During both the first and second Chechen Wars, Turkey was among the states that were harshly accused by Moscow for lending support to insurgents. The latest terrorist attacks in the Northern Caucasus should be viewed from within this framework. There are two points that are inherent in the timing of the attacks:
1-Just before the attacks Russian Prime Minister Putin made a historical visit to Turkey;
2-During the days when the attacks intensified in scale, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was holding a meeting, the third in the short span of one year, with the Russian leadership.
Consequently, escalated violence in the Caucasus target Turkey's efforts to achieve regional stability-and important diplomatic priority for Turkey which has close kinship relations with the region. The reliance of the terrorist groups on Islamist discourse, as well as the fact that Turkey is home to the largest population of Caucasian Diaspora in the region means that Turkey has a stake in the resolution of the issue of extremism threatening to further destabilize the region. The conflict in Chechnya over the past years has pitted Turkey and Russia against each other. In the past, money and militia were rallied for the Chechen insurgency in Turkey, prompting Moscow to accuse Ankara of supporting the situation. But circumstances today are starkly different from the 1990s. Approximately five thousand Turkish workers go to Russia annually to work. The death of a Turkish worker in the terrorist attack on 27 July in the Caucasus is a solid example of how closely Turkey must be paying attention to the events unfolding there.
The evolving strategic partnership between Russia and Germany is also among the targets of the militant strikes. That the terrorists, who claim to be acting in the name of Islam, have declared economic facilities and schemes as their targets is significant. Russia and Germany have been intensifying economic and political cooperation to jointly combat the economic crisis and rebound relatively quickly. The trade volume between the two countries is 68 billion Euros.
The escalated attacks over the last two months are an outcome of Russia's regional policies. They are a violent response against both maturing Russia-Germany and Russia-Turkey relations.
A Changing Climate
If we take this as our point of departure, it is clear now that the tone of relations between Turkey and Russia has changed significantly over time, and improved steadily on several levels since Putin's visit to Turkey in 2004. Such a climate is in the best interest of both sides. In simple terms, this is the practical application of what should be a natural relationship defined by cooperation between two major partners who have a say in the fate of the region. A reminder of the timeline of high level bilateral visits between Turkey and Russia, all in 2009, is enough to show the level of interest in expanding strategic cooperation between the two states:
- Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to Moscow in February;
- The May meeting between the two Prime Ministers in Sochi;
- The visit of the Head of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to the Russian Federation in late June;
- The visit of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Energy to the Russian Federation in early July;
- The Joint Economic Commission meeting and Putin's recent visit in August.

Turkey-Russia Nuclear Cooperation
Putin signed 20 agreements during his visit to Turkey in August. Moreover, these agreements concern significant projects in the energy sector, and most notably, marked Turkey's support to the Kremlin-backed South Stream pipeline project. With the agreements, NABUCCO has lost whatever claim it had to being a viable project.
Turkey is moving closer to establishing what is anticipated to be a long term partnership with Russia on its nuclear program. A Russian-Turkish consortium won the bidding for construction of the planned nuclear power plant in Turkey. In addition to the private sector's role, the state-run Türkiye Elektrik Ticaret ve Taahhüt A.Ş. (TETAŞ - Turkey Electricity Trade and Guarantee Public Company) will join the project with a 25% share. According to Turkish officials, a 30 year long Turkish-Russian cooperation arrangement has been set in motion on Turkey's nuclear program.
Both sides are content with the improving state of relations. A reciprocal sentiment of trust is beginning to increasingly define the tone of the conversation. There are no problems on the political front. In the economy and energy areas, there is an incredible potential for cooperation. The leadership on both sides are in a position to pragmatically and objectively understand their common interests, and the recently signed package of agreements on a variety of issues during Putin's visit is a reflection of this.
There are two points worth making:
1-In order to realize the potential for expanded and strategic cooperation, the government bureaucracy on both sides has a pivotal role to play. The Russian bureaucracy certainly needs to do its part, which essentially means carefully examining and understanding the Russian leadership's perception of Turkey. The agreements that were recently signed on the Samsun-Ceyhan and Blue Stream 2 projects should be put into practice-postponement would damage the current climate. The customs problems between Turkey and Russia should also be resolved.
2-Turkey is an integral part of Russian foreign policy and the reverse is equally true. Maintaining and building upon improved bilateral relations and establishing reciprocal dependency on the basis of shared goals will serve the best interest of both sides in the long term. To move beyond tactics to long term strategies for the region, both sides should perceive of the other within this framework. Opting instead for one-sided dependency and shortsighted attempts to undermine the other's interests will result in new bottlenecks-and threatens to destabilize an important partnership.
If relations are to continue on a positive trend, this is possible on the basis of mutually beneficial policy ‘packages.' At this point, meticulous, conscious and accommodating behavior on both sides is critical.
The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 directly affected Turkey. While Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Georgia, it has trade relations with Abkhazia, which declared its independence from Georgia. Tbilisi has seized merchant ships travelling from Turkey to Abkhazia in order to prevent the trade. Approximately 100 Turkish merchant ships that were seized by Georgia have forced Ankara's hand to re-evaluate its Caucasus policy.
Russia's Approach
The Russian leadership perceives relations with Turkey as solid and long-term. The appointment of Igor Sechin, Russia's deputy premier responsible for energy and a close ally of Putin, to the position of co-chair of the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Commission is a reflection of this outlook. The accelerated pace of bilateral economic and energy cooperation following his selection is an indication that a good choice has been made.
Surely, while Russia is emphasizing the role of the United Nations as part of the discourse on a multi-polar international structure, it practices a policy of balancing the role of the United States and NATO through improving bilateral relations with Western states. One of the main pillars of such an approach clearly involves Turkey. Consequently, improving relations with Turkey is not a tactical move but a strategic choice; therefore, the current level of relations is not a coincidence. On the other hand, if Russia continues to define its relations with Turkey only in these terms, there will be problems down the line. Mutual interests should be the central feature laying out the future of relations, and an "us versus them" kind of imposition must be avoided. If it is not, then the understanding of a trusted partnership may be irrevocably harmed, with the result that both sides will be at a loss.