The present-day geopolitical landscape has its specificity, at least in comparison to what one could find during the Cold War. And this could be easily seen in a blurring of the lines that divide friend from foe. It, of course, would be wrong to state that even during the Cold War era the lines between friends and enemies were clearly drawn. Still, at that time, one could easily define most of the global players by their allegiance to one of the major geopolitical centres-the USA and USSR. One could state, at the time, that one could well apply the famous definition of Carl Schmitt, who stated that one should be defined by his vision of the enemy. At present, however, the strict rule of geopolitical, strategic marriages has become blurred and almost obsolete. The state could engage in a complicated web of flirtation and geopolitical marriages. In some cases, the states could engage in a sort of ménage-à-trois where they had an amicable relationship with several powers, each of them hardly a friend to each other. The other aspect of this fluid, one might say, post-modernist in a way, geopolitical play is that it marks the end of many old rules, one of them being that "the enemy of my enemy is surely my friend." And the Russia/Afghanistan relationship could be an example. At present, fearful of the rise of Islamic extremists--the enemy of Russia and the West alike--Russia is willing to provide a helping hand to NATO and the USA which are often seen by the present-day Russian elite almost in the old Cold War fashion. Still, the very fact that Russia views NATO and, in a way, the USA as an enemy or potential enemy precludes that Russian support is sort of lukewarm and could hardly tip the balance in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and the USSR/Russia during the Cold War:
Enemy of my enemy is my friend

If one would study the present situation in Afghanistan and its roots, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 could be seen as most likely the point of departure. Still, the problems in the country had actually started in 1973 when the monarchy collapsed. The end of the Afghan monarchy could not be compared with the end of that of the Shah of Iran in 1979, when a strong and charismatic regime of the Ayatollahs had quickly established its authority. The event in Afghanistan was more similar to events in Russia in March/February of 1917 when the collapse of the monarchy had led to anarchy. The pro-Communist regime in Kabul, which emerged after several years of turmoil, was quite fragile; and, after some hesitation, the USSR moved its troops-for the first time since WWII-outside its East European empire. The Soviet rationale was, as is often the case in such a situation, manifold. The most important of the rationale seems to be the sense that with the changing mood in Washington the era of detente was coming to an end. At the same time, the people in the Kremlin, watching the American weakness in dealing with Iran, had assumed that they had the opportunity to expand their influence. And in 1979 Soviet troops moved on Kabul.
Those who engaged in the war with Soviet troops and their Afghan proxies were, of course, a heterogeneous bunch. Even more so as time progressed, the jihadist aspect of the resistance became increasingly clear. Those who professed this creed hardly saw much difference between the Soviets and the Americans. And even more important-at least if one would take Washington's statements at face value-they were hardly proponents of Western democracy and a market economy. Still, Reagan, despite the ideological spin of his foreign policy posture, ignored this aspect of the Afghan resistance in the same way he ignored the totalitarian nature of Red China, which, by all accounts, was much more "evil" than "the evil empire" of the USSR. Pragmatic raison d'état was of most importance here; and the USA mass media, following administration pronouncements, invariably presented the members of the Afghan resistance as heroic freedom fighters. Gorbachev, with his-as the future would show-ill-conceived vision of the reforms and the USSR's relationship with the West, had assumed that withdrawal from Afghanistan would clearly demonstrate the USSR's change for the better. And in 1988, the USSR, indeed, did pull out its troops. While the USSR and later, after its collapse, Russia, had much more pressing problems to be dealt with, the USA continued to assist the Afghan resistance, or at least, close its eyes on Pakistan's involvement in helping them. It is clear that Mohammad Najibullah, installed by the Soviets, was seen by the USA as a remnant of Soviet/Russian influence in the country. In fact, Gorbachev continued to send Najibullah assistance until the very end of the USSR. [1] Consequently, the USA was not displeased when the triumphant Taliban finally captured Kabul in 1996 and hung Najibullah in a most gruesome way.
While the Taliban had solidified its position, Russia had plunged into a protracted war in Muslim Chechnya, which led to the beginning of a spectacular terrorist attack against Russian civilians. There was also increasing Islamic resistance of all hues in nearby Central Asia, with the clear possibility that the Taliban could easily undermine the fragile stability in this part of the former USSR. While its relationship with the USA continued to be cordial on a formal level, there were increasing signs of a chill; and, in the view of Russian pundits and increasing numbers of the Russian public-the West, mostly the USA, of course, and Islamists of all sorts acted in unison to destroy Russia. As a matter of fact, the Russian public, watching NATO continue its Eastward expansion, came to the conclusion that the USA's, in fact, the West's in general, conflict with Russia was not due to ideological differences but was a geopolitical conflict, a "clash of civilizations," if you wish. In this situation, both the Chechen resistance and the Taliban became increasingly close to each other, as time progressed and were seen as part of one grand plan for Russia's destruction orchestrated by sweet smiling predatory Washington.
The feeling that both the USA and Muslim extremists were working in unison to destroy Russia became especially strong by 1999, at the very end of Yeltsin's presidency, when two important events, at least from the Russians' perspective, took place. On one hand, NATO's war against Serbia was launched and was seen by the majority of Russians as the way the West had shown its real colours and a potent warning to Russia. At the same time, the explosion of several apartment buildings in Moscow, with the death of several hundred people, had been attributed to the Chechens. And in this case, the sense that both Islamists and the West had worked together to unsettle Russia had been vivid in the Russian mind. It was shared even by the majority of the so recently strongly pro-American Russian liberals. The old theory that "one of my enemies should be the friend of my other enemy" seems to work well. Still, as time continued to progress a new paradigm started to emerge in the Russian mind.

My enemy as the enemy of my other enemy: enemy as friend

Putin, who came to power in 2000, was a professional politician whose Byzantine qualities were the result not so much of his personality but because of the nature of the Russian elite and its geopolitical setting. His advent to power coincided with the evolution of the Chechen resistance which increasingly portrayed both the USA and Russia and, of course Israel, as mortal enemies of Muslims. The spreading of this same type of ideology and practice was not just in the Muslim enclaves of Russia but in Central Asia as well. All of them were sending Putin a potent signal that the Islamist extremists could well be an enemy of both the USA and Russia, irrespective of their mutual antagonism. And, here, one should not just choose between "enemy" and "friend"--following the classical Carl Schmitt paradigm--but between two "enemies," each of which is also at loggerheads with the other. Taking this, as well as other rationales into consideration, Putin saw the Taliban as part of the broad Islamist network and took into account Chechen jihadist/Taliban allegiance. Consequently, he seems to have come to the conclusion that at least not all Islamists are just tools of the USA. Moreover, some of them, such as the Taliban, could be enemies of not only the USA and the West in general, but also Russia. And the Taliban, the Islamic extremists in general, could be even more dangerous to Russia in the long run than NATO despite NATO's continuous eastward expansion. Consequently, he made the decision to fully support the USA's toppling of the Taliban and condescended to go along with the creation of USA bases in Central Asia in 2001. Still, the USA was viewed mostly as a rival. And, consequently, the support of Americans in toppling the Taliban went along with anti-American actions-e.g., resuming the sale of weapons to Iran. Russia's apprehension in regard to the USA increased even more after the 2003 USA invasion of Iraq. At that point, Putin once again seemed to be returning to his previous vision of Islamic extremists as working together with the USA; and, after the Beslan hostage crisis (2004) in a speech he pointed out that Chechen extremists are not an independent force and someone other-implicitly the USA-stands behind them. Still, as time progressed, Putin and later Putin/Medvedev in tandem reluctantly returned to the assumption that Islamic extremists, including the Taliban, are enemies of the USA, the West in general, and Russia and that Russians should support the West, regardless of Russia/USA and Russia/NATO tensions. Still, these Russian actions are inconsistent and most likely would not make much difference.

Recent developments

The increasing fear of instability in Afghanistan was caused by different factors. The most important is the increasing rise of Russian nationalism and the growing tension between ethnic Russians and Muslim minorities, mostly those from the Caucasus. Two major ethnic riots in Kondopoga and Stavropol (2006 and 2007), each involving several hundred people, testifies to this. The state also engaged in a drive against "extremism," with Russian Muslims becoming a major target. People could be put on trial even for reading the works of Said Nursi, a Turkish theologian. At the same time, the Chechen resistance finally became jihadist when the Chechen president Doku Umarov proclaimed himself "emir" and also proclaimed that his goal is not just the liberation of Chechnya but of all the Muslim people of Russia. In 2005, major riots in Andijan in Uzbekistan also indicated that what Russians called "near abroad" could easily explode. The trends/events pushed the Russian elite to watch closely what was going on in Afghanistan where the Taliban became increasingly active; and Hamid Karzai, Afghan president, was well aware of Najibullah's ignominious end and not at all sure that NATO, and especially the USA, would stay the course, stretched hands in all directions for help. Here, the Russian elite came to the conclusion that the collapse of the Karzai regime could well lead to an Islamist wave from the Taliban-they continued to be praised by the Kavkaz Center, the major Internet publication of the jihadist Chechen resistance-to the Russian Caucasus and, finally, to the Russian heartland. It would also destabilise Central Asia from which Russia received a good percentage of its natural gas that was sent to Europe. All of this pushed the Russian elite to see Russia's help to NATO as essential for Russia's stability. In April 2008 at a meeting in Bucharest, Russia allowed NATO to transfer some goods to Afghanistan through Russian territory [2] and implicitly acknowledged that the Karzai regime is the only viable alternative to the Taliban. Those who see Karzai as an American puppet who needs to be overthrown are strongly criticized.
This was, for example, the case with a critic of Radzhab Safarov, an ethnic Tajik and Director of the Centre for Iranian Research in Moscow. Safarov stated in one interview that Karzai is an "American puppet" and implied that Russia should be glad to see Karzai's downfall. Responding to this, one observer stated, "in any case, Karzai is much better than Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. If Mullah Omar's ‘khalifat' would still run Afghanistan with his plan to invade Central Asia and to create another Taliban type of state, the Safarov compatriots would run to Moscow." [3]
Putin also demonstrated his full support of Karzai's government and made several symbolic gestures in his direction. Russia promised cultural,[4] and even, implicitly, military cooperation with Karzai's regime.[5] Afghanistan's debt to Russia was written off. [6] The Russian observers were also pleased by Karzai's assertion that Afghanistan is ready to maintain the most amicable relationship with all major countries in the region, including Russia. [7]
Still, Russia's rapprochement with Karzai would hardly make much difference in the stability of the regime. To start with, Russians are adamantly against sending any troops to Afghanistan. [8] Some Russian experts are even against using Russian commercial planes in Afghanistan. There are actually no visible plans to stabilize the situation in the country besides the general statements (quite popular in the West as well) that raw military power would hardly solve Afghanistan's problems. Moreover, even the little cooperation with NATO and Karzai is limited because NATO is still seen as a hostile force to Russia, at least in Europe where NATO has expanded to the East and the American missile defence system, which is planned to be installed in the Czech Republic and Poland, is seen by Russia as directed against it.
Consequently, Russia's vision of NATO in Afghanistan isn't always much different from what it was in the Cold War era. A Russian observer in the context of this vision proclaimed that Russia has allowed NATO to move goods through Russian territory only because of the implicit promise not to expand eastward. It has also been stated in publications that NATO is unprofessional and brutal-and, here, the Karzai government is quoted--that there are mounting collateral casualties among civilians, including children. [9]
NATO also emerges here as a rather weak force, and a split between Europeans and Americans could well lead to a European departure, in fact, a collapse of the entire effort. It was stated in this connection that NATO's performance in Afghanistan is actually disastrously bad: the Taliban controls most of Afghanistan and could well take Kabul in the near future.[10] Not only are NATO soldiers of poor quality and the NATO strategy in Afghanistan faulty, but also the overall geopolitical designs of the West are hardly manifestations of wisdom. One article dwelt on the independence of Kosovo sponsored by NATO, which created a state infested with al-Qaida cells. This could lead to Taliban-type activity in Europe and distract European/NATO forces from defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan. [11] The middle of Europe is directly connected with the Taliban, with whom NATO is fighting. Finally, in another interpretation, NATO's, and especially the Americans', increasing recent presence in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the fight against the Taliban but actually is to increase pressure on Russia and its allies. And Europeans are beginning to understand that they come to Afghanistan not to fight the Taliban but to serve American interests." [12]
All of these signals imply that Russia could indeed provide increasing and possibly substantial military help or at least advice to NATO and Karzai-it was stated in this respect in one article-but only if NATO and in particular the USA, would completely abandon its anti-Russian polity. And the West should also understand that without Russia and organisations in which Russia plays an important role, e.g., SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization),[13] NATO could hardly do anything in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War, the alliance was in most cases firmly placed in the context of the two rival major military/geopolitical blocks. Thus, enemies and friends were clearly defined, and help/support was allocated with little reservations. For a long time, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the beginning of the Bush presidency, Afghan resistance was seen as the ally of the USA and the USSR/Russia's enemy. But, with their increasing radicalisation, they were transformed into America's enemies after the US invasion in 2001. Still, a considerable segment of the Islamic extremist resistance, the Taliban first of all, see Russians as almost equally hostile as the US. And the Russian elite also understands that the Taliban is also an enemy of Russia as well as of the West. Still, Russia's cold relationship with the USA and its attempt to prevent diversifying the oil/gas supply to Europe makes the West apprehensive. On the other hand, NATO policy in Europe put Russia on guard. All of this makes Russia/NATO collaboration in Afghanistan mostly a showpiece without much implication for Afghanistan's stability and could, indeed, help the Taliban to prevail. And, if this happens, certainly both the USA and Russia would be in trouble as well as a good part of Eurasia.

[1] "Ispolniaetsia ll let so dnia ubiistva Nadzhibully," http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=10053.
[2] "Eksperty o soglashenii NATO i Rossii po tranzitu," Afganistan.ru. http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=11746
[3] Shakh Makhmud, "Afganistan: geostrategiia interesov i mezhdunarodnoe sotrudnichestvo," Afganistan.ru, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=11317.
[4] "Pervyi rossiiskii sait na iazyke pushtu," Afganistan.ru. http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=12535; Dimitii Verkhoturov, "Stroiashchiisia Afganistan, Afganistan.ru. http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id-12274. "Kabul gotov sozdat' blagopratnye usloviia dlia rossiiskiku investorov," Afganistan.ru. http.www.afganistan.ru.print/?id=11129; "Glava afganskogo MID vyskazalsia za razvitie ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestras Rossiei, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=11006; "Of'em vzaimnoi torgovls mezhdu Rossiei i Afganistanom vozros, bolee chem v dva raza," Afganistan.ru. http://www.Afganistan.ru/print/?id=12548
[5] "Byvshii nachal'nik Genshtaba SSSR: Moskva dolzhna pomoch' silam NATO v Afganistane na komercheskoi osnove," Afganistan.ru, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=9401;"V. Varennikov: afganskie vlasti zainteresovany v sotrudnichestve s Rossiei v voenno-­tekhnicheskoi oblasti," Afganistan.ru. http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=11554;
[6] "Chto meshaet razvitiiu Rossiisko-Afganskogo ekomoicheskogo sotrudnichestva?, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=11457.
[7] "Afganistan predstavil proekt, ‘vneshnepoliticheskoi doktriny'," Afganistan.ru., http:/www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=12025; "Spanta: my iskrenne zaiuteresovany v Fasvitii otnoshenii s Rossiei," Afganistan.ru, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id+12140.
[8] "NATO oproverglo soobshcheniia o vozmozhnosti vvoda rossiiskik voisk v Afganistan," http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id+11573.
[9] "Moskva obespokoena rostom poter' sredi grazhdanskikh lits v Afganistane," Afganistan.ru, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=12507.
[10] "Russkie sobiraintsia uchastvovat' v voennoi operatsii NATO v Afganistane?" Afganistan.ru, http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=10634.
[11] Andrei Serenko, "Taliban mozhet otkoyt' vtoroi front protiv NATO v Kosovo," http://www.afganistan.ru/print?id=11175.
[12] "Perspektivy rossiisko-­natovskogo sotrudnichestva po' afganskomu voprosu'," http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=1472.
[13] Egamerdy Kabulov "Zapad opasaetsia sblizheniia Afganistana i SOC," http://www.afganistan.ru/print/?id=9723