turkish officials, the negative impact of the Mi-17 project is the psychological obstacle it erected in front of Turkish-Russian military-technical cooperation. Turkey has been in negotiations with Russia for the maintenance of the Russian made Mi-17 for a long time. However, the Russian side insists that they had warned Turkey during the initial procurement of the possible maintenance complications and is now adamant that Turkey needs to foot the bill for the cost. The Russian defense export firm Rosoboronexport had warned Turkey that the firm which sold the Mi-17s did not have a license. As a result, having procured the Mi-17s from a no-license firm and with the helicopters in need of maintenance work, Turkey finds itself left out in the cold. Now, Moscow is using this against Turkey.
One of the Mi-17s crashed. Four of them, de-commissioned, are waiting in various locations in Russia. 14 of them are unusable and are sitting in hangars in Turkey. Today, the maintenance deadlock and issues on operationalizing the helicopters has led to a vicious standstill. Turkey is eager to move beyond the psychological obstacle that stands in the way of greater military-technical cooperation with Russia. If Russia comes up with a reasonable offer, cooperation between the two states would run smoother in more significant future projects.
A Lack of Will
The Russians have been complaining that Turkey too often allows politics to become part of military procurements. According to Russian experts, Moscow could offer the joint production of T-80 and T-90 tanks with a factory to be built in Turkey and produced under a license agreement.
According to Turkish officials, Russia is not Turkey's leading priority in terms of defense cooperation, but is viewed and treated as a growing regional partner nonetheless. Current trends indicate impressive developments in trade relations between Turkey and Russia and there is a significant increase in trade volume. There may be an imbalance in favor of Russia in trade for the time being, but every year 3 million Russians flock to Turkey. Projecting the climate of productive trade relations to the sphere of military-technical cooperation should be a priority, and that appears to be the case. Defense cooperation holds great potential, but the lack of will on both sides remains an impediment. The only way to move closer is for both sides to take certain steps. Turkey took an important step by granting the anti-tank missile contract to Russia. Now, the Mi-28 is up next.
Behind the Cold War Lens
If and when Russia takes a step to solve the Mi-17 problem, this can silence those who voice opposition to Turkish-Russian cooperation on both sides. This may seem minor but it has important consequences beyond the immediate issue. The Turkish Air Force has generally tried to stay away from the Russian systems, mostly because of past reliance on American systems. There is a degree of mistrust towards Russian systems. However, it is time to realize that things have changed.
In 2008, the Turkish and Russian navies conducted three important meetings. As a result, Turkish and Russian operations are in alignment in the Black Sea, perhaps to an extent never seen before. BLACKSEAFOR and BLACKSEA HARMONY are being implemented successfully.
But despite the efforts between the two countries in the area of military cooperation, there are doubtlessly some in Russia who still view Turkey behind a Cold War lens. However, they are not as influential as in the past. After the war with Georgia last year, lists were published that aimed to show Turkey as one of the parties responsible for the war because of its arms export to Georgia. Some accused Turkey of having opened the Straits to foreign warships in breach of the Montreux Convention. In reality, Turkey applied Montreux so strictly that its Western allies accused Turkey of siding with Russia. Turkish officials are determined to sustain the security of the Black Sea with its neighboring countries. Turkey opposes the entrance of foreigners to the Black Sea as much as the Russians do. The new Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu describes the common outlook with Russia as "a joint sense of responsibility towards the region". The weight of this is increasing. Turkey and Russia have been working more harmoniously in the Black Sea than ever before seen. Ankara wants to spread this policy perspective to Caucasia and other geo-strategic regions. The Caucasia Stability Pact continues despite Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a natural part of this cooperation is military cooperation. There is no concrete reason for both countries not to improve relations, only intangible ones.
Harmony of Approach
Political relations between Russian and Turkey are at their height now and both perceive each other as a strategic regional partner. In February 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a visit to Moscow and met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin; the meetings had a significant impact on both countries. Putin expressed Russia's interest in the high and intermediate altitude air defense systems project. Gul, in return, stressed Turkey's gratitude in hearing this. And here lies the main difference between Turkey and Russia: the Russian side wants to conclude such trade negotiations at high-level meetings. But Russia's "grant us the contract, forget the bidding process" approach puts Turkey in a difficult position. Turkey conducts such processes through the Undersecretary of Defense Industry. When a decision has been made, it is impossible to affect the procurement through political invitation. The Russians must understand Turkey's commitment to this process.
There are some other tricky issues as well. The Turkish attack and reconnaissance helicopter project (ATAK) ended in disappointment for Russia. The Kamov Ka-50-2, with its similar name with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, was about to close off the deal after 10 long years of bidding. But it was cancelled suddenly and Anglo-Italian Agusta Westland won the new round of bidding. Naturally, this caused anger and disappointment in Moscow.
As a result of this upset, Russia did not attend the Turkish International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) for a long time. However, the anti-tank contract has marked a new beginning. At this year's IDEF'09, Rosoboronexport had a high profile. The theme of the fair, "Eurasian Meeting", is a sign of the shift in Turkey's preferences in military cooperation.
Thus, military cooperation between Russia and Turkey is a necessity of history, geography and complex regional interests. Bilateral military cooperation is a significant but yet untapped part of the bigger picture. However, both sides need to silence those who oppose progress on such cooperation. For example, many official and civilian circles in Turkey argue that Moscow discriminates against Turkey, given Russian limitations on imports from Turkey and unresolved customs problems. In similar fashion, when Turkey proposed the Caucasia Stability Pact, some in Russia perceived this as the 2nd Turan wave. However, Turkey's only motive behind this proposal was regional stability.
A Promising Future
Anna Glazova from the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) asserts that Turkey should not pay too much heed to farfetched proposals suggested by Russia and underlines that following the developments in South Ossetia, the strategic situation in the region has changed dramatically. Negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, with which Turkey has no formal diplomatic relations, is a factor that stands to directly impact Russian-Turkish relations. Glazova says, "The agreement between Turkey and Armenia will create problems between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This will have repercussion for the Caucasia Stability Pact".
Sergey Khalyapin, an expert on military cooperation at RISS, points out that granting the anti-tank contract to Russia opens a new phase in Russo-Turkish relations, and adds:
"Intermediate and high altitude air defense systems may follow the anti-tank project. The S-400 and Patriot will be two important systems for Turkey. There is a fear that S-400 does not comply with NATO standards. However, similar systems are used in Greece and Greece is a NATO member."
Khalyapin make two interesting suggestions:
1. The production of T-80 and T-90 with 155mm guns in Turkey.
2. The production of NATO compatible weapon systems through a trilateral Turkey-Russia-Israel partnership.

Having initiated the process for national tank development and production, Khalyapin's first suggestion is an important one from Turkey's point of view. After all, the Russians had bought their first tanks from the United Kingdom and they then mastered the know-how for their development.
The second suggestion is a general one, but, from Turkey's perspective, it is more applicable. Military cooperation between Turkey and Israel is strong and deeply rooted. A future partnership between these three countries could change the regional market and strategic situation drastically. Turkey would have greater flexibility in a partnership arrangement with Russia if Israel were to be equally involved. Thus, the region that extends from the Urals to the Pacific would become a common market for these three countries. This situation, without a doubt, would increase regional stability.
According to the Director of CAST and Consultant of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Ruslan Pukov, the Turkish Defense Industry is at the first stage of its development and this in turn offers a wide range of options for pursuing enhanced military cooperation between Ankara and Moscow.
Upon careful analysis, these recent developments are evidence that any fears that stand to hamper relations between Russia and Turkey have already been overcome to a large extent. A model of military cooperation that is built and implemented upon the principle of shared commitment and responsibility for the region is feasible at this juncture. Turkey will find itself moving closer to Russia as it starts to consider all of its options. After all, this could be a matter of historical inevitability.