After three years, the natural gas crisis between the Russian Federation and Ukraine erupted again as a result of the unresolved dispute over price and debt figures, making gas-consuming countries in Europe and Turkey, heavily dependent on Russia for their natural gas supply, cringe. Pipelines that connect West Siberia natural gas fields to Europe and transport 80% of Russian gas export passes through Ukraine (See Map 1). Since these pipelines were built in the USSR era, they constitute "national lines", which disables Russian control on entrance and exit routes to Ukraine and domestic distribution. Should gas flow to Ukraine be limited or shut down completely, Ukraine can use other pipelines that pass through its territory, but other consumers that rely on these pipelines for energy supply and transit in Europe, the Balkans and Turkey are directly affected by the disruption in gas flow. During the winter of 2006, Russia cut off the gas exports to Ukraine due to disagreement over pricing; but this was resolved thanks to mediation efforts by Europe and Turkey before the crisis got out of hand.
This time, Russia shut off the gas valves to Ukraine on January 1, 2009, a decision no doubt colored by the crisis in the Caucasus in August 2008 and its effect on Russo-Ukrainian relations , coupled with irresolute negotiations on 2009-2011 gas prices and culminated debt. However, Ukraine continued to draw gas from the system, which resulted in drops in gas transit to Europe on January 6, 2009 and a shut down completely the next day. Central European and Balkan states, highly dependent on Russian gas, were almost immediately affected by the Russian move. However, Russia had informed Brussels about the disagreement between Russia and Ukraine and indicated the necessity to shut down the gas export two months ago, requesting the EU to prompt negotiations to put pressure on Ukraine. The EU did not break from tradition and kept its silence, under the banner of the "impartiality principle" during the crisis, only to present itself as an honest broker when the gas export was shut down.
EU and Balkan dependency on Russian gas cumulatively is about 26%, but the dependency of new EU members in Eastern Europe run the highest. The extent of dependency on Russian gas reflected in numbers make it clear that 18 of the 27 EU member states and the Balkans were hit hard by the crisis:
 Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Macedonia 100%
 Bulgaria 97%
 Hungary 89%
 Poland 86%
 Serbia 87%
 Greece 82%
 Czech Republic 74%
 Ukraine 66%
 Austria 65%
 Turkey 64%
 Romania 39%
 Germany 36%
 Croatia 32%
 Italy 27%
 France 25%
Different explanations emerged from the West on how to interpret Russia's hard-line position. Some accused the Russian Federation for flexing its muscle and manipulating its energy resources for political means. On the other hand, some pointed explicitly to the United States as the main culprit. John C.K. Daly points out that Gazprom's, and thus Russia's, behavior is simply a manifestation of the "capitalist" approach, and blames the US for seducing Russia:
"As Europeans shiver amid the Gazprom-Ukrainian natural gas dispute, pundits bloviating on the nefarious designs of the Kremlin are overlooking one simple truth about the altercation -- the world's largest gas company is simply behaving the way that hordes of American advisory teams have urged the Kremlin to do since 1991: as free market capitalists, albeit nearly two decades late"
Furthermore, some EU officials even expressed approval of Gazprom's position, pointing out that Russia has been providing a continuous and consistent supply of gas, for 40 years, even during the Cold War period.
In sign of assigning blame to Ukraine, just like had been the case in the previous energy dispute, Russia-lacking control over pipelines that cross through Ukraine-advise the EU and Turkey to take up the issue with Kiev directly. Initially, Russia insisted that it had only shut down gas transfer to Ukraine and that the necessary amount of gas for other gas customers was still supplied to the system. Russia and the EU had reached an agreement on establishing an EU-led observation committee to investigate gas levels at entrance and exit points in Ukraine with Gazprom. However, the agreement was never fully realized due to disagreements between the parties involved, and the flow of gas was not secured.
The escalation of tension triggered by the events of August 2008 meant that Russia would adopt a more severe position on pricing, terms of agreement and financial penalties. Reaching a speedy and acceptable agreement reminiscent of 2006 eventually proved to be much more difficult and time consuming.
The crises over the last three years forced Russia, much like the EU, to search for new and alternative energy routes. Russia wants to build a 1200km long "North Stream" pipeline which will pass through the Baltic Sea, and a 900 km long "South Stream", through the Black Sea-both alternatives to routes that trek across Ukraine and Belarus. Russia acquired significant European partners for these projects and reached agreements with E.ON/Ruhrgas/Wintershall-Germany for the North and ENI-Italy for the South Stream.
The crisis pushed Europe even harder to secure alternative energy sources and diversified transit routes for cutting down on dependence on Russian resources. The Nabucco Project, initiated in 2002 but stalled due to financial disagreements, again claimed its position at the top of the agenda as a notable alternative. The vital resources for meeting European energy demand-either along with or without Russian gas-lie in the Caspian basin and Middle East. The only route to access these sources or deliver them to Europe is through Anatolia, or more precisely, Turkey. Turkey, a trusted, democratic country that fully respects international law and regulations, appears to offer the most viable route when political and economic considerations are weighed.
By tapping into the advantages bred by its relations in this region, Turkey can put important proposals on the table for both the EU and Russia:
1. The potential of the South Stream pipeline is undercut by both technical and financial problems. On the other hand, the necessary engineering data, infrastructure and nationalization for a transit route for construction of a new pipeline are already in place for existing pipelines, namely Blue Stream and pipelines that extend from Turkey's west. This would mean gains both in financial terms and time of up to two years. As such, the cost of constructing a new pipeline that would be built parallel to Blue Stream and existing pipelines, connecting to Bulgaria and/or Greece would be considerably lower than the costs of a new South Stream. This alternative can be presented to the Russian Federation and it is viable in every sense.
2. Iran holds the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Ignoring such vast reserves whilst talking about "energy supply security" and "sustainability" is absurd. Turkey's agreements with Iran on the management and pipeline construction rights of the South Pars Basin stands as the most significant resource that would meet the European demand in the near future. U.S. sanctions on Iran are readily ignored by China as well as some European states that maintain close ties with the U.S., who have instead pursued the Iran option. Given these factors, the responsibility of producing Iranian gas, constructing a pipeline that would transport Iranian gas to Turkey and Europe and improving EU-Iran relations rest on Turkey's shoulders. When we consider trade relations between Germany and Iran (as shown at the Table 1), the impression that Turkey should not be afraid of U.S. sanctions becomes more apparent. Growing trade ties between the West and Iran would translate over time into improved political relations and offers the possibility of a political balance and stability to the region.
3. Partners of the Nabucco Project, particularly Austria with a coordinating role and the main contractor OVM, have not devoted adequate attention to funding issues and lobbying in supplier countries for the project. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the Caspian Basin were left idle, with the result that their proven and new resources are already tied up to the Russian Federation and China via agreements in place. Technically speaking, these states do not have uncommitted gas. The Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline, which is expected to become operational in the second half of 2009 and capable of transporting 30 billion cubic meter natural gas, is expected to reach fully capacity by 2011. Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) gained the rights for natural gas exploration and production in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan through product sharing agreements in 2008. This essentially means that besides Azerbaijan and Egypt, which have limited resources, Iranian and Iraqi resources are needed for reaching Nabucco's 31 billion cubic meters per year capacity requirement. Given the political uncertainty in Iraq on the subject, it is not yet clear when international corporations will launch larger-scale exploration and production projects. Thus, Iranian natural gas resources and basins (South Pars) expand in prominence and potential. If EU member states reach a consensus on joint energy policy and endorse Turkey's agreements on the production and use of Iranian resources, they would have a real opportunity to diversify their energy supplies and decrease their dependency on Russian gas. At this point, Turkey should take the necessary steps to emphasize in effective terms the importance of Iran to EU audiences and encourage the initiation of formal relations.
4. Russia's intensive attempts to enter the Liquidified Natural Gas (LNG) market continue. If Turkey helps Russia build a LNG train at Ceyhan-the liquefaction and purification facilities in a liquefied natural gas plant-Russia would be able to penetrate the Mediterranean LNG market with ease. In addition, Russia would likely enable Turkey to buy from this resource at low cost.
As expressed earlier, the two-way energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine on natural gas prices and payment ballooned to encompass Central and Northern Europe and the Balkans as the gas cut-off brought customer states to the brink of an energy disaster in the middle of an unforgiving winter. Industrial plants, schools and even private companies were forced to halt their activities in the crippling absence of heat and electricity. This situation did not affect Turkey to the same extent because it holds alternative suppliers and storage facilities for both LGN and gas. However, Turkey can benefit from the situation if it takes the necessary step with haste. The current global economic crisis inserts urgency and highlights the primacy of this issue. Not only would the relative low cost of such investments be deemed attractive by investors, but the employment opportunities and income-generating effect on Turkey's economy and hike in net income would be significant. Overall the strategic clout that Turkey would gain in its international relations during the management of the investments would be more far reaching than the financial gains.
In the globalized world defined in 21st century terms, energy security has gained "international" status. We cannot speak about the energy security of one state alone. When we look at the region from this perspective, the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of Turkey, which could become the trade hub on the West-East and North-South axis becomes more important in the sense of sustained energy security and stable political and economic relations between supplier and customer states. If Turkey can fully recognize its own potential role to balance the competition between powers looking towards this region with the skillful leverage of its strategic "energy geopolitics" it would certainly maximize Turkey's best interest. This is not out of reach.
During the days when the United Kingdom reigned over its great empire, Henry Temple Palmerson, British Prime Minister between 1855-65, described the central principles driving British foreign policy: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." There is no reason why this cannot be the strategic way forward for Turkey.

Map 1. Pipelines Passing Through Ukraine

Table 1. Iran--Germany Trade Relations/ January-September period, Billion Euro/Year

* Energy Strategist
mete@tr.net

i Mete Göknel, "Kafkaslarda Yaşanan Sıcak Yaz, Soğuk Bir Kışın Habercisi mi ?" [Is the Warm Summer in the Caucasus an omen of A Cold Winter?], Eurasia Strategic Research Centre (ASAM), September 4, 2008. Available at http://www.asam.org.tr.

ii John C.K. Daly, "The Russian-Ukrainian Drama: Gazprom a Capitalist, not an Energy Gangster," United Press International, January 12, 2009. Available at www.upi.com.