Shortly after assuming the Russian presidency, Vladimir Putin asked for a comprehensive review of the foreign policy assumptions that had guided his predecessor. Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept, the first in seven years, began with the somber comment that the previous administration's optimistic expectations of building beneficial and partner-like relations based on mutual respect with the West "have proven to be unfounded."2
Though the world was slowly overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, there were dangerous tendencies toward the creation of unipolar structures and behavior, along with a weakening of the tutelary role of the UN Security Council. Russia would do its best to assist in the formation of a multipolar international system, but it suffered from limited options. As a result, the country's first priority would be to "strengthen Russian statehood . . . and foster stable economic growth." 3
Putin's foreign policy review underscored the obvious fact that Russia in 2000 was in no position to defend its national interests. It was so weak domestically and economically that it was dependent on foreign loans to cover current accounts. In Putin's mind such dependence translated into a conditional sovereignty for Russia, and Russia needed a long-term strategy to re-establish full sovereignty. This strategy has since become known simply as "the Putin Plan."4

Phase I: Sovereign Democracy
At the heart of the Putin Plan lies the concept of "sovereign democracy," popularized by a long time member of the President's senior staff, Vladislav Surkov.
According to Surkov, sovereign democracy offers a way for the various generations living during this period of upheaval to link the positive experiences of the Soviet past to the modern values that Russia will need to succeed in a democratic and economically integrated world. In order to do this, however, all generations must be convinced that it was the Russian people themselves who made the choice to reject the past and embrace a modern, democratic and European future. The fall of the communist system was "a return to democratic values," not something imposed from the outside, and as evidence Surkov points to the willing, albeit painful, acceptance by the vast majority of Russians of the loss of their empire as the price to be paid for getting Russia back onto the democratic track from which it had been derailed in 1917.5
Casting the early 1990s as a victory of the Russian people, rather than a defeat of a social system, would allow all Russians to deal respectfully with the Soviet past, while also moving beyond it. The ability to define the past is not only vital to forging public unity, but to allowing the country to pursue democratic and economic reforms in a manner that is consonant with its own political culture. To become a truly sovereign country, Russia must become economically competitive. To be competitive it must be governed democratically; i.e., in a manner that reflects Russian traditions and culture.6
The central foreign policy implication of sovereign democracy, according to Surkov, is that nations must choose their own social and political systems, without coercion7 This, in turn, presumes multipolarity in global economic and international relations. Any monopoly on power, be it military, economic, or other, is a source of global injustice and a threat to Russian interests. "We sometimes hear" says Surkov, "that no one is interested in taking away our sovereignty (or that this is unreal), but the universal and daily need for resources and security is so great, and our supply of these is so rich, that excessive complacency here hardly seems appropriate."8
Surkov suggests that Russia ought to side with "an association of sovereign democracies (and free markets) against any type of global dictatorship (or monopoly), to make national sovereignty a factor for just globalization and the democratization of international relations. There is both pragmatism and romanticism in this task . . . and perhaps, even a mission."9

Phase II: The Munich Speech
Western analysts took little note of the far reaching implications of sovereign democracy until Putin's speech to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 10, 2007.10 Whle this speech merely summarized Russia's long standing grievances, it did so in a manner that focused attention on U.S. efforts to achieve global dominance. In unusually candid language, Putin laid out Russia's basic philosophical disagreements with current US and NATO strategies, and urged his audience re-think their assumptions.
Putin laid the blame for many of the world's problems squarely on the United States, and its desire to construct a unipolar international system through the use of force. In addition, "nearly the entire legal system of one state-first and foremost, of course, the United States-has overstepped its national borders in all arenas . . . As a result . . . no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall behind which they can find shelter." Instead of the dominance of one nation, Putin argued that the world needs a new architecture of global security, that would incorporate the interest of the many different international actors now coming onto the world stage.11
In his speech Putin highlighted the importance of preventing the militarization of space, providing ways for non-nuclear states to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, encouraging investment in underdeveloped countries, revising foreign aid programs that perpetuate economic backwardness, and ending the practice of certain Western governments to use NGOS to destabilize regimes they dislike.
In the West, Putin's cri de coeur is best remembered for its anti-American rhetoric, its appeal for a renewed emphasis on international law and the demands of rising global economies largely ignored. As a result, the signals of what was now vital to Russia's national interest, and where Russia would be willing to push back against Western encroachment, were missed. The August 2008 war in the Caucasus is a direct result.

Phase III: New Man in the Kremlin
After his election as president in March 2008, Dmitry Medvedev's first trips abroad were, tellingly, to Kazakhstan and China. It was not until June that he travelled to the West, to Germany, where he spoke of his foreign policy priorities and offered a number of several new proposals on pan-European military and energy security.12
Speaking to a gathering of German political and civic leaders, Medvedev pointed out how divergent approaches to human rights can lead to conflict. Rejecting the idea that nations can be "made" to conform to Western standards, he called instead for a true dialogue on human rights issues, reminding his audience that "Russian and European democracy share common roots. We share the same set of values and the same sources of law: Roman, Germanic and French law. I have said in the past that democracy is always shaped by history and by the national setting. We have a common history and we share the same humanitarian values. This common thinking is the foundation that enables us to speak not just the same legal or business language today but, I hope, also the same political language."13
Like his predecessor, Medvedev too undertook a review of Russian foreign policy. The main differences between this latest Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed on July 12, 2008, and its predecessor lie not in the analysis of global trends, but in Russia's new found capacity to influence them.14
The new concept argues that Russia's primary goal must be to continue to modernize and to create conditions that are conducive to the country's integration into the global economy. Secondarily, it must help to forge "a crisis-resistant international system."15
The document argues that "for the first time in modern history, global competition is assuming a civilizational dimension, which presumes a competition among different value systems and models of development, within the framework of universal democratic and market economy principles." The danger of what Samuel Huntington called "the clash of civilizations" is thus quite real, but the West's response has, to date, been limited to seeking ways in which it can preserve its privileges. Such one-sided efforts are "destabilizing."16
The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept continues to emphasize the vital role of the United Nations. Respect for state sovereignty, within a strengthened UN system, is deemed essential to ensuring that international norms are applied universally, and not as a weapon by one group of states against another. Among the principles that Russia seeks to emphasize within this new system are: "improving the manageability of the world development, [and] the creation of a self-regulating international system, an effort that requires collective leadership by the leading States, which should be representative in geographical and civilizational terms . . ."17
Regionally, Russia seeks to move from "good-neighborly" relations with the former CIS state to "friendly relations," and perhaps even to "strategic partnerships and alliances" with those who are ready for it. The goal is to transcend, once and for all, the Cold War division of Europe and "guarantee the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region-from Vancouver to Vladivostok."18
Speaking to a gathering of Russian ambassadors to international organizations in mid-July, Medvedev highlighted the main priorities of the new foreign policy concept: resisting attempts to advance national or group interests at the expense of international law; establishing a positive, rather than a negative, agenda for Europe that would include "intensive economic interpenetration;" promoting the "collective leadership of leading states" as the basis for a new global security architecture; establishing "open systems of collective security" in various regions of the globe; and assisting the "psychological adaptation" of Russia's partners to the reality that Russia today is very different from the USSR.19

Phase IV: After Georgia
Erupting less than a month after the adoption of this latest Russian foreign policy concept, the crisis in Georgia tested the mettle of the new president and his foreign policy. Since then it has become a watershed for how Russians view the West, comparable in significance to the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia. Russian pundits and politicians of all stripes have come to see the events of early August as a humanitarian crisis unleashed by naked Georgian aggression, and were outraged by the West's indifference to the sufferings of the people of South Ossetia.
As influential foreign policy analyst Fyodor Lukyanov put it, "Russia has been genuinely shocked by this foreign reaction and by the one-sided support that Georgian President Mikheil Saakasvili has received from the West, despite violating every conceivable humanitarian norm of civilized conduct. Moscow sees this as more than just a double standard, but as unabashed cynicism . . . Russia is now inclined not only to reject completely a path determined by Western values, but actually to deny that such values even exist."20
"By backing the Georgian aggression, the West has lost any moral authority, and references such as ‘This is how they do it in civilized countries' will not work," says Sergei Markov, an analyst with close ties to the Kremlin.21 Another Kremlin advisor, Vyacheslav Nikonov, comments: "not only have we been denied condolences and support - but the West has responded with a firm promise to re-arm the aggressor . . . what would Washington have thought of us if Russia had responded to 9/11 by endeavoring to re-arm Al Qaeda?"22 The moral outrage at the West has been so complete that long time regime opponents like Yabloko party chairman Sergei Mitrokhin, human right activist Lev Ponomaryov, and even jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, voiced their support of Medvedev's actions.23
Partly to calm public outrage, and to offer a framework within which Russians could sensibly re-examine their relations with the West, at the end of very August President Medvedev listed five principles that he said would now guide him in implementing Russian foreign policy:

First: Russia recognizes the primacy of the basic principles of international law.
Second: The world should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible.
Third: Russia does not want confrontation with any country; Russia has no intention of isolating itself. Third: Russia does not want confrontation with any country; Russia has no intention of isolating itself.
Fourth: Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are. We will also proceed from this in pursuing our foreign policy. We will also protect the interest of our business community abroad.
Fifth: Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had friendly cordial relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, with our close neighbours. 24

More recently, while reaffirming Russia's commitment to the latest foreign policy concept, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov issued what can only be considered a warning to the West about the potential for a deep and abiding conflict over values:
"To us, the CIS space is not a ‘chessboard' for playing geopolitical games. This is a common civilizational area for every people living here, one that keeps our historic and spiritual legacy alive. Our geography and economic interdependence give tangible competitive advantages to all of the Commonwealth countries. . . . The response of some western countries to the South Ossetia crisis . . . vividly illustrates a deficit of morality. Those incapable of siding with the truth and justice simply cannot, no matter how hard they try, represent the whole of European civilization, not to speak of the incompatibility of that approach with other civilizations and cultural traditions."25

Conclusion: Whose afraid of a New Cold War?
To put the impact of recent events in the Caucasus on Russian foreign policy thinking into perspective, it is helpful to consider the reactions of two of Russia's most influential political analysts: Gleb Pavlovsky and Sergei Karaganov. Pavlovsky, a former dissident, has built an internet media empire around his "Fund for Effective Politics," and served for many years as an informal advisor to Dmitry Medvedev. Karaganov is chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which played a central role in shaping the foreign policy debate under president Putin. Thanks to his membership in the Trilateral Commission and the New York Council on Foreign Relations, he is also considered one of Russia's most knowledgeable interpreters of U.S. foreign policy.
Reacting to the president's five points, Pavlovsky highlights that Russian foreign policy has, for the first time, embraced the importance of values in international politics. It remains unclear, however, to what it extent it will pursue such values at the expense of Realpolitik, as it apparently did by recognizing Abkahzia and South Ossetia as independent states. Pavlovsky also suggests that Medvedev's stark rejection of unipolarity implies a de facto policy of containing the United States, and it is not clear what resources Russia can rely on to accomplish this ambitious task. Presently, there seems to be little more behind such a statement than the hope that the Europeans can be convinced that it is not in their interest to slavishly follow America's lead. One reason they might feel encouraged to do so, he suggests, is the recent display of American impotence in the Caucasus, and the relative ease with which Moscow was able to derail Washignton's strategy in the region. 26
Karaganov, by contrast, is much more skeptical of the ability of US foreign policymakers to learn from their mistakes. While he agrees with Pavlovsky that the "new Cold War" is an effort by the West to preserve its traditional position of privilege, he doubts anything will change with a new American president27 Pavlovsky, at least, is open to the idea that Obama could be made to see that current United States policies are "an agenda for failure."28
Sadly, this reflects the breadth of mainstream Russian foreign policy thinking. It ranges from pessimists who hope for a more reasonable approach if Barack Obama becomes president, to pessimists who believe that both Democrats and Republicans are too deeply committed to the idea of America as "the indispensable nation" to recognize the truth. The resulting conflict of visions between Russian and American elites is no longer ideological in nature, as the one between communism and capitalism was, but this scarcely makes it less dangerous.
The saving grace of the First Cold War was that, for all its rhetorical excesses and moralistic grandstanding, policymakers on both sides were very careful to avoid direct confrontation, fearful of initiating events that might trigger a nuclear exchange. The Second Cold War holds no such fear, leaving us with all the faults of the First Cold War, but none of the constraints. As a result, we are lulled into a false sense of security by the absence of ideological competition and by Russia's past weakness.
Much more apropos to the current situation are the lessons once learned by a young Winston Spenser Churchill during his brief stint as military journalist in the Ottoman Empire. Observing the rise of nationalist sentiment on the bones of a collapsed multi-ethnic empire, Churchill reflected on why the Ottomans and the British could not come to terms, even in areas where their interests so obviously overlapped: "Had it been possible for the main lines of British policy to have been more in accord with legitimate Turkish aspirations, I am sure we could have worked agreeably with Enver Bey. But all the puppets in the world tragedy were held too tightly in the grip of destiny. Events moved forward remorseless to the supreme catastrophe."a
Nicolai N. Petro is professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island (USA). He is the author of eight books on Russian politics, including Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State co-authored with Alvin Z. Rubinstein. He served as special assistant on Soviet affairs in the U.S. Department of State in 1989-1990. Additional publications are available on his web site: www.npetro.net
Vladimir Putin, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya kontseptsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 28), , available online at: http://www.mid.ru/mid/vpcons.htm (accessed 7/11/2000).(Putin, 2000 ref_num261)
Vladimir Putin, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya kontseptsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 28), , available online at: http://www.mid.ru/mid/vpcons.htm (accessed 7/11/2000).
Russia's current president, Dmitry Medvedev notes that even then, at the outset of 2000 they were "seriously thinking about how to work for the coming decades. Thinking . . . also of values and ethical goals." cit_bfDmitry Medvedev, "Vystuplienie Pervogo zamestitelya Predsedatelya Pravitelstva RF Dmitryia Medvedeva na II Obshcherossiiskom grazhdansom forume," VIPerson.Ru (January 22, 2008), available online at: (accessed 1/24/2008).
Vladislav Surkov, "Suverenitet-eto politicheskii sinonim konkurentosposobnosti," United Russia (February 22, 2006). Available online at: http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=111148 (accessed 12/1/2006)
Vladislav Surkov, "Russkaya politicheskaya kultura: vzglyad iz utopii," Kreml.org (June 8, 2007). Available online at: http://www.kreml.org/opinions/152440881?mode=print (accessed 6/16/2007).
Vladislav Surkov, "Natsionalizatsii budushchego," Ekspert, No. 43 (November 20, 2006). Available online at: http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_budusche... (accessed 11/20/2006).
Surkov, "Natsionalizatsii budushchego."
Surkov, "Natsionalizatsii budushchego."
Vladimir Putin, "Vystuplenie i diskusii na Miunkhenshoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti," Kremlin.Ru (February 10, 2007), available online at: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/02/118109.shtml (accessed 2/10/2007).
cit_bfPutin, "Vystuplenie."
Dmitry Medvedev, "Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders," Kremlin.Ru cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#110, available online at: (accessed 6/9/2008).
Medvedev, "Speech."
Dmitry Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (July 12, 2008), , available online at: http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d487371... (accessed 10/1/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Medvedev, ref_num22753)
Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki."
Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki."
Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki."
Medvedev, "Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki."
Dmitry Medvedev, "Vystuplenie na soveshchanii s poslami i postoyannymi predstavitelyami Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiyakh," Kremlin.Ru (July 15, 2008), available online at: http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/07/204113.shtml (accessed 10/1/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Medvedev, ref_num22752)
Fedor Lukyanov, "Seven Theses Prompted By The Russia-Georgia Conflict," RFE/RL (August 26, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#158, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/2/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Lukyanov, ref_num22452)ref_af
Oleg Shchedrov, "Georgia war boosts Medvedev's status," Reuters (September 4, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#166, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).
Vyacheslav Nikonov, "The War in the Caucasus: What is the West Refusing to Understand?" Izvestia (September 3, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#165, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Nikonov, ref_num22517)
"Medvedev sets out five foreign policy principles in TV interview," BBC Monitoring (August 31, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#163, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).
"Medvedev sets out five foreign policy principles in TV interview," BBC Monitoring (August 31, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#163, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).

Sergei Lavrov, "Transcript of Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Foreign Ministry's MGIMO University on the Occasion of the New Academic Year, September 1, 2008," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (September 1, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#166, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).
Gleb Pavlovsky, "Vozvrashchenie iz Gori," Ekspert, No. 33 (622) (August 25, 2008), , available online at: http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2008/33/vozvraschenie_iz_gory/ (accessed 8/25/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Pavlovsky, ref_num22127)ref_af
Sergei Karaganov, "Weakening 'Old West' Seen as Provoking Conflict, Possible Cold War," Rossiiskaya gazeta (August 29, 2008), cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-#165, available online at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 9/4/2008).
Gleb Pavlovsky, "'Nam nado videt chertu, gde my ostanovimsya . . .'," Russkiy zhurnal (August 13, 2008), available online at: http://www.russ.ru/interv_yu/nam_nado_videt_chertu_gde_my_ostanovimsya (accessed 8/25/2008).cit_af ref_bf(Pavlovsky, ref_num22403)ref_af
Winston Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1947)cit_af ref_bf(Churchill, 1947 ref_num17815)ref_af, p. 57. .