Turkey, one of the key actors in the Middle East, is in the midst of a difficult, yet decisive, process towards the resolution of the nearly 100 year old Kurdish problem. The debate gained momentum when Turkish President Abdullah Gül remarked in March that "good things will happen concerning the Kurdish problem in the days ahead" and it has now reached a point of no return with the more recent and concerted steps taken by the government. Over the past few months, Beşir Atalay, Turkey's Minister of Internal Affairs, initiated a round of consultation meetings with NGOs, analysts and opposition party leaders. Prime Minister Erdoğan, despite turning down previous requests by Ahmet Tűrk, the leader of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, or DTP) which is the political wing of the Worker's Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan, or PKK), finally met with him in August under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Although officially Erdoğan met with the DTP leader not in his capacity as Turkey's Prime Minister but as leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), this in no way diminishes the symbolic meaning of the meeting.

Despite the flurry of confidence-building talks and steps taken since the beginning of the process, the Turkish government has failed to provide a clear road map about the course of the initiative. What was at first vocalized as the ‘Kurdish initiative' by Erdoğan was replaced after a while with the phrase, "Democratic initiative." This immediately prompted some observers to raise questions over the initiative's chances of resolving the complicated web of problems when reference to the Kurdish component seemed problematic from the onset. From the government perspective, the change in terminology appears to be intended to emphasize the plan's reconciliatory intentions, and its all embracing and solidarity-based character.

The Kurdish initiative was first discussed at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting in August. The NSC is Turkey's top advisory organ and convenes bi-monthly, bringing top military and government leaders together under the chairmanship of the President. Its declaration in support of the initiative was taken as a watershed moment marking a convergence of opinion between the civilian and military wings.

But PKK attacks in late August and early September created a dynamite effect, threatening to blow up the very foundations of the initiative. Acutely aware of this, Erdoğan condemned the attacks as a "sabotage to the initiative". In fact, the attacks were the PKK's attempt to be recognized as the rightful and legitimate party that should be taken into account in any government effort to address the Kurdish problem. This goes hand in hand with the DTP's defiant urging that the PKK's imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan be treated as a party to the resolution of the problem. The Turkish government, on the other hand, has harshly rejected calls to that end. For Erdoğan, the democratically elected DTP is the legitimate counterpart and negotiating figure in efforts to carry the democratic initiative forward.

What has been presented as concrete steps since the beginning of the process remain ambiguous in their nature. Preparations involving the provision of Kurdish-language university level education come at the top of the agenda. Although there was an interest in establishing a Kurdish Department at Artuklu University in Turkey's Southeastern province of Mardin, Turkey's Council of Higher Education was unable to reach an immediate decision. But on September 10, after an eight hour deliberation, the council decided on the creation of a "Turkey's Living Languages Institute" at the university. At the institute, which is planned to open in February 2010, education may also be given in Farsi, Syriac, Laz, Arabic and Armenian as well as Kurdish. The legal reason why approval for a Kurdish only department could not be granted is the Turkish Constitution of 1982 where Article 3 states that the official language of Turkey is Turkish. Article 4 forbids the proposal to change Article 3. Under these conditions, the introduction of Kurdish language education in public schools is problematic: theoretically speaking, can it be treated as a foreign language or as a second official language? Taking this scenario one step further, if Kurdish were to be taught as a foreign language, which country's language would this be? Turkey still cautiously refers to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq as the "Kurdish Regional Government" for a number of interlinked reasons having to do with political habit, restraint and sensitivities across a number of fault lines.

The Turkish Military's Approach

The Turkish Military joined in the debate by bringing a new dimension to the definition of Turkishness. The Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug opened a new window when he said "The people of Turkey who founded the Republic of Turkey are called the Turkish Nation". In the past, using the phrase "people of Turkey" was problematic even for civilians since the term was perceived by some to insinuate that peoples or nations other than the Turks lived in Turkey and this was met with harsh opposition. The irony is that the current Turkish government comes from this conservative tradition.

Parties to the Solution?

During the first whirlwind days of the initiative, announced at a press conference by the Minister of Interior Affairs Atalay, Ankara's political agenda was occupied with workshops, meetings, and a flurry of supportive as well as skeptical statements made by government officials and parliamentarians on the matter. The Prime Minister's speech at his party's group meeting and his last "Address to the Nation" contained almost unprecedented criticisms of the state's Kurdish policy to date and signaled a commitment to alter the existing paradigm. But it was not too long before the government hit the brakes, coming under pressure by resistance mobilized by opposition parties, coupled with DTP's backtracking into increasingly radical rhetoric.

Despite criticising the initiative from the beginning for a variety of reasons, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) Deniz Baykal, nevertheless avoided shutting the door on it completely. The declaration of the AKP leader that he would like to meet with CHP in person and that he would insist on this may be an indication that the meeting is likely to take place at some point. This would give the CHP the upper hand.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli has expressed that his party will not be part of this initiative in any way. With this harsh stance, Bahçeli aims to consolidate his influence in the rural areas of Anatolia, where AKP and MHP voters are generally intermixed and hopes to even win over elements of the CHP voter bloc. The success of this strategy is inversely proportional to the success of the Kurdish initiative. If the government succeeds, to some extent at least, in the Kurdish initiative, the MHP's plan could back fire. However, in case of the opposite, the MHP may ultimately stand to gain from its failure.

Chief of Turkey's General Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug broke his silence regarding the government-sponsored initiative with a written statement on the occasion of the August 30 Victory Day celebrations, making red lines even bolder. Although the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has maintained its silence since that day, rumours are that this did not make the government's job any easier. We can at least conclude that the TSK is not involved in the initiative "actively."

The DTP, on the other hand, was supportive of the initiative at the beginning, until they realised that the PKK and Ocalan were pushed to the curb, which caused them to shift to a more radical discourse. However, when those who are in charge of the initiative, as well as its supporters strongly criticised DTP's behaviour, and even Ocalan said "they do not know what they are doing"; DTP had to reconsider its tone.

The specifics of any roadmap under formal discussion at the government level and debated at the NSC meeting are still opaque, but the following measures may be among those that were or are under review:

The fundamental condition: Disarmament
The primary and preliminary expectation of both the Turkish government and public is the complete disarmament of the PKK. However, the insistence of the PKK and DTP that the burden of responsibility is on the government to take the necessary steps first has done nothing to move beyond the present deadlock. This has severely restricted Erdoğan's range of motion. Achieving or even attempting other political measures is contingent on the meeting of the disarmament requirement first. Unfortunately, the PKK, despite declaring a unilateral ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadan, continued its attacks during this period.
Evacuation of Mahmur camp

After the Gulf War, for various reasons, a number of Turkish Kurds immigrated to northern Iraq and settled in Mahmur Camp, which is close to the Turkey-Iraq border. According to UN data, the population of the camp is 11,350. The camp has operated and expanded for the past 11 years as PKK's logistical and militant recruitment base. In 2004, Turkey and the US-Iraq government signed an agreement for the closing of Mahmur and the resettlement of the population. However, the terms of the agreement were never put into operation. Today, Turkey wants Mahmur, which has become a base for the PKK, to be evacuated by the United Nationals High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The legal rights of those living in the camp including their Iraqi spouses and children, will be guaranteed by Ankara.

Expansion of Kurdish broadcasting

Turkey has taken several concrete steps in resolving the Kurdish problem over the last 10 years, motivated in part by the European Union accession process. One of the most striking examples is that TRT, the state broadcasting corporation, launched a Kurdish-language television channel earlier this year. The broadcast of TRT Şeş (Şeş means six in Kurdish) may be expanded as part of the initiative package.

Revising the elementary school curriculum

This may involve discussions to lift the oath that elementary school students read everyday across the country (with its emphasis on citizenship responsibilities on the basis of Turkishness).

Teaching Kurdish as an elective course

Without requiring any legal or constitutional changes, the Ministry of Education could include Kurdish in the official curriculum as an elective course like English, drama, soccer, media or information technology courses. This may complement government plans to build an additional 200 schools in heavily Kurdish-populated Southeastern Anatolia.

Empowering local authorities

Through a framework of legal reforms initiated through the EU process, steps may be taken to support decentralization within the unitary state structure, while ensuring the localization of democratic processes at all levels of government. Most of the provinces in Southeast Anatolia are currently ruled by the DTP.

Amnesty

A comprehensive amnesty may be issued for PKK terrorists who are based in the mountains of Turkey or in northern Iraq. For this to happen, the scope of Article 221 of the Turkish Penal Code may be made more encompassing or its better functioning guaranteed. This may mean that terrorists who have not committed a crime may be granted amnesty in Turkey and the leadership cadre of the PKK sent to exile in a third country (possibly in Scandinavia).

Possible Scenarios...

...Should the Kurdish Initiative Succeed

If the process succeeds the possible outcomes, in light of the Turkish government's expectations, could be as follows:

1. Decades-old PKK terrorism would finally come to an end;
2. Funds that have been spent for internal security and the battle with terrorism could be shifted for investments in human security and broad-based development projects;
3. Economic, social, cultural and political cooperation between Turkey-Iraq-Syria would be based on more solid ground;
4. Turkey would be better positioned to achieve its regional development targets and sustainable progress could be achieved in closing regional gaps in terms of opportunity, stability and economic empowerment;
5. Turkey and northern Iraq could improve trade and economic ties and eventually constitute a joint economic zone;
6. Turkey's EU accession process would gain momentum;
7. The AKP would lose some votes in Western and Central Anatolia;
8. While the current Turkish administration would claim that it displayed the long-absent political will to finally resolve the long standing Kurdish problem, the PKK would claim that the Turkish state finally gave in to their demands;
9. Turkish troops numbering approximately 230,000 throughout the Iraqi and Syrian borders would be scaled back;
10. The Turkish Armed Forces could be more flexible in its defence procurement; shift to a semi-professional army, and decrease troop numbers.

...Should the Kurdish Initiative Fail

The Status Quo Continues...

1. Terrorist attacks would continue to disrupt progress and more lives would be lost;
2. The Turkish Armed Forces would carry on the combat against terrorism;
3. Relations between Turkey and Iraq would experience ups and downs;
4. Obstacles could be experienced in the transportation of Iraqi oil and natural gas to the West;
5. While social and cultural steps for Turkish Kurds would be maintained, they would be vulnerable to debate;
6. The AKP leadership would accuse those who support the status quo for impeding progress while the PKK would claim that the government lacked the necessary political resolve to get the job done from the get go;
7. Political pressure would mount against DTP and AKP and both parties would lose votes; and
8. Turkey's EU accession would be held in abeyance.

Civil War...

The process in 1990-93 and the process since 2003 show surprising commonalities. We have to consider a possible civil war scenario from this perspective. Following the Gulf War, the PKK moved out of the Syria controlled region and settled in northern Iraq, consolidated its strength and launched its attacks from here.

The main reason that created such conditions was the authority vacuum in northern Iraq. The main factor behind this was the UNSC's 688 resolution dated 5 April 1991, which ended the Iraqi central government's authority above the 36th parallel. The protection of this region was given to US, British and French coalition forces that were deployed in Southeastern Turkey. The force, consisting of 77 airplane and helicopter and 1862 personnel based in Incirlik (Adana) and Pirinclik (Malatya), was accused of providing logistical support to the PKK by Turkish military authorities and politicians. During that period, Turkish General Eşref Bitlis, who was responsible for counter-terrorism operations, died in an airplane crash, prompting allegations of assassination. The issue was brought before the court and investigators examined the possibility of assassination in the expert report prepared for the Turkish Armed Forces. Gen. Bitlis's report to the President on American, British and French logistical support to the PKK was brought to the attention of the authorities.

The PKK, which solidified its presence in 1992 in northern Iraq, planned a civil uprising in Turkey's Southeast. With Abdullah Ocalan's order, named "Arguments for Uprising Tactics and Our Mission" dated 17 January 1992, the uprising was initiated in August. According to PKK's strategy, the provinces of Elazığ Bingől, Muş, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Batman and Bitlis, where the Kurdish population is high, would be surrounded by the PKK through the mountains. Militants in the cities would open fire on the Turkish security forces from civilian populated areas, and upon the return fire of Turkish security forces, the uprising would be mobilized with the claim that the "Turkish Army opened fire on civilians". The militants based in the mountains would then come to the rescue and take control of these cities. This strategy was put into action but failed.

Following this in 1993, the PKK request for a ceasefire and disarmament entered the agenda. The owner of the request at the time was Celal Talabani, who was one of the top political leaders in northern Iraq at the time and Iraq's current President.

After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan by Turkey, terrorist attacks came to a visible standstill between 1997 and 2003. However, terrorism reared its ugly head again with more frequent and deadly attacks with the occupation of Iraq. Turkey accused the US of supporting the PKK and respectable Turkish newspapers published photographs of American officials and PKK terrorists in northern Iraq during this period.

With the escalation of terrorism, the issue of a political resolution within the US-Turkey-Iraq triangle emerged with more urgency. The PKK declared a ceasefire for some time and announced its wish for an "honourable peace". The current initiative is the result of this historical process. However, if the initiative fails, civil war may be one of the possible scenarios:

- PKK attacks would increase and the Turkish Army would intensify its operations;
- A State of Emergency would be resumed in the region;
- The Turkey-Iraq border would be closed;
- The Turkish Army would initiate operations in northern Iraq and establish forward bases there;
- Turkey would be forced to come head to head with the US and Iraq;
- The PKK would try to escape to Iran;
- The possibility of a new alliance between Iran and Turkey would gain prominence;
- Improved relations over the last three years between Turkey and Iraq would be destroyed;
- DTP would be shut down (Turkey's Constitutional Court still has a case for the closure of the party on its agenda);
- MPs from DTP would be stripped of their immunities and arrested;
- The PKK would spread its operations to the West of Turkey;
- Increased nationalism in the Western provinces of Turkey could result in ethnic-based violence (the majority of the Kurdish population lives in rich Western cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya, Bursa, Sakarya etc.)
- Prime Minister Erdoğan would be forced to hold early elections and lose;
- Relations between the EU and Turkey would break down, and Ankara would face debilitating political pressure;
- The West would apply an arms embargo against Turkey;
- Turkey could close its military bases to the US troops withdrawing from Iraq (just like the 1 March 2003 parliamentary decision);
- Turkey's NATO membership would be subject to debate;
- The NABUCCO project would collapse; and
- Turkey would distance itself from the Western block and become closer to Russia, China, India and Iran.
Turkey is changing its skin, largely due to the changing global balance of power. The most stubborn hurdle standing in the way of this transformation seems to be the issue of PKK terrorism and the Kurdish problem. In the last 10 years, Ankara has taken serious steps in resolving its Kurdish issue. Even the Turkish Armed Forces has begun a process of review and re-thinking of strategy. The Turkish government has passed the point of no return. Perceiving Turkey through the 1980s Cold War lens would be misleading. Outside interventions in Turkey's domestic handling of this issue from such a misplaced and outdated perspective would cause the opposite reaction from what is intended. In the new political configurations and balancing acts that define 21st century realities, which Turkey and its allies have been trying to revise after the 1990s, Turkey has assumed a different role. Turkey has transformed from a state that was inclined to be discouraged and retreat into passivity into a state that is a rising regional power. The final destination that the current process takes Turkey is one where just like 35 years ago, it will make its own decisions on its own terms.

Turkey's real democratisation problem is not over the expansion of individual cultural rights but rather the elimination of the remnants of an ancient feudal system that still forces Turkey to have one foot in the past while the other is firmly rooted in the future. But who will achieve this: the powerbrokers and representatives of this backwards feudalism or the advocates of modern Turkey's democratic values?