Introduction
Warfare is going under a major transformation. The United States defense community sees this transformation as a revolutionary change in warfare, initiated by the advancement of communication, computing and sensor technologies. This revolutionary change is termed Network Centric Warfare (NCW), in which all units and platforms become interconnected, increasing the efficiency of military operations. NCW is sometimes seen as change in the nature of warfare. Furthermore, it is used as a political discourse for justification of war; presenting war as more humane -less/no civilian casualties because of high tech weapons that are more precise than ever. As the technological leader of the world, the U.S. is the forerunner in adapting its military might in accordance with the principles and ideals of NCW, in order to keep its military supremacy.

On the other hand, NCW is the source of an illusion. An illusion for both the military and society. As a theoretical construct, NCW is divorced from the realities on the ground and the nature of war. The belief that technology could solve all the challenges that are posed by the adversary, regardless of their tactics and nature, was unfortunately shattered by the grave situation in Iraq and Afghanistan when the conventional hostilities ended. Therefore, the aim here is to show that NCW is not a revolution in military affairs that is changing the very essence of war, but rather a force multiplier that could enable state military apparatus to fight more effectively, provided that doctrine and organization or the armed forces are constructed in accordance with a threat evaluation.

What is a Revolution in Military Affairs?

According to Colin S. Gray, "the core idea is that from time to time there is a radical change in the character of warfare, a change that may or may not be sparked by technological developments" . Technological developments have a lesser significance in Gray's understanding of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which was opposed by other scholars. According to Geoffrey Parker, technological developments is the integral part of RMA, like double helix of a DNA, thus, in order to label a change in warfare, technological innovations have to exist. Parallel with Parker's understanding, Andrew F. Krepinevich defines RMA as:

"It is what occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict." Former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen offers a different definition:

"A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a nation's military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations or tactics to achieve decisive results in fundamentally new ways."

Consequently, different understanding of RMA, leads to different classification of what constitutes a revolution in military affairs. For example, if one takes Cohen's definition of RMA, then revolution of Gustavus Adolphus would not be considered as a revolution, because Adolphus never reached a decisive victory to end the Thirty Year Wars. In fact, Adolphus was killed at the indecisive battle at Lützen in 1632.

Secondly, definitions of RMA, except some, implicitly assume that revolutionary change is synonymous with change in the nature of warfare. Such a view is a grave mistake. How the war is waged does not change the real impetus behind the nature of war, that is, the duel between actors to impose their will on each other, with the tendency of escalation. In other words, as Clausewitz said "war is the continuation of politics by other means" . Therefore, ‘change in the character of war' in Colin Gray's definition is important.

Despite these differences, academia generally accepts five revolutions in military affairs. First, RMA is "the seventeenth-century creation of the modern state and of modern military institutions" . Second, RMA is the French Revolution; the rise of national political and economic mobilization marked by the Napoleonic Warfare. Third, RMA is the Industrial Revolution; marked by financial and economic power based on industrialization and technological advancements in land warfare and transport -railroads, telegraph, artillery, and automatic weapons-. The fourth revolution came with the First and Second World Wars with the advent of combined-arms tactics and operations and technologies. Finally, the fifth RMA came with the invention of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems.

RMA, despite controversies on its definitions, increasingly gaining ground in Western defense communities, but was especially embraced by the US defense community. Hence, the concept of RMA became the main driving force behind what is called Network Centric Warfare and transformation of military forces.

Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is seen as the sixth revolution in military affairs, that is, the reflection of the information revolution experienced in early-1990s. Some authors even argue that NCW is the new theory of war, although such claim that interpretation is an overshoot . However, the NCW concept lacks sense of direction because NCW is not a unified concept. The Office of Transformation, established to direct and investigate U.S. military transformation, does not provide a clear definition of the NCW concept, hence the solid aim on the future structure of the military of the future. Arthur Cebrowski, former head of the Office of Transformation, argued that setting a definition would hinder the military's flexibility. Leaving NCW as a vague term would enable the military to change course if necessary. In the end, NCW, in general, is about the use and distribution of information. Hence, resulting in a structural transformation of the military, different from the conventional approach.

NCW is the use of advanced information technologies to attain higher rates of information sharing between all units of the military. Thus, from top to bottom, military commanders would have greater situational awareness, enabling self-synchronization or decreased time of regular corrections. Military organization will change accordingly, becoming more flexible and interconnected. As a result, NCW will greatly increase military effectiveness.

However, none of the foundational publications discuss the nature of the adversary. Furthermore, they do not talk about how NCW would perform in different operational environments. The only problem that these publications mention is the vulnerability of the information domain. Hence, future adversaries would target this domain in order to attain advantage over the U.S. military. Furthermore, there are problems associated with the implementation NCW.

False Hope of Network Centric Warfare

Implementation of NCW started within the U.S. military, when Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense in 2001. Although, the U.S. military began to exploit the advantages of information technologies from the late-1980s and early-1990s, the reorganization of military structures and implementation of new doctrines in accordance with NCW were not initiated. Thus, the early-1990s is marked with intense debates on the future of the U.S. military, but there was no action towards it. After taking office, Rumsfeld ordered the establishment of the Office of Force Transformation under the Department of Defense to implement the concept of NCW and shape the U.S. military force accordingly. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NCW was put into action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although, the U.S. military is still under transformation and the goals of transformation have not been met, military operations since 1990, especially with the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, have pointed out the false hopes that were created by NCW concept and its proponents in the U.S. defense community.

Preparing for the Last War

Throughout history, states have suffered from the tacit acceptance that next war will be fought in a similar fashion to the last one. Hence, preparations, military structures and doctrines developed accordingly, until an adversary decides to fight in ‘unconventional' ways. The French Maginot line is the best example of this. After the First World War, France assumed that the next war, despite the new technologies like the tank, radio communications, advancement in airplanes, would be similar to the First World War. This assumption led to construction of the Maginot Line composed of heavy fortifications in order to stop the advancing bulk of soldiers and tanks. However, the Maginot Line was by-passed by Wehrmacht and the French Army surrendered to the German Blitzkrieg. Although, the U.S. defense community argues that they are preparing for future warfare, recent conflicts showed that the concept of NCW is rooted in Cold War thinking .

NCW assumes that the adversary will have a conventional army with massed formations, identifiable targets, and supply lines. Proponents argue that with the supremacy of information, a Network-Centric army could deliver high levels of destruction with a small number of units. Although, we cannot rule out conventional warfare all together, today the primary adversaries are non-state actors, fighting in unconventional ways. As McMaster argues "capability-based analysis focused narrowly on how the US would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was right" . However, non-state actors are defining where to fight and when to fight, which are turning out to be rather different than U.S. state assumptions. These actors are not identifiable targets, they do not have massed formations waiting for the battle to come and do not have any supply lines. Consequently, non-state actors could mass their dispersed militias at the last minute of attack, and vanish as quickly as they appeared.

The Nature of Land Warfare

Unlike naval and air warfare, land warfare has more factors, both military and non-military, that affect the operations. NCW assumes that land warfare has similar characteristics with naval warfare; hence, it has a simplified understanding of land warfare's battlespace . Consequently, U.S. Department of Defense approach is ‘platform-centric'. However, as David Betz argues, war on land is ‘people-centric'. On the other hand, in land warfare detection of targets via sensors is a difficult job to do; especially if the adversary is good at camouflage. David Bets argued that "camouflage, concealment and decoys remain effective and relatively very cheap" . Furthermore, Stephen Biddle argues that "there is still a great deal of scope for enemies who make consistent use of camouflage and concealment, are disciplined about communication security, and employ decoys and other ruses to escape long-range detection and targeting by precision weapons".

Moreover, insurgencies blend into the civilian population. Such conditions necessitate conducting operations the old school way, meaning soldiers engaging in close combat. Geography also presents significant obstacles in front of the troops. Moreover, NCW "works best in relatively pristine mediums, such as in deserts, on the oceans or in the air" . Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army was quick to eliminate their conventional armies, already weak opponents. The Iraqi and Talibans resistance was quickly beaten. However, when it comes to operate in difficult terrains, sensors do not help much. "In Afghanistan, at Tora Bora for example, surveillance of the difficult terrain could not compensate for the lack of ground forces to cover exfiltration routes"

Power to the Top

NCW is unlikely to change the military structure. Military hierarchy will remain intact, possibly more powerful than ever. NCW is expected to provide more freedom to officers at the smallest unit of the army because of the improved situational awareness and seamless flow of information. However, this is a double-edged sword. As much as NCW provides situational awareness to low ranking officers, it also provides increased awareness to high-ranking officers about their units. Consequently, high-ranking officers become increasing involved in tactical battlespace as well as strategic battlespace. This enables high-ranking officers to intervene with lower ranking officers' conduct of operation. For example;

"It is claimed... that in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 a Hellfire missile-armed Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which had tracked a convoy carrying the Taliban leader Mulah Omar and his bodyguards to a building, missed the chance to kill him because the US Central Command commander, General Franks, forbade an attack on the advice of his legal advisor."

The validity of the above example is questionable. However, Rebecca Grant provides an insight to the probability of similar situations as above:

"Not only did intelligence sources have to produce coordinates quickly enough that they could be relayed to a command centre and then on to a strike aircraft, but also the target might have to be approved. No commander wanted to end up attacking a carload full of Afghan civilians when the target was Al Qaeda fighters. Restaurants, private homes, and civilian-style vehicles all posed nightmarish ID problems, especially under time pressures."

The Necessity to Show Military Presence

Stability and order operations necessitate a military presence. Success of such an operation is based on three factors: to show that the military can ensure safety of the local civilian community, to deter the adversary and to respond quickly. In stability and order operations, the support of the local community is a necessity for success. Acquiring the support of area civilians means that the army will have better information about non-state actors and can prevent people from joining the adversary. However, in order to achieve this, the military has to ensure the safety of the local community. Otherwise, locals, who have nothing to do with the non-state adversary and just want to live in peace, may be easily intimidated by the threats of non-state adversaries, hence making them more weary about sharing information with the military. Moreover, younger people can be forced to join the adversary in order to protect his or her family. Secondly, the military should be able to deter the adversary from attacking by giving zero tolerance for breeding space. Finally, just like its non-state adversary, militaries should be able to concentrate their forces before the non-state actor disappears. In order to do all of the above, the military needs substantial numbers of troops, covering nearly all grounds of the operation area, which cannot be done by small units foreseen by the NCW . As one Army officers puts it:

"The Army is too focused on high-end threats and doesn't take into full account the environment we're fighting today. In order to hold ground, you have to put boots on it. New technologies are necessary but there are still too many limitations [to their effectiveness] as we are seeing today."

Although NCW's performance against the conventional armies of Taliban and Iraq is satisfying, in the new environment of warfare, where non-state actors are prominent, the U.S. approach to NCW failed to meet these new-age threats. That the character of war is changing is indeed true. But this change was not initiated by the United States, but initiated instead by the non-state actors, like Al-Qaeda.

Network Centric Warfare as a Political Discourse

The 1991 Gulf War is both a victory for the ‘overwhelming force' doctrine and a failure that prepared for its demise. The lesson drawn by many technophiles was that technology could win wars, with minimal civilian and military support, hence the era of mass armies came to an end, This conclusion has significant political implications for the justification of war for western societies.

After the Cold War, western societies changed their attitudes towards war/military operations. During the Cold War, western societies had a greater threshold for casualties and military operations, because of the presence of ‘the evil enemy'. However, in the absence of the enemy, western societies have become increasingly casualty and risk averse and reluctant about military spending. High-risk operations, even peace operations, become the source of political crisis.

This societal attitude has reflected upon Western militaries. Their budgets were slashed, troop numbers were lowered and most of developing platforms were abandoned. Ways of doing things have also changed. Western militaries started to focus more on force protection and became weary of taking any risks, even if that meant saving civilian life.

NCW offered new ways for governments to justify their military operations. Governments use emerging new technologies, like Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), unmanned vehicles etc, to make war more humane. The discourse of ‘surgical air strikes' creates a perception that only military targets will be hit with minimal or no civilian casualties. Therefore, war is only waged against criminals, who need to be punished. However, in contemporary battlespace ‘surgical air strikes' does not mean anything, because the adversary uses the civilian population as camouflage. Moreover, there is always a margin for error, which can be the result of standard deviation of weapons accuracy - no weapon is 100% accurate-or wrong intelligence.

Furthermore, small units are presented to successfully accomplish what large forces were able to do in the past. Consequently, low numbers of troops are needed for the operations. This would enable governments to break the resistance of the public opinion, because sending a small force means that the military casualties will affect less civilians.

However, such political discourse on NCW and warfare actually hinders military operations. Political NCW discourse decreases the publics' threshold for casualties because it creates the illusion that the army will not suffer any casualties. Consequently, when the adversary inflicts minor damage to the state army, public support instantly crashes, in most of the cases operations ends prematurely. This has translated into political weakness of western militaries. Therefore, illusions on the character of war and state military capabilities designed for presenting war as more humane and acceptable to the public has actually proved to be more restricting, and hinders the effectiveness of military operations, even if they are well justified.

Conclusion: War is a war is a war

War is a messy and bloody business. It was like that before, it is today and it will be tomorrow. Looking at war through the ideational construct of Network Centric Warfare, and believing that the nature of warfare is changing is a naïve approach. Adversaries will always find new ways to counter advancing technologies and new ways to neutralize them. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved this.

However, the character of war is changing. Unfortunately, non-state actors, like Al Qaeda and the Taliban, rather than the states, have initiated this change. Proponents of NCW are far from accepting this fact. NCW is constructed upon the assumption or age old faith that conventional armies are still the main threat; hence, military organization and troop transformation is geared towards meeting conventional threats. Despite the defense of the NCW by its proponents, the U.S. military and its allies became helpless in the face of unconventional warfare; hence operational problems, especially in Afghanistan are increasing.

Furthermore, political discourse dependent on the promise of NCW, proved more damaging to militaries and political elites, contrary to what they expected. Justifications made on the promise of low casualty -both military and civilian- and low troop levels, proved more problematic in the face of unconventional warfare. Risk-averse societies became more aware of the use of NCW as a political discourse to present the contemporary war as more humane.

In the end, the concept of Network Centric Warfare should not be seen as a revolution in military affairs. It should be approached as a force multiplier; hence, this concept should be developed under the light of real threats. The necessities on the ground should lead the process of military transformation and future doctrine, rather than an ideational construct.

1 Gray, Colin S. (1999) Modern Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP), pg. 200
2 Quoted from Gray (1999), pg. 200-1
3 Quoted from ibid, pg. 201
4 Parker, Geoffrey (1995) "In Defence of the Military Revolution" in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press), pg. 349
5 Clausewitz, Carl von (1989) On War Indexed Edition. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans. & eds.) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP), Book 1, ch. 1
6 Murray and Knox (2001), pg 13
7 Murray and Knox (2001), pg. 13
8 See Blaker, James R. (2007) Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare (Westport, Connecticut & London: Praeger Security International), pp. 18-20
9 See Betz, David J. (2006) "The More You Now, the Less You Understand: The Problem with Information Warfare" Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 506-7
10 Mcmaster, H.R. (2008) "On War: Lessons to be Learned' Survival, Vol.50, No.1, pg. 19
11 Betz (2006), pg. 507
12 Betz (2006), pg. 514
13 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defence Policy (Strategic Studies Inst. monograph, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nov. 2002) quoted from Betz, pg. 521
14 Reynolds, Kevin P. (2006) "Building the Future Force: Challenges to Getting Military Transformation Right" Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 27 No. 3 pg. 452
15 Mcmaster (2008), pg. 22
16 Betz (2006), pg. 520
17 ibid, pg 521
18 Rebecca Grant "An Air Force Like no Other" Air Force Magazine On-Line 85/11 (Nov. 2002), 32, www.afa.org/magazine/nov2002/1102airwar.pdf quoted from Betz , pg. 521
19 See Kagan, Robert (2004) "Too Few Troops" Weekly Standard, April 26
20 Reynolds (2006), pg. 452
21 See Buley, Benjamin (2008) The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political Utility of Force (London & New York: Routledge)