NATO, having completed its 22nd summit in Bucharest last month, continues to search for a new raison d'être and direction following the end of the Cold War. The intensity of this search becomes apparent with the frequency of summits held after the Cold War (12 in 18 years) as compared to the number held during the Cold War (10 in 41 years). Deep-rooted changes in the security environment during the last two decades appear to be the main mobilising force behind NATO's quest.
Transformation of the Security Environment
The most important transformation in the field of security is the change in the concept of threat, which constitutes the basis for security policies. The possibility of large-scale international wars diminished with the end of the Cold War, whereas "new threats", which have in reality always existed but which never drew much attention during the Cold War, have become more important.
The list of "new threats", that now follow the same pattern in all recent security reports, leads with that of terrorism, then the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), weapons smuggling, human and drug trafficking, micro-nationalism, ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, organised crime, environmental issues and resource problems/conflicts.
The contemporary perception of what constitutes a threat for the West has been shaped primarily by two events; the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks in 2001. The former primarily affected Europe's; the latter affected the United States' threat perceptions. Consequently, this was reflected by a separate direction in their security policies. The United States opted for a strategy that is based on the use of military power, if necessary unilaterally, with pre-emptive strikes on potential threats, as implemented in Iraq. On the other hand, the European Security Strategy, although it shares the United States' perspective on the threats, has opted for a non-military approach that prioritises the use of soft power, and envisages projecting stability and implementing a preventative engagement doctrine . NATO's new security strategy appears to be closer to the Bush doctrine of taking action against potential threats, irrespective of when or where in the world . Threats should be neutralised while at a distance and beforehand. The concept of Security has replaced the concept of Defence.
These "new threats", as described above, mostly emanate from under- developed regions of the world, which in the main is a Muslim geography, also widely known as the Broader Middle East and North Africa.
The strategic void created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union is another example of the most important changes brought on by the end of the Cold War, and which was swiftly filled by the United States in the unipolar world that lead to the United States' ambition to re-shape the Middle East region, which has two third's of the world oil reserves. As the biggest and strongest member of NATO, the United States reflects NATO policies in line with its national policies.
Why Has NATO Survived?
After the end of the Cold war, the most important security concern in the Euro-Atlantic region was whether or not NATO survives, despite losing its raison d'être. In a Darwinian sense, NATO survives by evolving in accordance with the changing (security) environment.
NATO's survival after the Cold War was dependent on three important reasons; (1) the United States' desire to preserve close ties with Europe, (2) the failure of Europe to form an effective security organisation within the European Union and (3) that NATO, with 59 years of experience, appears to be the most effective and constant security alliance for its member countries that are under risk from the above mentioned "new threats".
The United States' dominance over Eurasia would have to continue in order for the American Empire, which rose as the sole superpower from the Cold War, to perpetuate through to the next century, as mentioned in Brzezinski's book "The Grand Chessboard" . Europe is the most important bridgehead of the United States in Eurasia. The protection of this bridgehead by the United States is important because it stops Europeans from producing independent policies from the United States and prevents Europe from becoming a counterweight to US power. Furthermore, Europe becomes a springboard for the United States to project its power to regions that are gaining importance (the Middle East and Central Asia). As mentioned in Brzezinski's "The Choice" , the only power that could cooperate with the United States in the Broader Middle East project is Europe (NATO). The only problem is whether or not Europe is willing to participate in this type of co-operation.
NATO's most important problem, from an American perspective, is the unwillingness shown by the European allies to help in security matters as much as the United States would like. In 2007, the United States paid 630 billion dollars (68%) of the total 928 billion dollars of the NATO defence budget . The European Union has not developed an independent military power that is consistent with its economic and political power. Although European allies of NATO have 2.4 million soldiers, only 55,000 soldiers (2%) can be deployed out of Europe. Big gaps exist between the US and European allies in key military abilities, like strategic deployment, air refuelling and smart bombs. This situation creates, as mentioned by Secretary General Robertson, a usability gap, which results in overdependence on the US.
The difference in military abilities between the US and the Europeans is not the only problem; allies sometimes experience problems in security matters also. An example of these problems is NATO's difficulty in finding combat troops to fight against Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
In an environment where the capability of the UN in the area of security is compromised and where the EU is unable to construct an effective security organisation, NATO, with its 59 years of experience and regardless of the above mentioned problems, continues to be an effective military alliance. A shared military culture, which has been developed over many years, standardisation, interoperability and knowledge of shared abilities, cannot be easily undermined.
How NATO Managed to Survive
While NATO continued its survival for the above given reasons, it was the ability to evolve around the following issues within a changing security environment that enabled it to succeed.
New Strategic Concept
According to NATO's new strategic concept, which was drafted during the Rome Summit 1991 and finalised in the Washington Summit 1999, the role of collective security for members was emphasised and did not change. The political dimension of security was given more importance to come in line with the military dimension of the alliance and coupled with this the close cooperation with non-member states that share in the common aims of the alliance.
Essential elements of the concept are :
• The preservation of transatlantic links
• The development of effective military capabilities for new tasks
• The development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the alliance
• The prevention of clashes and importance of crisis management
• Partnership, cooperation and dialogue with all states whether or not the member of the alliance but who share the aims of the alliance
• The formation of an enlargement strategy
• Principles for new force and command structures
Within the 9 years of endorsement of the strategic concept, NATO has gained valuable experiences from operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq and in light of these experiences NATO has begun the construction of a new strategic concept.
New Area of Operation
During the Cold War era, one of the most debated issues within NATO was, as a defence alliance, whether or not to intervene in non-member states, in other words, out of area operations. However, in the new security environment this debate has faded out and at the NATO Ministerial Meetings, Meetings of Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik, May 2002, the decision was made to intervene anywhere that a threat exists .

The first out of area operations for NATO, however, occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995, for the implementation of the Dayton Accords and then in Kosovo, 1999, to stop the Serbian massacre of Albanians. Out of area operations of NATO proliferated as the alliance assisted Poland, who participated in the Iraq War, to form a force, assist in communications, logistics and transfers and helped in the training of Iraqi security forces. Finally, in August 2003 NATO extended out of the Europe-Atlantic area and assumed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command in Afghanistan. After this there was no longer a geographical barrier for the operations that NATO took on.
Enlargement
Founded in 1949 with 12 states, during the Cold War era NATO had three enlargements, Turkey and Greece in 1952, Germany in 1955 and in 1982 Spain. The most significant enlargement happened after the Cold War with acceptance of 10 new members. Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, made up the fourth wave in 1999 then the three Baltic States along with Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, made up the fifth wave in 2004, increasing the number of members to 26. At the Bucharest Summit, Albania and Croatia were invited to membership for the sixth wave of enlargement. With the acceptance of these states, membership numbers will rise to 28. Moreover, at the Bucharest Summit, the membership of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was postponed until the resolution of the name problem with Greece, and, despite the lack of a date as yet, membership has been promised to Ukraine and Georgia.
The main reasons behind enlargement in the post-Cold War era are; (1) filling the strategic void left after the collapse of the Soviet Union, (2) to get closer to crisis regions by moving towards the East and (3) controlling the Russian Federation.
Enlargement is not only about having new members, but also, in accordance with the strategic concept, which points out that the security of NATO is linked to stability in the neighbouring regions, enlargement is seen as the spread of stability to those regions. Consequently, in 1994, the Peace for Partnership (PfP) initiative began, and partnership status has been agreed with 23 states, thus cooperation with those states has been institutionalised.
NATO has developed its cooperation with Russia, which started with PfP in 1994, and developed in 1997 to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council as a decision-making mechanism on security matters.
In a similar fashion, the NATO-Ukraine Commission has been established through the development of a special relationship with Ukraine.
The Mediterranean Dialogue, which was initiated in 1994, is another important cooperation channel with non-member/partner states. Dialogue with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria was established in accordance with the belief that the security of NATO is inseparable from the security of the Mediterranean region. Dialogue encompasses such matters as; bilateral talks, training support, civilian crisis management and scientific support.
In addition, during the Istanbul Summit 2004, special relationships were established with six Gulf States under the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
Furthermore, the number and diversity of relations increased with the granting of a "Global Partnership" status to states that are non-member/partner but participated in NATO operations. Comprising of 65 states in varying statuses, NATO has become a "collective security organisation", more like a mini-UN, rather than an alliance.
The New Command and Force Structure
NATO, in accordance with the new security environment, changed its command structure; two strategic commands were reduced to one, five regional operational commands were reduced to two, thirteen sub-regional commands were reduced to six and the total number of headquarters decreased from 20 to 11. Consequently, NATO has achieved a command structure that is simple and enables easy decision making.
Similar changes were made in force structure. High readiness and lower readiness multi-national Corps headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force, for joint operations with non-member states, and a NATO Response Force, a 20,000 force for rapid intervention to crisis regions, have been established.
Bucharest Summit
Afghanistan, enlargement and the deployment of a Missile Defence System in Europe proved to be highly debated issues at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by Heads of State and Government, which was held in Bucharest on 2nd - 4th April.
The primary issue at the summit was that of NATO forces in Afghanistan. The primary aim of the United States was to get re-enforcements for the US, British and Canadian troops, who were fighting against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the South of the country. The plan was to get a 700-strong French force to be sent to the Eastern part of the country, thus releasing the US forces in that sector to the South which would then encourage Canada to change its decision of withdrawal from the South. However, despite threats from Bush, the United States was unable to get the support it wanted in Bucharest.
Afghanistan is important for NATO and the United States for two main reasons: for the continuation of NATO's existence and the prevention of the Taliban from gaining strength in Pakistan. If NATO were to fail in Afghanistan, where it has experienced the largest and most intense fighting since its foundation, the raison d'être and the future of the alliance would be in peril. The existence of two groups within NATO, active vs. non-participants (with a just reason) of the fighting, is an undesired situation for the United States. Furthermore, the most dangerous scenario for the United States would be if the Taliban increased their influence in Pakistan, leading to the control of the country and resulting in the acquirement of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In this case, Iran would accelerate its nuclear program, forcing the United States to confront two nuclear powers, one Sunni and the other Shiite. This situation may force the United States to improve its relations with Iran. In short, any failure in Afghanistan would result in the formation of a new balance of power.
In Bucharest, where Albania and Croatia were offered membership, the United States was unable to include Ukraine and Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). This was a result of the objection of European allies, especially France and Germany, who are afraid of the reaction of Russia.
Another issue that the United States pushed for is the deployment of a missile defence system in Eastern Europe. The United States reached its goal with the approval of the missile defence system by NATO. However, the proposed integrated NATO-US missile defence system disturbs Russia, because this system could counter Russia's most important weapons system for its security; Long-Range Ballistic Missiles. When the current and developing missiles of Iran and North Korea are taken into consideration, the suspicions, that the deployment of missile defence systems in Eastern Europe are targeting Russia rather than the above states, gains strength. Both at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council talks in Bucharest, and Bush-Putin talks in Sochi, NATO and the United States tried to relieve the concerns of Russia.
Russia played an important role as a key player in the decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit.

Conclusion
NATO, which is preparing for its 60th anniversary, experienced a significant transformation, changing from a "defence alliance" of 1949 to a post-Cold War collective security organisation that is being used for the United States' quest for global hegemony. The most evident indication of NATO being used by the US is the overlap of agendas of the Bucharest Summit and the global hegemony agenda of the United States.
The difference between the United States and European allies on capabilities and the failure of European allies to commit as much as the United States wishes, emanates negative signals about the future of the alliance. How long the United States can sustain its current load of responsibilities is questionable. The stagnation of the US economy, casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, failure to reach its goals despite the economic cost, and inexistence of a timetable, are all indicators to the failure of the Great Middle East project. This situation brings up the question of "like all the other empires in history, has the United States fallen into the overextension trap?" Loss of power by the US would mean the end of NATO.
Although, the Cold War is said to have ended, the United States, China, Russia and Europe are fighting their own secret Cold War. The rise of rival powers to the United States through this struggle, which signifies a transition to a multi-polar system, will define NATO's position within the new balance of power.
The most important problem, the weakening of solidarity between NATO's member states, is that NATO members do not have a shared understanding of the "new threats". The shared threat perception of the members during the Cold War successfully held the alliance together. Currently, however, starting with terrorism, there is no agreed definition, let alone a shared threat perception. For instance, some European members of NATO, nowadays, are protecting the ethnic separatist threat that Turkey, which protected NATO's South flank for the last 40 years, is facing . The Court of Justice of the European Communities accepted a case which was filed by the terrorist organisation, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (the PKK), and is removing it from the list of recognised terrorist organisations . The United States is preventing and restricting Turkey from enforcing its rights according to International Law on Northern Iraq. On the other hand, the United States, rather than making Afghanistan the center of gravity in the war against terrorism, chose to make petrol rich Iraq as the center of gravity in order to establish global hegemony. They are now using NATO to correct their error.
In short, relations between Turkey and NATO became one-sided and against Turkey's interests after the end of the Cold War. NATO does not provide any extra security for Turkey's vital interests. Turkey should evaluate recent multilateral opportunities and review its Turkey-NATO (and Turkey-US) relationships.

Endnotes
I) The Council of European Union (2003) "A Secure Europe in a Better World" http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 14.04.2008
II) NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2006) "NATO Handbook" http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf 14.04.2008
III) Basic Books (1998)
IV) Basic Books, New Ed edition (2005)
V) NATO Official Website http://www.nato.int/ 14.04.2008
VI) "NATO Handbook"
VII) NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers Reykjavik Iceland (14-15 May 2002) http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-icl/0205-icl.htm 14.04.2008
VIII) "PKK'ya yardım eden NATO üyesi Avrupa ülkeleri var" (PKK gets help from some NATO member European States) A Statement from Chief of Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt. Hürriyet, 22.05.2007
IX) PKK and KNK v Council of European Commission, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Commission of the European Communities, C-229/05 P
(The Court of Justice of European Communities, 2007)